

## RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISM AND VIOLENCE: IS THERE ANY DIRECT CORRELATION BETWEEN FUNDAMENTALISM AND VIOLENCE?

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**Abstract:** This essay examines the correlation between religious fundamentalism and violent acts. The prominent question addressed in this paper is about is there any direct correlation between fundamentalism and violence?. To answer this inquiry, this writing is going to elaborate three points. First, it defines the term fundamentalism and describes its shared characteristic features. Secondly, it will describe the meaning and categories of violence used in analyzing correlation between religious fundamentalism movements and the utilization of violent actions such as bombing attacks, assassination, kidnapping etc. Thirdly, this article also tries to analyze the links between fundamentalism and violence and how these links are understood in the study of 'fundamentalist Islam' and 'violent political Islam'. This essay argues that the presence of religious fundamentalism such as radical Islamic group does not always connote to violent. Whether or not a religious fundamentalism group will be advocating violent means in its movement is more likely depending on some intermediary factors such as state's response.

Tulisan ini membahas tentang hubungan antara fundamentalisme agama dan kekerasan. Pertanyaan yang ingin diangkat ialah apakah ada hubungan langsung antara fundamentalisme agama dengan kekerasan?. Untuk menjawab pertanyaan ini, maka tulisan ini akan mengemukakan tiga aspek, yaitu, pertama; mendefinisikan istilah *fundamentalism* dan menjelaskan kerakteristiknya. Kedua, menjelaskan makna dan kategori kekerasan yang digunakan sebagai kerangka teoritis dalam menganalisa hubungan antara fundamentalisme agama dan kekerasan. Ketiga adalah menganalisa hubungan tersebut dan mencoba melihatnya dari perpektif gerakan radikal Islam. Tulisan ini mengasumsikan bahwa kehadiran gerakan fundamentalisme agama tidak selalu punya kaitan dengan kekerasan. Penggunaan kekerasan oleh gerakan fundamentalis sangat tergantung dengan fakto eksternal seperti respon Negara.

**Keywords:** fundamentalism, religious fundamentalism, violence, and state

## I. Introduction

The presence of Islamic fundamentalism groups has been attracting attention from both domestic and international media and academics, mainly after 9/11 2001 in the USA and subsequent terrorist attacks in Indonesia. The strong allegation was that a number of Islamic fundamentalism movements, such as *Laskar Jihad* and *Jemaah Islamiyah*, were terrorist organisations, and targets in the West's 'global war on terror'. Not surprisingly, some scholars argued that the al-Qaeda network had spread into Southeast Asia, including Indonesia.<sup>1</sup> Some argue that the Islamic fundamentalism was brought to Indonesia from the Middle East, which accounts for its militancy and violence as part of a global threat.<sup>2</sup> This assessment of political Islam in Indonesia, however, is an over-simplification that ignores the variations in the phenomena of transnational Middle Eastern Islamist movements. Not all Islamist movements in Indonesia committed violence or terrorism. Gerakan Tarbiyah and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia were two instances of fundamentalist Islamic groups that were committed to physical non-violence. In this regard Ayoub argues that "most contemporary transnational Islamist activities do not fall within the jihadist description"<sup>3</sup> and that transnational Islamist movements were very numerous, ranging from missionary activity (*da'wa*) to political activity.<sup>4</sup>

Based on the above argument, this paper is going to put forward three points regarding fundamentalism and violence. First, it defines the term fundamentalism and describes its shared characteristic features. This is important because it avoids confusion and misunderstanding in the assessment of Islamic politics. Secondly, this writing describes the meaning and categories of violence used in analyzing correlation between religious fundamentalism movements and the utilization of violent actions such as bombing attacks, assassination, kidnapping etc. Thirdly, this article also tries to analyze the links between fundamentalism and violence and how these links are understood in the study of 'fundamentalist Islam' and 'violent political Islam'. While the two are often taken as synonymous, they are shown to be very distinct components of Islamic teaching and practice in Indonesia.

What the main question will be addressed is about -as mentioned in subtitle above- is there direct connection between religious fundamentalism and violence?. In this paper, I will argue that the phenomenon of religious

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<sup>1</sup> See for example, Rohan Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror* (New York: Colombia University Press, 2002); Zachari Abuza, *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror* (Boulder and London: Lynn Rienner Publishers, 2003).

