HIZBUT-TAHRIR IN DA'WAH AND ISLAMIC POLITICAL MOVEMENTS IN INDONESIA

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Abstract: This paper reviews Hizb ut-Tahrir in the landscape of Islamic *da'wah* and political movements in Indonesia. The discussion is divided into four sections: Hizbut Tahrir and the trans-national Islamic movements in Indonesia, Hizb ut-Tahrir as a form of Islamic political consciousness, Hizb ut-Tahrir as a da'wah and political movement and its *khilafah* as a challenge to Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia (NKRI-the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia) concept. As a trans-national movement, Hizbut-Tahrir spread through three major aspects i.e. social movements, education and da'wah, as well as through publications and the internet. Hizbut Tahrir in Indonesia then becomes a mass organization with its official name Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI). HT is a model of Islamic political awareness based on the blueprint of the past government model of *khilafah ala minhajun nubuwwah.* The awareness of political Islam is strongly based on a response to the condition of Muslims and Islamic countries experiencing a downturn and under the control of Western dominations and hegemonies after the colonialism era. Based on this, the presence of HTI in Indonesia cannot be separated from movements carrying the mission of *siyasah* (politic) to achieve the HTI's goal of *Khilafah Islamiyah.* In order to realize the goal, the HT movements choose parliamentary paths through door to door *dakwah* in the form of *halaqah. Khilafah* and NKRI (Pancasila) are two diametrically different concepts. HTI

Movements in Indonesia of course will receive a resistance, even be considered as "a latent danger" that threaten the existence of NKRI and Pancasila. The idea of enforcing *Khalifah Islamiyah* as a political struggle will certainly challenge the existence of NKRI and Pancasila as the ideology of the Republic of Indonesia. The concept of *Khilafah Islamiyah* is essentially 180 degrees different to the concept of NKRI and Pancasila.

Keywords: Hizbut Tahrir, Islamic Politics, Trans-national Islam

Introduction

The fall of the New Order brought fresh air to the rise of diverse groups movements that previously had no stages during the New Order era. The various groups movements both Socialist-Marxist and Islamic politics movements that have a commitment to change the state into an Islamic State. Therefore, this group formerly "banned" even suppressed by the New Order regime. The dark history of DI /TII rebellions which later transformed into the NII, and the emergence of Komando Jihad in the 1980s and reached its peak in the 1984 of Tanjung Priok tragedy, led the Islamist political groups experiencing a cooling down and turn into underground movements.

In addition, NII group is more likely to be a local movement and almost has no direct connections with International Political Islam movements. Islamic groups using educational approaches in their movement patterns, *usroh* groups, and other independent groups that

detached from NII organization emerged and flourished.[1] In its development, this groups metamorphosed into *Tarbiyah* groups which combined movement models of *Ikhwanul Muslimin*'s system and ideology. This group is not fully categorized as a jihadi group although its goals are to promote Islam as a solution, leadership and governance systems, and to enforce Islamic law at the State level.[2] The group then gained its moment in 1998 by forming the Indonesian Muslim Student Action Union (Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia-KAMMI) and politically consolidated through the Justice Party (Partai Keadilan-PK) later changed into the Justice and Prosperity Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera-PKS).

One group representing the political Islam group is Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI). The group chooses extra-parliamentary approach because of, ideologically, this group rejects a democratic system. HTI's ideology becomes an integral part of the trans-national Islamic group founded by Taqiyuddin an-Nabhani, Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT). Therefore, HTI is a form of trans-national Islamic movement which has entered Indonesia with its global ideology of *Khilafah Islamiyah* system.

HTI as a trans-national Islamic movement is like *Ikhwanul Muslimin* (the Muslim Brotherhood) and the Wahabi-

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[1]Nur Ridwan Khaliq, *Regenerasi NII: Membedah islam Jihadi di Indonesia,* (Jakarta: Erlangga, 2008), p. 8.

[2] *Ibid.,* p. 9.

