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GLOBALIZATION AND TRANSNATIONAL ISLAMIC EDUCATION: The Role of Turkish Muslim Diaspora in Indonesian Islam

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Abstract

Globalization and the development of communications have enabled increased the spead of ideas and people across the Islamic world and establishing new forms, including transnational Islamic movements. Indonesia, as the country with the largest Muslim majority, has attracted Islamic activists from accross the globe. What is little known is that some of the most active transnational Islamic movements in Indonesia in recent years originated from Turkey. This journal article introduces an ethnographic study of lesser known of the major Turkish transnational Islamic organizations which have established in Indonesia: the Süleymancıs, the Nurchu, and the Gulen Affiliated Movements. This study will elaborate the role of the organization, particularly in the establishemnet of the Islamic education institutions with distinct characteristics of Turkish transnational Islamic movement. To understand the movements in context, the author benefit from the 'opportunity spaces' theory which has introduced by Hakan Yavuz when studying the Turkish Muslim movements in Turkey.

Keywords: Turkish Diaspora in Indonesia, Islamic education, Islam and globalization,

Abstrak

Globalisasi dan perkembangan komunikasi telah memungkinkan peningkatan sebaran gagasan dan orang-orang di seluruh dunia Islam dan kemudian membentuk gerakan-gerakan Islam trans-nasional. Indonesia, sebagai negara dengan mayoritas Muslim terbesar, telah menarik aktivis Islam dari seluruh dunia. Beberapa gerakan Islam trans-nasional paling aktif di Indonesia dalam beberapa tahun terakhir berasal dari Turki. Artikel jurnal ini memperkenalkan studi etnografi tentang organisasi Islam transnasional Turki yang telah didirikan di Indonesia: Süleymancıs, Nurchu, dan Gerakan Afiliasi Gulen. Studi ini akan menguraikan peran organisasi, terutama dalam mendirikan lembaga pendidikan Islam dengan karakteristik berbeda dari gerakan Islam transnasional Turki. Untuk memahami gerakan Islam tersebut dalam konteks, penulis meminjam teori 'opportunity spaces' yang telah diperkenalkan oleh Hakan Yavuz ketika mempelajari gerakan Muslim Turki.

Keywords: Turki, gerakan Islam, pendidikan Islam, globalisasi.

الملخص

جعلت العولمة وتطور الاتصالات من الممكن زيادة توزيع الأفكار والناس في جميع أنحاء العالم الإسلامي ومن ثم تشكيل الحركات الإسلامية عبر الوطنية. لقد اجتذبت إندونيسيا، كدولة أغلب سكانها مسلمون الناشطين المسلمين من جميع أنحاء العالم. بعض أكثر الحركات الإسلامية عبر الوطنية نشاطا في إندونيسيا -في السنوات الأخيرة-، نشأت من تركيا.

تقدم هذه المقالة دراسة إثنوغرافية للمنظمات الإسلامية التركية عبر الوطنية التي أنشئت في إندونيسيا: Süleymancıs، Nurchu، وحركة غولن. توضح هذه الدراسة دور المنظمة ، خاصة في إنشاء مؤسسات تعليمية إسلامية ذات خصائص مختلفة عن الحركة الإسلامية عبر الوطنية التركية. لفهم الحركة الإسلامية في السياق ، يتم استخدام نظرية "opportunity spaces" التي قدمها هاكان يافوز عند دراسة الحركة الإسلامية التركية.

الكلمات المفتاحية: العولمة، تطور الاتصالات، تركيا.

A. *Introduction*

Indonesia is a majority Muslim country saturated with Islamic movements. With a population of over 250 million, approximately 80% of whom are Muslim, Indonesia represents a huge market for promoters of Islamic piety, not only from the region, but from across the globe. Globalization as it is indicated with the advance in communication and traveling accrong the globe has enabled sharing ideas and moving people to work together to establish Islamic organizations.