<sup>2</sup> For example, see Greg Fealy and Anthony Bubalo, *Jejak Kafilah: Pengaruh Radikalisme Timur Tengah di Indonesia (Joining the Caravan? The Middle East Islamism and Indonesia)*, (Bandung: Mizan, 2005).

<sup>3</sup> Mohammed Ayoub, *The Many Faces of Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Muslim World* (USA): The University of Michigan Press, 2008), p. 134.

<sup>4</sup> Mohammad Ayoub, *The Many Faces of Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Muslim World.*, p. 134-35.

fundamentalism such as Islamic radical groups does not always cultivate violence. There are any intermediary factors which may trigger a religious fundamentalism group to be using violence.

## II. Definition and Characteristics of Fundamentalism

Fundamentalism is a very problematic and complex concept. This is because, first, the use of this term to denote phenomena of religious movements taking place outside evangelical Christianity<sup>5</sup> is much debated among scholars. Some adopt a strict stance to reject the extension of the term fundamentalism beyond the Christian tradition. The reason for this is that fundamentalism is said to be inappropriate in explaining the phenomenon of Islamic movements for example. Others, however, try to extend the use of the term to non-Christian religious movements. It is argued that historically, though religious movements exhibit a large number of unique religious teachings and practices, many also share a 'certain resemblance',<sup>6</sup> or have many characteristics in common.

Secondly, as a complex notion, there are major disagreements over how to define fundamentalism. As a result, the term may be used to draw a religious movement negatively, such as associating fundamentalism with terrorism and violent extremism.<sup>7</sup> Alternatively, fundamentalist belief may suggest piety and an emphasis on inward looking spiritual engagement with the material world. Definitions of fundamentalism expressed by scholars do not always cover all of its possible aspects. Therefore, given these difficulties, the purpose of the definitions considered in this thesis is more as "a point of departure" rather than as a constant or unchanged labeling or depiction of the phenomenon.<sup>8</sup>

Jeffery K. Hadden and Anson Shupe define fundamentalism as 'the proclamation of reclaimed authority over a sacred tradition which is to be reinstated as an antidote for a society that has strayed from its traditional

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<sup>5</sup> During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, an internal debate in American Protestantism known as the Modernist Controversy happened. The controversy is mainly about the biblical explanation of creation and the divine status of the Bible. It later led to two trends of thinking; modernist or liberals and traditionalist or conservatives. The former argued that Christian's adherents should necessitate to follow the change by adapting Christian's views to the development of science and scholarship for example, and while the latter still maintain the older tenets of revelation and biblical inerrancy.

Between 1910 and 1915 some pamphlets that contained with the anti-modernist opinion published under the title of *The Fundamentals*. In further development, those who agreed with these pamphlets popularized the 'Fundamentals' as 'a catch-phrase for anti-modernism'. For complete explanation see Michael Barkun, 'Religious Violence and the Myth of Fundamentalism', *A Franks Cass Journal*, Vol. 4, Number 3, Winter, 2003, pp., 55-70, p. 56.

<sup>6</sup>To find the complete explanation, see Gabriele Marranci, *Understanding Muslim Identity: Rethinking Fundamentalism* (UK: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009),

<sup>7</sup> Gabriele Marranci, *Understanding Muslim Identity*, 2009, p. 10.

<sup>8</sup> Jamhari and JajangJahroni, *Gerakan Salafi Radikal di Indonesia (Radical Salafi Movement in Indonesia)*, (Jakarta: PT Raja GrafindoPersada, 2004).

cultural values.<sup>9</sup> They identify three main features. First, it is theological which imposes implementation of religious doctrines on the private and public spheres. Secondly, there has to be political fundamentalism, by which they mean prohibition among followers, often enforced, against worldly vices such as secularization and modernization. Thirdly, fundamentalism is cultural, differentiating between various religions and the search for the true and righteous 'dominant religion.'<sup>10</sup>

Almond *et al.* define fundamentalism as 'a discernible pattern of religious militance by which self-styled true believers attempt to arrest the erosion of religious identity, fortify the border of the religious community, and create viable alternatives to secular institutions and behaviors'.<sup>11</sup> It can be said from this definition that fundamentalists assume that religion is everywhere under threat from misleading ideas such as secularism, modernism and liberalism. Therefore they call for the religion's followers to fortify their own religious identity and community against these threats by reviving traditional religious values in both the private and public spheres.