Salafi group.[3] In Indonesia, the term of trans-national ideology was firstly popularized by Hasyim Muzadi, a former Chairman of the Executive Board of Nahdlatul Ulama, since 2007. The term refers to cross-country religious ideologies which are deliberately exported from abroad and spread in Indonesia. Interestingly, according to Muzadi, these ideologies are not only from the Middle East but also from the West. While Majelis Mujahidin, Ikhawanul Muslimin, Jaulah, and Al-Qaeda refer to groups which are categorized as transnational ideologies from the East (*NU Online*, 15/05/2007), *Jaringan Islam Liberal* (the Liberal Islam Network) is a trans-national ideology influenced by the West.

In this study, four issues were raised, namely: How are Hizb ut-Tahrir and Islamic trans-national movements in Indonesia? How does Hizbut Tahrir play its roles as a model of political consciousness? How dynamic of Hizb ut-Tahrir as a *da'wah* and a *siyasah* movement? What is the concept of *Khilafah Islamiyah* when facing the NKRI concept?

Hizb ut-Tahrir and the Islamic Trans-Islamic Movement in Indonesia

In terms of academics and Western literatures, the

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[3]According to the study conducted in 2015, the trans-national Islamic groups categorized into three groups, namely; MT group (the Muslim Brotherhood), a group of Wahabi-Salafi, and the Hizb. Tim Peneliti bidang kehidupan Keagamaan Balai Penelitian dan Pengembangan Agama Makassar, *Pergeseran Paham Keagamaan mahasiswa Muslim di Kawasan Timur Indonesia*. (Makassar: Balai Litbang Agama Makassar, 2015). A research report.

transnational ideology is closer to fundamentalism term which is conceptualized by John L. Esposito into three definitions.[4] First, attempts to return to the basic beliefs. In the context of Islamic society, the effort to return to the Qur'an and hadith is a model of normative life. Second, the term of fundamentalism is strongly influenced by American Protestant traditions. Fundamentalism is a 20th century Protestant movement emphasizing literal interpretation of the gospel as a fundamental aspect to Christianity and human life. For most Christians, this label is a tinge of insult which means closer to static and stagnant conditions. Third, the term fundamentalism is used to define something relates to political activity, extremism, fanaticism, terrorism, and anti-Americanism. John L. Esposito defines these transnational movements as the "Awakening of Islam" or "Islamic activism" which is considered suitable with the values of Islamic tradition such as concepts of *tajdid* (updates) and *islah* (repair).

For close similar reasons, some scholars define this movement as "Islamism". It refers to a view projecting Islam as an ideology that can be applied not only in politics but also in all dimensions of modern societies.[5] According to this group, Islam must determine all aspects of life within the

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[4]John L. Esposito, *Ancaman Islam: Mitos atau Realitas,* (Bandung: Mizan, 1996), p. 17-18.

[5] Oliver Roy. *Globalized Islam the Search for a New Ummah.* (London: Hurst, 2004), p. 58.

society from governance, education, legal system, culture and economics. From this point of view, therefore, the group believes the importance of the presence of a state or an Islamic governance system while most other Muslims groups believe that to be a good Muslim is possible even without be an Islamist.

If this trans-national understanding is substantially similar or equal to Islamism, then the phenomenon of this movement can actually be drawn back to historical roots of Islamic awakening and renewal which have flourished in the Middle East since the 18th century, for example Muhammad bin Abdul Wahab (1703- 1787) in central Arabia, the 19th and 20th centuries movements led by Jamaludin al-Afghani (1839-1897), Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905), and Rashid Ridha (1865-1935) (Fealy and Bubalo, 2007; 30). The Abdul Wahab's movement to return to the *as-salaf ash-shalih* (the first three generations since the Prophet Muhammad), which is also known as Wahhabi movement, overshadowed the birth of Hassan Al-Banna's *Ikhwanul Muslimin* (Muslim Brotherhood) in Egypt in 1928. Al Banna viewed the Western's threats are not only physical but also intellectual and spiritual. Thus, they must be countered by returning to the basic teachings of Islam and create *al-nizham al-Islami* or Islamic state system.