Indonesia has long experienced Islamic influences originating from overseas, particularly from Saudi Arabia, to which millions of Indonesian Muslims make the required religious pilgrimage to Mecca every year. In addition, for centuries Muslims from Southeast Asia have travelled to the holy land, and to Al Azar University in Egypt, for religious studies. However, these are not the only ways religious influences from the Middle East have reached Indonesia. Since the early twentieth century, Islamic reform movements from the Middle East and South Asia, such as Haramayn and India, extended their influence into South East Asia through publications and Sufi movements.[1] Then in the later twentieth century, particularly

[1]Azyumardi Azra, *The Origins of Islamic Reformism in Southeast Asia : Networks of Malay-Indonesian and Middle Eastern 'Ulama' in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries* (Crows Nest, N.S.W.: Crows Nest, N.S.W. : Allen & Unwin, 2004), 6-7; Michael Francis Laffan, *The Makings of*

from the 1970s when Indonesia's 'New Order' government suppressed Islamic groups like Masjumi and Dewan Dakwah Islamiah Indonesia (DDII) it considered threats to its control, organisations like the Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia (an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood) funnelled funds from Saudi Arabia to movements, groups and projects deemed likely to promote the Islamist agendas once openly promoted by Indonesian Islamic parties such as Partai Keadilan Sejahtera.[2]

The Muslim Brotherhood was an important source of inspiration for the Tarbiyah Movement in Indonesia. The Tarbiyah Movement developed in the mid-1980s through small study groups on Indonesian campuses called halaqah. Halaqah literally means "circle" or more specifically refers to a small religious gathering in which a teacher sits surrounded by five to ten students. This trend was started in 1979 at the Masjid Salam of Bandung Technology Institute (Institute Teknologi Bandung/ITB) by Imaduddin Abdurahhim, a lecturer at the University. It is said that Abdurahhim was influenced by the ideals of the Muslim Brotherhood while he was studying in the United States. Moreover, he made contact with people who shared those ideals. The creation of the Tarbiyah Movement was heavily influenced by ideals from the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.[3]

In turn, the Tarbiyah Movement provided an important source of ideological inspiration for Jaringan Sekolah Islam Terpadu (The Integrative Islamic Schools Network). Beginning in the mid-1990s, the first Integrated Islamic schools were established by activists linked to the Tarbiyah Movement in several different cities. Luqman al Hakim SIT promotes a transnational Islam, inspired by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and linked to the Indonesian Islamic political party, Justice Party (Partai Keadilan) which later became Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (Justice and Prosperious Party/PKS).[4]

Islamic educational institutions have been key sites for the transmission of Middle Eastern influences into Indonesia. Indonesian students receive scholarships to study in Egypt (Al Azhar University) and Saudi Arabia (Ummul Qura University) and they bring the Middle Eastern influences in the education sector in Indonesia. One such example is the Institute of Islamic Knowledge of Indonesia and Arabia (LIPIA, Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesian Arab). Established in Jakata in 1980, and affiliated with the Imam Muhammad bin Saud Islamic University, this institution connects young Indonesian Muslims with Arabic networks of knowledge in the form of educational institutions and key religious figures. While global

Indonesian Islam: Orientalism and the Narration of a Sufi Past, Princeton Studies in Muslim Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2011), 24, 233.

[2]Yon Machmudi, "Islamising Indonesia the Rise of Jemaah Tarbiyah and the Prosperous Justice Party (Pks)," ANU E Press, accessed; Karen Bryner, "Piety Projects: Islamic Schools for Indonesia's Urban Middle Class" (Ph.D, Columbia University, 2013).

[3]Bryner, 101-02; Machmudi,

[4]Bryner, Abstract.

linkages to the Indonesian Muslim community are well documented,[5] relatively little academic attention has been given to the Turkish-based movements established in the late 1990s in Indonesia. The Turkish influence or connection to Indonesia has mainly shown in the Ottoman expedition to Aceh. A part from that, only little attention has been shown in the topic of Turkish in Indonesia. Neverthelese, Turkish Muslims have been playing pivotal role in the area of Islamic education. There are at least three Turkish movements active in the field of Islamic education in Indonesia: the Fethullah Gulen affiliated education institutions; the Suleymancis; and the Jama'at Nur.

The first of these Turkish movements, the Fethullah Gulen Movement, established Pribadi Junior High School in Indonesia in 1995 in conjunction with the Association of Pacific Countries in Economical and Social Solidarity (PASIAD) and the Indonesian Yenbu Foundation (Yayasan Yenbu Indonesia). The Gulen Movement in Indonesia offers primary, secondary, and tertiary level education. The Sekolah Pribadi offers primary school education, Karisma Bangsa offers high school level education, and an NGO-like institution, the Fethullah Gulen Chair, works in cooperation with the State Islamic University of Jakarta (UIN Jakarta) to provide some tertiary teaching.