Bruce Lawrence defines fundamentalism as a desire and effort to reclaim religious authority. It refers to acts by 'earnest folk to retain a place for old-fashioned values in a rapidly modernizing world.'<sup>12</sup> Thus, there are a number of different possible features and types of fundamentalism, namely; fundamentalists develop their own technical terminology or use particular words to understand the world. They support minority concepts often rejected by the majority as heretical, or they reject secularist and 'wayward' religious adherents. Almost in every case fundamentalist movements are ruled by charismatic males.<sup>13</sup>

Within the context of Islam fundamentalism<sup>14</sup>, according to Martyn E Marty, could be recognised as exhibiting four features. First, fundamentalism is 'oppositionalism'. Islamic fundamentalism calls on its adherents to oppose the perceived threats or enemy, encompassing modernity, secularization, liberalization and western values in general. Secondly, hermeneutics is rejected. For Islamic fundamentalists the Qur'anic text should be understood through literal means, or *taqlid*, the copying or obeying of authoritative interpretations.<sup>15</sup> They disagree with a critical and rational approach to interpreting the Qur'an,

<sup>9</sup> Amirthavenkatraman, 'Fundamentalism and Its Stereotypes,' in *Journal of UDK: 279.124, Biblid 0025-8555*, 58, Vol. LVIII, br. 1-2, 2006, pp. 7-35, p. 9.

<sup>10</sup> Amirthavenkatraman, 'Fundamentalism and Its Stereotypes,' p. 9.

<sup>11</sup> Michael O. Emerson and David Hartman, 'The Rise of Religious Fundamentalism,' *Annu. Rev. Sociol.*, 2006, 32, pp. 127-44, p. 130.

<sup>12</sup> Amirthavenkatraman, 'Fundamentalism and Its Stereotypes,' 2006, p. 9

<sup>13</sup> Amirthavenkatraman, 'Fundamentalism and Its Stereotypes,' 2006, p. 9.

<sup>14</sup> Fundamentalism has been turned into various synonyms such as religious revivalism, political Islam, radical, Islamist, *salafi*, Wahhabi. Despite the debate on the labeling of the phenomenon in academic discourses, in this thesis these terms will be interchangeably used.

<sup>15</sup> Martyn E Marty, "What is Fundamentalism? Theological Perspective", in Hans Küng and Jurgen Moltmann (eds), *Fundamentalism as an Ecumenical Challenge* (London: SCM Press, 1992), p., 3-31

or *ijtihad*, because human reasoning is incapable of determining the Qur'an's essential meaning. Thirdly, fundamentalists discard religious pluralism because this principle contradicts the Qur'an's values as God's final revelation, and confuses one's faith. Fourthly, fundamentalists reject historical and sociological development because it diverts the spiritual concern with abiding by literal doctrines and understanding the scripture.<sup>16</sup>

In addition, Jamhari and Jajang Jahroni, in their book *Gerakan Salafi Radikal di Indonesia*, identify several specific features of religious 'radical-fundamentalism'. First, fundamentalists believe that Islamic tenets involve all aspects of life ranging from politics and laws, to economics and society. Secondly, Western values such as secularism and materialistic must be rejected.<sup>17</sup> Fundamentalists acknowledge Islam's historic failure to establish a religious society but blame it on the misguided pursuit of Western values. Thirdly, fundamentalists argue that to achieve social and political change, Islamic followers should be guided only by Islamic principles contained in the Qur'an and *hadith*. Fourthly, as a consequence of the rejection of the Western ideologies, fundamentalists also reject social-political regulations demanded by West as a form of neo-colonialism. The fifth feature is that, although fundamentalists are known to be puritanical and anti-Western, they do not reject advance technologies.<sup>18</sup> In other words, they utilise aspects of modernity such as science and modern tools of communication and other technologies.<sup>19</sup> Finally, 'Islamisation' is more likely to be achieved with a good organisation of well educated and ideologically driven followers forming militant groups and communities.<sup>20</sup>

Taking these views into account, Islamic fundamentalism can be defined as a movement in which its followers perceive that religion is under threat from the processes of secularisation and modernisation. These processes result in the erosion of religious identity. Thus, fundamentalists believe that the only one solution is to escape from the unbeneficial conditions of the modern material world by pursuing significant social-political change, which is only possible with the revival of the religious values and traditions in in the private and public spheres.