After Al-Banna's death, his ideology was further fueled by his powerful follower, Sayyid Qutb in the late of 50's. This figure was executed by the Egyptian government in 1966. Previously, after the Egyptian government's repression policy

on *Ikhwanul Muslimin*, some of its activists fled to Saudi Arabia. One of them was Said Ramadhan who later became one of the founders of *Rabithah al-Alam Islami*. Al-Banna's son-in-law then moved to Geneva to develop the Ikhwan's ideology movements in Europe. Muhammad Qutb, the younger brother of Sayyid Qutb also moved to Saudi Arabia then became a lecturer at King Abdul Aziz University Jeddah. He taught for years and one of his students was Osama bin Laden.[6]

In the era of the 50s, Taqiudin Al-Nabhani (1909-1997) also founded *Hizbut Tahrir* in East Jerusalem, the area which was controlled by Jordan. He criticized the *Ikhwanul Muslimin* as a very moderate movement. The Israeli-Palestinian conflicts had been seen by Taqiudin as a wider reflection of conflicts between Islam and non-Islam or Western worlds. To win the conflict, he considered an inception of an international Islamic caliphate which cover Arab regions and stretch into non-Arab territories.

The transmission path of Islamism ideas to Indonesia according to some of these studies at least through three areas.[7] First, social movements. In this path, the transmission of ideas was carried by students studying in the Middle East, such as at Cairo's Al-Azhar University, the Islamic University

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[6]Abdurrahman Wahid (*ed*), *Ilusi Negara Islam: Ekspansi Gerakan Islam Transnasional di Indonesia.* (Jakarta: Gerakan Bhineka Tunggal Ika-the Wahid Institute-the Maarif Institute, 2009), p. 82.

[7]Fealy Greg and Anthony Bubalo. *Jejak Kafilah: Pengaruh Radikalisme di Indonesia.* (Bandung: Mizan, 2007), p. 84.

of Madinah, the University of Ummul Qura Mecca, the University of al-Imam Muhammad bin Saud in Riyadh, and King Abdul Aziz University. Meanwhile, the main channel of the jihadist group was through the Afghan war during 1980s which later formed the Al-Qaeda and *Jamaah Islamiyah* groups.

Second, through education and da'wah. Organizations and some people from Middle Eastern countries including Egypt and Kuwait have been actively involved in education and da'wah in Indonesia. Their agencies include the attaché of the Saudi embassy in Jakarta, Rabithah Alam Islami, the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO), the Word Assembly Muslim Youth (WAMY), and non-governmental charities such as al-Haramain - whose branches were categorized as supporting terrorist organizations by the United States (Fealy and Bibalo; 92). Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Arab (LIPIA - Institute of Islamic and Arab Sciences), which is a branch of al-Imam Muhammad bin Saud University in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, is also considered as one of institutions promoting the *Ikhawanul Muslimin* and *Salafi* ideologies. Some of the university alumni have become the Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS- the Justice and Prosperity Party) officials. Sidney Jones's research reveals that most of the LIPIA alumni become influential figures in the Salafi movement in Indonesia through education and publications (Fealy; 96). The three organizations that have significantly particular supports from Saudi are Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (Indonesia Islamic Da'wah Council - DDII), Jamiat Islam wa al-Irsyad and PERSIS.

Third, through publications and the internet. A number of medias both printed and online such as books in Arabic as well as their translated version have also become one of the most effective transmission lines of *Ikhwanul Muslimin* and Salafi ideologies. Some book publishers in Indonesia even particularly publish or translate salafi and Ikhwanul Muslimin books. Greg Fealy and Bubalo's study further mention that there are three main flows of the Islamist movement in Indonesia. First, I*khwanul Muslim* which was adopted by tarbiyah movements and began to spread in colleges during 1980s and early 1990's. At that time, of course, the movements grew as underground movements to avoid pressure from the Soeharto's regime. The movements then found their momentum when the Soeharto regime collapsed. Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia (KAMMI - Indonesian Muslim University Students' Action Union) was established in April 1998, some of its leaders then established the Partai Keadilan Sejahtera are their product. Second, the salafi group which is mostly based on da'wah and education, for example the Al-Sofwah Foundation, the Ihsa at-Turost Foundation, and Al-Haramain al-Khoiriyah. The most remarkable salafi movement is Forum Ahlus Sunnah Waljamaah (FKAWJ) which supported the inception of Laskar Jihad in 1998, led by Jafar Umar Tholib, but banned in October 2002. Third, the jihadi groups. This group type is the most extreme Islamist group movements allowing violence and killing such as suicide bombings. Jaringan Islamiyah (JI-Islamiyah network)