The second movement, the Suleymancis Movement, is represented in Indonesia by a foundation called the United Islamic Cultural Centre of Indonesia (UICCI), founded in 2005, and the Pesantren Tahfidz Sulaimaniyah. The UICCI focuses on Islamic education, and memorizing the Quran, for primary and high school students.

The third Turkish movement that has extended its operations to Indonesia is the Jamaat Nur. Established in 2007, the Jamaat Nur disseminates the ideas of Badiuzzaman Said Nursi, the most prominent Turkish Muslim scholar of modern Turkey. In Indonesia, the activities and program of the Jamaat Nur are coordinated under the Foundation of Nur Semesta (I. Yayasan Nur Semesta).

Although these Turkish organizations were only established in Indonesia in the late 1990s, they developed rapidly and substantially by establishing networks and branches throughout Indonesia. Having different characteristics from the previously mentioned transnational movements, such as the Front Pembela Islam (FPI), the Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), the Laskar Jihad (LJ), and the Jamaah Islamiyah (JI) commonly identified as 'fundamentalist' and sometimes as 'militant', these Turkish movements exhibit a more peaceful approach to Islamic renewal and

[5]Peter G. Mandaville, ed. *Transnational Islam in South and Southeast Asia: Movements, Networks, and Conflict Dynamics* (Seattle, Washington: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2009); Peter G. Mandaville, "Transnational Islam in Asia: Background, Typology and Conceptual Overview," in *Transnational Islam in South and Southeast Asia: Movements, Networks, and Conflict Dynamics*, ed. Peter G. Mandaville (Seattle, Washington: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2009)., Noorhaidi Hasan, "Transnational Islam in Indonesia," in *Transnational Islam in South and Southeast Asia: Movements, Networks, and Conflict Dynamics*, ed. Peter G. Mandaville (Seattle, Washington: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2009)., Bryner., Machmudi, , and Zulkifli, "The Struggle of the Shi'is in Indonesia," ANU E Press, accessed.

life in multi-religious societies and focus on altruistic service (*hizmet*) to the Muslim community by providing Islamic education. This approach has attracted the approving attention of growing numbers of Indonesians to the Turkish-based transnational movements.

The establishment of the Suleymanci United Islamic Cultural Center of Indonesia (UICCI) in Jakarta in 2005 signalled a widening of Turkish Muslim outreach to the most populous Muslim majority country in Asia and the world, Indonesia. It is distinctive among the transnational organizations from Turkey in that it still maintains links with the Naqshbandi Sufi order in its homeland. It joins the other Turkish organizations established earlier in Indonesia, such as the Gulen Movement and the Jamaat Nur. This new-comer, with its distinct agenda of hizmet and cultural atmosphere, as can be seen from its name and activities, adds a new dimension to the colour of Indonesian Islam.

B. *The Turkish Islamic Transnational Movements in Indonesia: History and Their Hizmet*

To start with, this section of the paper will covers the historical establishment of three Turkish transnational movements in Indonesia: the Nurcu, the Fethullah Gulen, and the Suleymancis movements. It will review the historical formation of three principle indigenous revivalist movements in Turkey and then explore their role in terms of Islamic educational establishments. It also will highight some similiarities and differences of the educational service (*hizmet*) provided by the Turkish organizations.

The Turkish Islamic movements in Indonesia share unique characteristics comapred to the other non-Turkish Islamic movements who previously established their institutions and influence in Indonesian Islam. Therefore, to understand these Turkish origins Islamic education promotors, I will utilize the the concept of 'Opportunity Spaces' that was intrucused by Hakan Yavuz when he studies Turkish Islamic movements in Turkey. Opportunity Spaces is defined as "social sites and vehicles for activism and the dissemination of meaning, identity, and cultural codes".[6] In reality the Opportunity Spaces can take form in the community of Muslims, or economic institutions, or educational education.

The first revivalist movement, variously called the Nurcu, Jamaat Nur, or the Nur Movement, was named after the charismatic Turkish Ulama, Bediüzzaman Said Nursî (1877–1960). This movement began after the death of Ulama Nursî. The movement relied predominantly on the writings of Said Nursî, particularly his magnum opus, Risale-i Nur Külliyatì, which became the base of this faith

[6]M. Hakan Yavuz, *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 151.

movement.[7] Over the years, Nurcu has evolved into the most powerful influential Islamic movement in Turkey.[8]

Yavuz identified three major Nurcu splinter groups: the Fethullah Gülen affiliated movements, the Yeni Asyacì, and the Yeni Nesilciler, as well as dozens of other small groups.[9] This demonstrates the significance of the Nur Movement. Although the Gülen Movement is inspired by, and is part of, the Nur Movement, the Gülen Movement shows some distinct characteristics. These characteristics will be differentiated in this study.