Applying traditional religious values as a guide to changing the secular material world, fundamentalists believe that the Holy Books (the Torah, Qur'an, and Bible, for example) are guides to all aspects of life as revealed by God. They are meant to be comprehended literally and followed without reflection or

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<sup>16</sup> Martyn E Marty, "What is Fundamentalism? Theological Perspective", p., 3-31.

<sup>17</sup> Jamhari and JajangJahroni, *Gerakan Salafi Radikal di Indonesia (Salafi Radical Movement in Indonesia)*, p., 4

<sup>18</sup> Not surprisingly, any fundamentalism movements utilize Internet and others media to disseminate their ideologies or agendas and even using them to strengthen the social basis of Islamic society and also to fight back against the West. See Jamhari and JajangJahroni, *Gerakan Salafi Radikal di Indonesia (Salafi Radical Movement in Indonesia)*, p. 5.

<sup>19</sup> Michael O. Emerson and David Hartman, 'The Rise of Religious Fundamentalism, p. 134.

<sup>20</sup> Jamhari and JajangJahroni, *Gerakan Salafi Radikal di Indonesia*, 2004, p. 5.

asking critical questions. In addition, Islamic fundamentalists reject the western ideologies despite using modernization as a tool. They have also a strong desire to establish an exclusive religious society and form of governance (caliphate) that has distinct boundaries from unbelievers.

### III. Violence: Meaning and Category

Another term to be clarified in this writing is the term "violence". As with 'fundamentalism' it is surprisingly complex and difficult to define. According to Johan Galtung there are three forms of violence; direct, structural, and cultural violence. Direct violence includes killing, maiming, sanctions, misery, desocialization, repression, expulsion, and so on. This feature of violence is easy to recognize, as it is 'physical', though most definitions of contemporary terrorism also stress the 'threat' of violence. This form of 'violence', according to Galtung, 'tends to be institutionalized, repetitive, and ritualistic, like a vendetta'.<sup>21</sup> Conversely, Structural violence and cultural violence are more complex. The key word for understanding structural violence is 'exploitation'. Its simple logic is that 'the topdogs get much more out of the interaction in the structure than others, the underdogs'. In other words, there is 'unequal exchange' in interactions and relations between actors.<sup>22</sup> The process of exploitation is sustained by two other steps in structural violence. The first step is penetration combined with segmentation. The former means that the topdogs force the underdogs to speak based on the topdogs' interests. The latter refers to the topdogs' effort to limit the explanation of what really happens to the underdog. The second step is marginalisation combined with fragmentation. Marginalisation is an exertion to put and maintain the underdog on the periphery or outside, while fragmentation is to set the underdogs apart from each other.<sup>23</sup>

The final feature of violence, according to Johan Galtung, is cultural violence. It refers to any aspect of culture, including religion, ideology, language, art, empirical science, and formal science (logic, mathematics), that can be utilized as a justification for and legitimation of direct and structural violence. As a result, both direct and structural violence look natural and right, or 'normal'.<sup>24</sup> For example, as part of culture, religion plays a pivotal role in triggering violence because religion as a set of beliefs is easily manipulated by leaders to support violence by followers. For example, there are usually strict dichotomies between good and evil in which the former is quite often associated with God, or as revealed by God to the leader, while the latter refers to Satan, with which the leader denounces the sins of opponents. Such black

<sup>21</sup> Johan Galtung, 'Cultural Violence', in *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 27, no.3, 1990, pp. 291-305, p. 292.