established on 1 January 1993 by Abdullah Sungkar is one of the jihadi groups. These jihadi network members committed some suicide bombings in Indonesia, for example Imam Samudera and his friends.

The pattern of transformation and regeneration of trans-national Islamic groups in Indonesia is utilized through educational institutions such as universities and schools. Since 1980s this group has been known as *usroh* movements and spread on campuses through Lembaga Dakwah Kampus (LDK-the Campus Da'wah Institute). The movements also targeted public high schools through their extracurricular activities of Kerohanian Islam (ROHIS).

Hizb ut-Tahrir: A Model of Islamic Political Awareness

John L. Esposito divides the Islamic scholars in response to the relationship between Islam and politics into three major groups.[8] The first group is a conservative group that has entirely given a "blueprint" of early period of Islamic political system. According to this group, the Islamic political system has been completed in the time of the Prophet and the Caliphs. Today's Muslims only need to apply the previously formulated and exemplified concepts in the earlier period of Islam by the Prophet and the Caliphs (*khilafah ala minhajun nubuwwah*). The second group is the neo-traditionalist group. The group is similar to conservative groups in terms of their

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[8]John L. Esposito, *Islam and Politik*, (Jakarta: PT. Bulan Bintang: 1990), p. 302-304.

political views on ideal Islamic political system. However, this group still gives an open space for interpretations and formats of the Islamic government system. The main difference between the two groups are the first conservative groups opposed democracy and political struggles through parliament while the second group follows democracy and struggles through parliament. The third group is a group of Islamic scholars and thinkers known as reformers (*mujaddid*). They argue that the early period of Islam is the ideal era of normative divine values. The reformers sharply distinguish between Islamic values and Islamic principles. They believe that the Islamic principles are based on revelations and cannot be changed by any institutions and customs in the Islamic world due to historical and social reality development. This group provides open spaces for Islam to adapt and adopt other cultures both in social and political institutions. The first group was represented by Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT), the second group represented by the Ikhwanul Muslimin, and the third group was a group of reformers such as Jamaluddin al-Afghani, Muhammad Abduh, Rashid Ridha, and so forth.

HT is a model of Islamic political awareness based on the *blueprint* of the past *khilafah minhajun nubuwwah*'s governance and political model. The awareness of political Islam is strongly based on Muslims and Islam countries conditions experiencing a downturn and under the control of Western dominations and hegemonies especially after the colonialism era. Romantic memories of golden age of Islam when its civilization and glory of science controlled and

influenced the world inspire the HT, especially when considering the 20ᵗʰ century Muslims' conditions which are at the inferiority point of civilization.

The goals to restore Islam as a civilization ruler, a key of knowledge, and the superiority of Islam over others *(Islamu ya'lu wala yu'la alaih)* become lighters strengthening the HT's political consciousness. The system of *Khilafah Islamiyah* (*khilafah ala minhajun nubuwwah*) is seen as the only solution to all problems faced by Muslims as well as a unifying formula to all Muslim countries to unite as a single ruler of the world. Disparity of *das sein* and *das solen* and paradoxes of Muslims in the past and present become objective reasons for the HT's strengthening political awareness. In addition, it is also strengthened by a conservative interpretation of sacred text doctrines which are formally-symbolically interpreted to produce conclusions supporting the *Khilafah Islamiyah* as the only solution. The model of orthodox interpretation becomes an epistemological *manhaj* of HT in systematizing and internalizing its concepts in the form of consciousness and political ideology propagandas. The HT's style of political awareness is a reflection of bottomless frustration from a group of people, especially young people when facing uncertain futures.[9]

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[9]Noerhaidi Hasan, "'Jalan Lain Menuju Demokrasi", A Preface to Ainur Rofiq al-Amin, *Membongkar Proyek Khilafah ala Hizbut tahrir di Indonesia* (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2012, p. xiv-xv.