The magnum opus of Said Nursi, the Risalah Nur Kulliyeti, has been crucial to the movement. It has shown the transition from 'an oral culture to a print culture'.[10] The study of the Risalah Nur Kulliyeti has enabled the creation of 'new mechanisms of sociability', which might also be called 'new opportunity spaces', among the followers of Said Nursî. In addition, it also has raised public consciousness and intellectual exchange among Turkish Muslims by gathering and studying the Risalah Nur.[11]

In Indonesia, Nurcu was established by Yayasan Nur Semesta. Dershanes were established, which function as places of study and interaction for the *tullab an nur* (students of the Risalah Nur). The Nur Movement in Indonesia originates from the Kayseri branch, which sent a person who devoted their time and energy to run the dershane (*a waqf*). As in the case of other Nur movements elsewhere, the focus of Nurcu in Indonesia is to disseminate the thoughts of Beduzaman Said Nursi, particularly his magnum opus, Risalah Nur Kulliyeti, through dershanes and book publications.

The second revivalist movement is the Gulen Movement. As the name indicates, the founder of the movement was Hocaefendi Fethullah Gulen (b. 1938). The Gulen Movement is the most successful of the Nurcu movements and, therefore, the most powerful religious movement in Turkey. The movement benefited from the model of Said Nursi, alongside its own version. While the Nurcu use dershane as a place to study the ideas of Said Nursi, the Gulen established *ışık evleri* (houses of light). In addition, the movement expanded the ideas of Nursi. While Nursi focused on personal transformation, Fethullah Gulen focused on both personal and social transformation.[12]

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[7]M. Hakan Yavuz, *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey*, 151.

[8]Mustafa Gökhan Şahin, "Said Nursi and the Nur Movement in Turkey: An Atomistic Approach," *Digest of Middle East Studies* 20, no. 2 (2011): 226, http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1949-3606.2011.00097.x; Yavuz, 151.

[9]M. Hakan Yavuz, *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey*, 170.

[10]M. Hakan Yavuz and John L. Esposito, *Turkish Islam and the Secular State : The Gülen Movement* (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 2003), 13.

[11]M. Hakan Yavuz and John L. Esposito, *Turkish Islam and the Secular State*, h. 13.

[12]M. Hakan Yavuz and John L. Esposito, *Turkish Islam and the Secular State*, h. 19.

The Gülen Movement is a civic initiative; a civil society movement which started as a faith-initiated, non-political, cultural, and educational movement. One characteristic of the Gülen Movement is its expansion through non-Turkish Muslims. Its service spans from Turkish Muslims in Turkey to non-Muslims virtually everywhere. For Ebaugh,[13] the Gülen Movement "differentiates itself from other Islamic groups by stressing a non-exclusivist form of Turkish nationalism, the free market, openness to globalization, progressiveness in integrating tradition with modernity and its humanistic outlook".[14]

The development of the Gülen Movement occurred in three stages: (1) the development of the lighthouses (ışık evler); (2) the 'education movement'; and (3) persecution and forced liberalization.[15] At present, the Gülen Movement is the most influential Turkish movement globally.

For the Gülen Movement, media, education, and the market are the primary 'opportunity spaces'.[16] The Gülen Movement relies on different types of media to disseminate the thoughts of it's foundational figure, Fetullah Gülen, and to expand it's influence. For example, the movement set up its own forms of communication, such as book printing, magazines, newspapers, television programs, a radio channel, and an online newspaper. These means of communication have attracted Turkish people, and facilitated the expansion of the movement throughout Anatolia, since the 1980s and 1990s. Indeed, media was particularly important in the formation of social and cultural associations and foundations .