<sup>22</sup> Actors may encompass person, districts, nations, or region. Whatever they are, importantly they can act and interact each other. Johan Galtung, *Peace and Social Structure, Essays in Peace Research*, vol. III, (Copenhagen, Ejlers, 1978), p. 29-31.

<sup>23</sup> Johan Galtung, 'Cultural Violence', 1990, p. 293-294.

<sup>24</sup> Johan Galtung, 'Cultural Violence', 1990, p. 291.

and white dichotomies create sharp opposition between 'the Chosen One (by God) and the Unchosen Ones by God, chosen by Satan'. Those who are the chosen ones will receive eternal salvation and closeness to God in Heaven, whereas the unbelievers will be doomed to eternal damnation in hell with Satan.. According to Galtung, Heaven and Hell are also said to be felt on earth in the form of misery and luxury, which are preparations for Hell/Heaven.<sup>25</sup> This view justifies violence by believers who judge others to be 'unchosen' and unworthy.

Meanwhile, Mary R Jackman in "Violence and Legitimacy in Expropriative Social Relations", offers a definition of violence based on the 'injuriousness of actions'. She argues that violence contains 'an action that inflicts, threatens, or causes injury'. The form of the injuries 'may be corporal that has consequences such as 'pain, laceration, death, functional and impairment', and are against the 'basic need of physical survival, avoidance of pain, and preservation of bodily integrity and autonomy'. It may be psychological including 'fear, anxiety, anguish, humiliation, or diminished self-esteem', encompassing 'the destruction, loss, or defacement of property or the loss of earnings', or it may be social which includes 'stigmatization, exclusion, imprisonment, banishment, or expulsion'.<sup>26</sup> Violence 'may be corporal, written, or verbal'. Because corporal violence is more easily identified, actors or agents of violence often try to use written or verbal means instead. Such ways may lead to injurious results either directly, 'as in formal edicts or contracts stipulating physical harm against an individual or group', or indirectly such as a 'a moral or physical threat' against individuals or groups.<sup>27</sup>

By considering these definitions of violence, it can be said that the forms it can take are diverse, ranging from direct or physical to symbolic violence, and which may be committed in various ways. Related to the assessment of religious fundamentalist movements in this essay, what is relevant from Galtung's conception of violence is that religion has the potential to justify or legitimise violence. It does not mean that religion is inherently violent or will lead inevitably to violence,. Whether or not religion results in violence depends arguably on the leader's interpretation of the religion's tenets and the fanaticism of followers. In other words, religion has the theological teachings and symbols to justify terrorist violence.<sup>28</sup> Mary R. Jackman argues that the psychological and social outcomes of violence, publications defending violence and verbal calls to violence have to be taken into account.

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<sup>25</sup> Johan Galtung, 'Cultural Violence', in *Journal of Peace Research*, 296-7.

<sup>26</sup> Mary R Jackman, 'License to kill: Violence and Legitimacy in Expropriative Social Relation', in John T. Jost and Brenda Major, eds., *The Psychology of Legitimacy: Emerging Perspectives on Ideology, Justice, and Intergroup Relation*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp., 443-4

<sup>27</sup> Mary R Jackman, 'License to kill: Violence and Legitimacy in Expropriative Social Relation',

<sup>28</sup> Mark Juergensmeyer, *Terror in The Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), p. xii.

#### IV. Link between Fundamentalism and Violence

Is there any intrinsic link between religion in general (fundamentalism in particular) and violence? To answer this question, it is interesting to note Emerson and Hartman's observation about the influential work of Mark Juergensmeyer, especially his *Terror in the Mind of God*.<sup>29</sup> According to Emerson and Hartman Juergensmeyer provides a wide range of social approaches to understanding the phenomenon of terrorism and violence and their relation to fundamentalism.<sup>30</sup> First, religion is sometimes hijacked by those who are actually not affiliated with a specific religious motive or movement to commit violence. In their hands, religion is used to justify the violence committed. In other words, not all religiously motivated violence is conducted in the name of fundamentalism. Second, not all fundamentalist movements regard violence as the best way to achieve their ultimate political objective, whatever it is.<sup>31</sup>