HT is a model of romantic political consciousness that idealizes the past for the future. The past is the complete blue print and should be supported to be realized in the future. An awareness of Islamic universalism which is packed in the concept of internationalism/globalism also becomes a trigger for HT's political awareness. The international political awareness is the basis of HT's struggle to break boundaries of nation-state in single power of *Khilafah Islamiyah*. This political consciousness finds its momentum as a form of resistance to Western dominations and hegemonies over Islam, as well as the trigger to lift Muslims from their inferiority. However, is this political consciousness model appropriate to today's Muslims contexts and futures and perfectly compatible with the ideal of Islam as *rahmatan lil alamin*? It seems that HT needs to read and reflect on how the theocratic ideas and history of Islamic *Khilafah* had encouraged the emergence of authoritarian rulers who oppress the people in the name of God and take refuge behind the power of God.

Khilafah Islamiyah is a form of human creativity in the form of political ideas for a better world. As a view and concept, it is legitimate to be offered as a discourse. However, this idea would be problematic when it is postulated into a standard idea and viewed as a blueprint of a fixed Islam model. This consciousness model will, of course, be a latent danger that will lead Muslims to a deeper deterioration due to internal divisions and conflicts. Many Muslim scholars and thinkers, in the past and the present time, disagree with the

idea of political awareness of HT. Furthermore, the HT's concept could provoke a clash among Muslims if the concept is insisted and treated as the only concept conforming the Islamic concept and denying other Muslims political concept. Therefore, HT must realize when upholding the *khilafah* idea and should not make it as an obligation.

Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia: Da'wah and Siyasah Movements

Is the HT's movement in Indonesia a da'wah or a *siyasah* (politic) movement? To answer this question, we need to discuss the background of HT's establishment as a trans-national movement. Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT) or Liberation Party is an international Islamic political and ideological organization actively struggling for the establishment of *Khilafah Islamiyah*. Hizb ut Tahrir was founded in Al Quds City, East Jerusalem, Palestine in 1953 by Taqiyuddin al-Nabhani (1909-1977 AD).[10] The establishment of HT based on a belief that every century a new figure or reformer will come, develop and improve conditions of Muslims and Islam communities including in the 20th century. This belief motivates Islamic movements in the Middle East, especially in Palestine. The movement spirit is driven by the socio-political situations of third world societies which, at that time, were hit by economic, political, cultural, psychological, and

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[10]Ihsan Samarah. *Biografi Singkat Taqiyuddin al-Nabhani*. (Bogor: al-Izzah Press), 2002. p. 4.

spiritual crises. The crises were not only limited to certain countries but to the Islamic world in general. The crises were an accumulation of various problems caused by failures of Islamic nation's development, social and economic development and the collapse of Islamic military power then supported by widespread hatred against non-Muslims or Western nations.[11]

Based on this, the presence of HTI in Indonesia cannot be separated from a movement that actually carry the *siyasah* (*politic*) mission in order to develop *Khilafah Islamiyah*. In order to realize the goal, the HT's movements are performed through extra parliamentary path, for example through a door to door da'wah in a form of discussion groups which is known as *halaqah*. Taqiyuddin al-Nabhani's book of *Nizhamul Islam* is the first book that will be discussed in *halaqah*. The book contains a collection of doctrines regarding HT's views and concepts that will be taught to its new members. As a religious movement, HT makes the *da'wah* movement as a model to achieve its *siyasah* (politics) goal and its final goal to create *Khilafah Islamiyah*. The *Khilafah Islamiyah* jargon has always been the ultimate word for every issue occurring in the midst of Muslims.