Since the time of Ataturk, in 1924, Turkey has been substantially secularised. Successive Turkish governments strictly prohibited the teaching of religious subjects in schools. In line with this, Gülen stressed the role of education for the cultivation of the self rather than a narrowly religious faith. Hence, Islamic subjects might not be found in the Gülen schools. However, the essence of Islamic teachings can be identified in Gülen's teachings on Islamic morality and the discipline of self. This is because Gülen did not see Islam as purely orthodox religious teachings of certain beliefs; rather he saw Islam as a source of morality and identity. Accordingly, as long as Muslims practice Islamic morality, they are practicing Islam. Notably, Gülen argues that there is 'no identity without morality and no morality without Islam'.[17]

Moreover, Gülen effectively exploited education as an 'opportunity space' by providing extensive scholarships and creating networks of dormitories across Turkey. With good management, and the support of Turkish businessmen in the Gülen movement, the movement established significant numbers of remarkable

[13]*The Gülen Movement* (Dordrecht: Springer Science+Business Media B.V, 2010).

[14]*The Gülen Movement* (Dordrecht: Springer Science+Business Media B.V, 2010), h. 45.

[15]M. Hakan Yavuz and John L. Esposito, *Turkish Islam and the Secular State*, h. 32-43

[16]M. Hakan Yavuz and John L. Esposito, *Turkish Islam and the Secular State*, h. 189.

[17]M. Hakan Yavuz and John L. Esposito, *Turkish Islam and the Secular State*, h. 189.

education institutions including schools, boarding houses, colleges, and universities.[18]

The Gülen movement also benefitted by using the market, another 'opportunity space', to its advantage. Many Gülen adherents are involved in business activities. In fact, according to Ebaugh,[19] the success of Gülen-inspired projects relies on the numerous local circles of businessmen, professionals, and workers in Turkish cities, towns, and rural areas. The local circles model arose within the cemaat, a type of social group that evolved in Turkey after the formation of the Republic, the outlawing of Sufi orders, and the abolishment of madrasas.[20] Gülen adherents collect religious-based charity and use it for their projects. They have also established many business organizations, such as ISHAD (The Association for Solidarity in Business Life), and HÜRSAAD (Free Industrialists and Businessmen Foundation), which give significant support to activities run by the Gülen movement.[21]

The Gülen Movement started in Indonesia in the 1990s and was the first Turkish movement in the country. Its activities began in the sphere of business, connecting Indonesia and Turkey through PASIAD and educational institutions such as Pribadi School and, later, Karima Bangsa School. In later developments, Gülen-affiliated groups also involved universities, interfaith dialogue, and cultural events through the Fethullah Gülen Chair which was established in cooperation with the Jakarta State Islamic University (UIN Jakarta). The Gülen Movement also actively disseminated the thoughts of Fethullah Gülen through the publication of transnated books and magazines.

The third revivalist movement is the Süleymanci Movement, named after its founding figure Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan (1888-1959). As mentioned previously, the Nur and Gulen movements both drew their inspiration from the charismatic figure of Said Nursi. Whilst Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan and Badiuzzaman Said Nursi both lived in the same time period, they each had distinct characteristics, which are reflected in the movements. Notably, the Nursi and Gulen movements do not wish to be labelled Sufi, whereas Sheikh Süleyman is a known Sufi Sheikh of the Naqshbandi order, and his followers preserve Sufi practices within the movement. Moreover, the Nurcu and Gulen movements tend to extend their role into secular spheres, whereas the Suleymanci Movement focuses on religious education and Muslims.

The Süleymancì Movement concentrated on the use of political and economic 'opportunity spaces', which, shaped the evolution of the Süleymancì Movement. In terms of political 'opportunity spaces', it applied a policy of

[18]M. Hakan Yavuz and John L. Esposito, *Turkish Islam and the Secular State*, h. 19.

[19]Ebaugh., H. R. *The Gülen Movement* (Dordrecht: Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010), h. 147.

[20]Ebaugh., H. R. (2010). *The Gülen Movement*, h. 147.

[21]M. Hakan Yavuz and John L. Esposito, *Turkish Islam and the Secular State*, h. 19.

engagement with the Turkish Government, particularly after 1949 in the era of the multiparty system. In this period, the Turkish government began to accommodate religious identity claims and allow the establishment of Quran seminaries. This policy has enabled the Süleymancì to engage with the government by educating preachers to work for the Directorate of Religious Affairs. Consequently, Süleymancì preachers began to dominate the office of Directorate of Religious Affairs in Turkey.