Another answer to the question is that there are two forms of fundamentalism, namely 'active fundamentalism' and 'moderate fundamentalism', so it depends. Active fundamentalism justifies violence as a means of making significant social and political change. Moderate fundamentalism, though it shares the same literal reading of religious scriptures or tenets, does not advocate or utilise violence in pursuit of religious ideals.<sup>32</sup> Perhaps a good example of 'moderate fundamentalism' is the group which is operating in Indonesia; *HizbutTahrir Indonesia (HTI)*. Like its counterparts in elsewhere, including in Central Asia (Uzbekistan for example),<sup>33</sup> HTI consistently rejected violence as a tool of social and political changes. It advocated peaceful methods and ways deliberately because the use of violence was absolutely in contradiction to Islamic values and *da'wah*, or 'issuing an invitation', which is what the Prophet practiced.

However, some fundamentalist groups condone religious violence. There are numerous examples of violence and terrorism committed by extremists-fundamentalist groups in the name of religion, evidenced Africa (bombings of US embassies in Tanzania and Kenya), Europe (bombings in Paris), America (bombing of New York's World Trade Center),<sup>34</sup> Indonesia (bombings in Denpasar Bali), and so on. There are various explanations of the phenomenon of international terrorism in the post 9-11 era of globalisation. Some argue that 'theatrical or dramatic forms of violence' (borrowing Juergensmeyer's term) are a part of the political trend. Some social scientists

<sup>29</sup> Mark Juergensmeyer, *Terror in The Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence*

<sup>30</sup> Michael O. Emerson and David Hartman, 'The Rise of Religious Fundamentalism', p. 136.

<sup>31</sup> Michael O. Emerson and David Hartman, 'The Rise of Religious Fundamentalism', p. 136.

<sup>32</sup> Amirthavenkatraman, 'Fundamentalism and Its Stereotypes,' 2006.

<sup>33</sup> To know how HT in Uzbekistan is having strong commitment to not using violence, though the rule of Uzbekistan suppress its presence, please see Emmanuel Karagiannis and Clark Mccauley, 'Hizbut-Tahrir al-Islami: Evaluating the Threat Posed by a Radical Islamic Group That Remains Nonviolent,' in *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 18:315-334, 2006

<sup>34</sup> John L. Esposito, 'Islamic Fundamentalism in The Middle East and Southwest Asia, *UNHCR Centre for Documentation and Research*, 2001, p. 29.



define terrorism and violence as 'the use of covert violence by a group for political ends.'<sup>35</sup>

In contrast, according to Juergensmeyer, terrorist and violent acts are not merely a form of political action, but are a kind of symbolic statement, which means they have meaning beyond the immediate target.<sup>36</sup> Violent, religious acts must be seen as symbolic, ritualistic, or a sacred drama. Moreover, Juergensmeyer's use of adjectives such as symbolic, dramatic, and theatrical, is intended to describe terrorism and violence as *performance acts*. This implies that they are shows designed deliberately to affect various audiences so that the populace watching the violence via the news media feels a part of the show or drama. Moreover, the term *performance* also signifies the idea of the act as *performative*. This concept draws on the language of a philosophy tradition that explains that certain forms of speech, such as the vows pledged during a marriage ceremony, the nonverbal actions such as raising a white flag as a symbol of defeat, or terrorist acts, have a social function as *a transformative impact*. Consequently, according to Juergensmeyer, violence and terrorist acts are either *performance events*, which means they 'make a symbolic statement' or they are '*performative acts*, insofar as they try to change things'.<sup>37</sup>

From the above explanation, the question to be asked is why fundamentalism advocates violence in some case but not in others. One answer is an analysis emphasizing the following two interactions among believers:

...first, there is the interaction with those who can confer or withhold religious legitimation of behavior. Second, there is the interaction with those forces deemed to be hostile or evil.<sup>38</sup>

It can be concluded from this quote that first, choices between violence and non-violence relates to interpretation of doctrines and texts. Within religious traditions that do not possess a central authority which, in turn, leads to potentially competing authorities, the presence of those who are willing to confer the religious license for violence are more easily found., The process of interaction may takes place through either of two ways; believer's want to commit violence comes first and the search for legitimation follows the action. Alternatively, the believer searches for religious legitimacy of violence and then decides to commit a violent act. The second pattern of interaction is with 'others'. The believer tries to differentiate him/herself from those 'outside', in

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<sup>35</sup> Walter Laqueur, *The Age of Terrorism*, (Boston: Little, Brown, 1987), p. 72, quoted from Mark Juergensmeyer, *Terror in The Mind of God*, p. 122.