Dakwah movement has been the HT's model and conducted through a penetration to *Lembaga Dakwah Kampus* (the Campus Da'wah Institute - LDK) since the early decades

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[11]Imdadun Rahmat. *Arus Baru Islam Radikal: Transmisi Revivalisme Islam Timur Tengah ke Indonesia. (*Jakarta: Erland., 2002), p. 1.

of 80's. By mid 1990s, HT's ideas began to spread to different levels of society through preaching cadres in mosques, offices, companies and families, as well as through publications, for example *Al-Islam* bulletin and monthly magazine *Al- Wa'ie* which have specific themes and become references in various discussion activities, seminars and even marches or demonstrations. When Indonesia entered the reform era; a widely open momentum was available for HT to legalize its movement. In 2000, HT held the International Conference of *Khilafah Islamiyah,* in Senayan Stadium, Jakarta. The conference was the first public activity of HTI under the name of Hizbut Tahrir. It was predicted that about 5000 people attended the event. Since that, the Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) officially and openly conducted its activities to introduce ideas, programs, agendas and leadership to the public.

Based on Balai Litbang Agama's (Research and Development Centre of Ministry of Religious Affairs in Makassar) study on "*Pergeseran Paham Keagamaan mahasiswa Muslim di Kawasan Timur Indonesia* - Religious Shifting of Muslim Students in Eastern Region of Indonesia" found that HTI has greatly influenced LDKs in some campuses in Kawasan Timur Indonesia (Eastern Region of Indonesia - KTI). The study also revealed that universities in Kendari city were greatly influenced by HTI's penetrations, for example Haluoleo University, IAIN Kendari, and Muhammadiyah University of Kendari. The effects of HTI have also massively spread to schools through the *Kerohanian Islam Sekolah*

(Schools Sprituality Organization-ROHIS). HTI manages to spread its influences among young Muslims through an intensive and massive approaches to LDKs and ROHIS. The HTI's propagations and movements are unique. It is because the HTI does not only discuss basic standard themes in Islamic da'wah, such as *aqidah* (faith), *ibadah* (ritual worship), and *muamalah* (commercial and civil acts under the Islamic law) but also current themes and issues regarding with capitalism, neo-liberalism, and other global themes. The HTI's *da'wah* themes are always relevant with the current situations. Through the bulletin of *al-Islam*, HTI managed to spread its propagandas and agendas to public through mosques. As a result, a great number of mosques have been subscribed to the bulletin and then distributed them for free before Friday congregation prayers. The bulletin themes are up-to-date with national and global, social and economic issues. These issues are presented with sufficient critics and always ended with the HTI's ultimate solution of *Khilafah Islamiyah* to all problems.

HTI must be recognized to be successfully develop *da'wah* and *siyasah* movements as a united model. Therefore, it is no wonder if thousands of people always attend HTI's actions, especially young Muslims. HTI is a da'wah movement with a distinctive Islamic understanding and different with other Islamic movements. Thus, the HTI movements should not be seen as, *an sich,* only a political movement although politics is the main brand of HTI's movement with the *Khilafah Islamiyah* as the key and essential theme. As a political

movement, HTI organizes itself as a movement carrying the idea of establishing the global *Khilafah Islamiyah* through extra parliamentary ways. HTI develops Islamic *da'wah* for the purpose of implementing Islam teaching and values in life therefore the Islamic teaching becomes the basis of the State and constitution and law (*qanun*). The Islamic faith based on *aqidah aqliyah* (thoughts) and *aqidah siyasiyah* (politics) are the basis to emit rules and guidance in solving human life problems, whether in the field of politics, economy, education, social society and others. From this view, therefore, the HTI's *da'wah* and *siyasah* movements could be understood.