However, the situation later shifted. Following the military coup of 1971, secularist policies were re-established and the Süleymancì lost their close connection with the Turkish government. They were also forced to turn over some of their buildings to the government. From that moment onward, the Süleymancì, according to Yavuz, focused more on economic 'opportunity spaces' in the form of Turkish workers. The Süleymancì managed to get support from Turkish workers, from whom they collected religious charity funds to support the movement. This economic 'opportunity space' later helped to manage expenses and meet other needs, including the establishment of boarding houses and the provision of scholarships for university students (Yavuz, 2003, pp. 146-147).

Moreover, since the implementation of 1965 Law, and the 1971 military coup in Turkey, the Süleymancìs have looked abroad for the economic 'opportunity spaces'. They built a distinct "Turkish Islamic" community among Turkish workers in Germany; a secular country with a significant Turkish migrant worker population. The Süleymancìs have run the German wing of their organization, under the name of Verband der Islamischen Kulturzentren (VIKZ) or Association of Islamic Cultural Centres, since the 1970s. This organization has its headquarters in Cologne. (Thielmann, 2008). The Süleymancìs people have established Islamic centres to provide Islamic education to Turkish workers. The Süleymancì imams also play significant roles in Muslim society in Germany. Notably, the Süleymancìs have distinguished themselves by earning a reputation for dormitories that are cleaner, more highly disciplined than those of the state, and equipped with up-to-date technology to meet the needs of the university students (Kamp, 2008; Yavuz, 2003, pp. 146-147).

In a developed country such as Germany, which has a significant Turkish community, the Süleymancìs made productive use of economic 'opportunity spaces' among the Turkish workers. Those workers were relatively free from the influences of the Turkish government and could provide religious charity to support the Süleymancìs movement and its activities. Benefiting from this economic 'opportunity space', the Süleymancìs were able to continue their aim of protecting the new generation against leftist-atheism and radical political Islam. Moreover, the transnational movement also provided opportunities for expansion. Since the beginning of 2000s, Süleymancìs have run the most powerful dormitory networks in Turkey and have built the second-largest mosque network in Germany.

As discussed previously, the United Islamic Cultural Center of Indonesia was established, by Süleymancì followers, in Jakarta in 2005. Its main focus is to provide students who live in its boarding schools with an Islamic education. Schools focus on memorising the Qur'an. This has attracted wide support, both from local Muslims

and the Indonesian Government, from the Ministry of Religious Affairs to the Ministry of Social Affairs. Since the Suleymamcis started their *hizmet* in Indonesia in 2005, they have successfully established 17 branches across Indonesia.

E. *Conclusion*

The above description on historical establishment of the Turkish transnational movement in Indonesia as well as ellaboration of their service (hizmet) and role in Islamic education have enrich the Indonesian Islam in this globalised world. It show connection of the two countries, Turkey and Indonesia as mutual network to develop the Islamic education.

By the time the Turkish transnational movement arrived in Indonesia it was already a well- established transnational religious movement with standardized institutional practices. In Indonesia, the movement adapted to local understandings. One example of this was the way in which the movement presented its Islamic boarding schools to Indonesians. Initially, Süleymancı dormitories were called *asrama Turki,* which literally translates from the Turkish word '*yurt*' (I. *asrama*). After several years, the Indonesian Süleymancıs recognized that this term did not properly represent their idea of a boarding school, nor was it attracting Indonesian Muslims. This was primarily because the word '*asrama*' means 'shelter' rather than 'Islamic boarding school'.

The Süleymancı movement adopted the local term, '*pondok pesantren*', meaning 'Islamic boarding school', for its schools in Indonesia, while the Nurchu uses the word pesantren kilat, as well as the Gulen Movement who provide Islamic camp within the global schools. This enabled the movement to connect its dormitory, character-focused, religious education with similar, well- respected, and widespread indigenous religious educational institutions in Indonesia.

This facilitated popular local understandings of the Süleymancı educational approach. It also meant that Süleymancı boarding schools were entitled to support from the Ministry of Religious Affairs. In Indonesia, the Ministry of Religious Affairs is tasked with providing support to educational institutions or *pondok pesantren*.

Notably, however, the Süleymancı movement made a distinction between its *pesantren* and other *pesantren* in Indonesia. To highlight its unique educational program, specifically speed-learning to recite the whole Qur'an from memory, the Süleymancı movement officially renamed its centres 'Pondok Pesantren Tahfidz Sulaimaniyah' (Sulaimaniyah Qur'an Memorization Islamic Boarding Schools). This name was first used for the UICCI Rawamangun school in East Jakarta.

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