<sup>36</sup> For example, Juergensmeyer's remark of the result of his interview with Mahmud Abouhalima, who is a convicted perpetrator of the World Trade Center Bombing, is that 'the bombing of a public building may dramatically indicate to the populace that the government or the economic forces behind the building were seen as enemies, to show the world that they were targeted as satanic foes.' Mark Juergensmeyer, *Terror in The Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence*, p. 123.

<sup>37</sup> Mark Juergensmeyer, *Terror in The Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence*, pp., 123-4.

<sup>38</sup> Michael Barkun, 'Religious Violence and the Myth of Fundamentalism', p. 64.

terms of people whom he/she presumes are non-believers or support a corrupt system. In this regard, it is interesting to take into account the theory 'dramatic denouements' proposed by David Bromley in reading the phenomenon of New Religious Movement and violence. He argues that 'dramatic denouements' can take place:

'when a movement and some segment of the social order reach a juncture at which one or both conclude that the requisite conditions for maintaining their core identity and collective existence are being subverted and that such circumstances are intolerable'.<sup>39</sup>

In addition, dramatic denouements can be terminated by three options. First, *capitulation*, where one party capitulates to the other. Secondly, *exodus*, where one party retires from the other's sphere and, thirdly, *battle* which is where one party tries to dominate or even destroy the other. The last way is more likely related to religiously motivated violence.<sup>40</sup> Bromley's second pattern of interaction is similar to Galtung's concept of cultural violence in which religion's tenet about the strict division of people chosen by God and people chosen by Satan, or between what is good and the truth, and what is bad and the devil, is one of the triggers that results direct in structural violence. It is possible that fundamentalist groups take this as justification to attack people or systems presumed to be wrong, heretical, or backsliding.

The second answer to the question is that religiously based violence is more likely triggered by the religious-political circumstances rather than religion itself. Religious violence can occur if the state does not ensure religious diversity or freedom, supporting one religion's expression over all others. In this situation, unsupported religion is motivated to oppose the government. 'Whereas government regulation and state-sponsored religion encourage sects to fight both church and state, a truly competitive religious market encourages religious tolerance and mutual respect if only as a matter of necessity'.<sup>41</sup> In other words, it may be argued that fundamentalist movements may turn violent due to changes in 'influential external structural factors' such as state. If state regulation and the broad social and political environment appreciate or at least tolerate the existence of fundamentalist movements, they are less likely to employ violence in pursuit of their political goals. This is because they may suffer a violent political backlash and bear a high social cost such as their literal physical extinction.

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<sup>39</sup> David G. Bromley, 'Dramatic Denouements', in Bromley and Melton, *Cult, Religion, and Violence*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), quoted from Michael Barkun, 'Religious Violence and the Myth of Fundamentalism', p., 65.

<sup>40</sup> Michael Barkun, 'Religious Violence and the Myth of Fundamentalism', pp., 65-6

<sup>41</sup> Laurence R Iannaccone, 'Toward an Economic Theory of "Fundamentalism"', *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics*, Vol. 153, 1997, pp. 100-116, p. 113-4.

## V. Conclusion

The phenomenon of fundamentalism in religion, particularly in Islam, and its relationship to violence is a complicated matter. There are neither accepted definitions nor explanations about the relationship. Related to violence, fundamentalism may be divided into two streams; namely, groups that oppose the use of violence, such as acts of terrorism, and, secondly, groups that justify violence as a means of achieving political objectives. This writing identified two factors, one internal the other external, that can trigger a fundamentalist group to commit violent acts, The internal factor derives from an extremely rigid understanding of religious values, while external factors are driven from outside circumstances such as state's repressive response to the existence of religious fundamentalism. Eventually, it can be argued that if a fundamentalism group meets one of both factors, it is almost certain that it is going to utilize violence in its motion.

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