Khilafah vis a vis *Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia* (Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia – NKRI)

HTI movements in Indonesia will, of course, reap resistances even it can be considered as "a latent danger" threatening the existence of NKRI and Pancasila (The Five Principles of National Ideology). The HTI's idea of *Khilafah Islamiyah* will face challenges from the existence of NKRI and Pancasila as the state ideology of Indonesia. The concept of *Khilafah Islamiyah* is 180 degrees different to the concept of NKRI and Pancasila. As a result, the HTI's concept directly negates the NKRI and Pancasila. It can be seen from the HTI's jargons propagating democracy as a *kufr* (infidel) system, the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI) and Pancasila are not in accordance with Islam, rejection to the concept of nation state, and other jargons that always confront Islam and Indonesia's values and

concepts. Since 2000, HTI has intensified and regularly conducted open activities such as actions, conferences, and marches to campaign its main goal of *Khilafah Islamiyah*. On practical levels, HTI has shown its paradoxes by criticizing democracy and its system. Howewer, at the same time HTI also exploits the democratic climate in Indonesia to safely propagate the HTI's ideas and goals.

In many countries, especially in Muslim countries, HT gets resistance, rejection, even bans from the governments which formally prohibit HT activities in their countries. The rejections and bans of HT's *da'wah* and political movements are reasonable as a form of prevention. It is because the existence of HT in a country would threat the country's government system. In Indonesia, especially after the reformation, it seems that HTI has open opportunities to act and freely criticize the state and government system of Indonesia. There are hardly any meaningful rejections regarding HTI's activities until early 2017 when Barisan Ansor Serbaguna (Multipurpose Ansor Troops - Banser NU) with its power formally rejects all HTI's public activities.

The actions undertaken by Banser NU get supports from various groups and organizations which believe the HTI is a threat to the NKRI and Pancasila. The Banser NU's actions are responses to the HTI which courageously criticize and reject the NKRI and Pancasila concepts. At a structural level, a discourse to disperse HTI as a mass organization has been raised by the government. The plan to dissolve HTI based on the view that HTI and its *Khilafah* idea are threats to

the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI) and Pancasila.

Responding to the government's accusations that the HTI is a threat to Pancasila and NKRI, the HTI's spokesman, Ismail Yusanto, argued that the view about the Khilafah's threats to the NKRI is false. It is because the real threats of the NKRI and Pancasila are secularism and neo-imperialism. Ismail Yusanto stated that *sharia* will actually save Indonesia from a collapse because of secular system and the *Khilafah* will stop the neo-imperialism that is now afflicting Islamic countries, including Indonesia.[12] The writer opines that Ismail Yusanto's statements are forms of diplomatic language to avoid direct and frontal expressions of the idea of Islamic Caliphate that will replace the Unitary State of Indonesia and Pancasila. It should be noted that concepts and forms of Islamic Caliphate (*Khilafah Islamiyah*) and Islamic *Sharia* will be fundamentally different to Pancasila as the ideology of this country and nation.

Khilafah and NKRI (Pancasila) are two diametrically different concepts. Thus, accepting one concept will eventually mean a rejection to the other. Therefore, Indonesia's government and people must be aware of the HTI's propagandas and doctrines although until now the HTI has not shown any sign of deceptions and coups. The HTI only conducts marches and campaigns showing supports to

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[12]http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id/2007/12/04/khilafah-dan-nkri/. Accessed on May 6, 2017.

Khalifah system. The HTI with its *khilafah* concept and NKRI relations reach its climax on May 8, 2017 when the government through Menteri Koordinator Politik Hukum dan Keamanan (the Coordinating Minister for the Political, Law and Security Sector - MENKOPOLHUKKAM) declared the dissolution of HTI as a mass organization in Indonesia. The dissolution step can be understood as a form of the government early warning regarding with all kinds of ideas and efforts to change the political system and governance of the NKRI and Pancasila. On the other hand, the dissolution of HTI can be understood as backward steps injuring and violating democracy and freedom of speech. Everyone is free to express his/her ideas although the idea is different from the mainstream's. The government should take the role and open an intensive dialogue with the HTI while conducting real movements and actions to protect the NKRI and Pancasila concepts by strengthening national awareness especially to younger generation.

The dissolution steps will not entirely reach the target and reduce the influence of HTI and its movements. It is because HT actually does not need a state or a country since from the beginning the HT has rejected any state and country concepts which are considered as modern political systems. In its movements, the HT has been already well-established and effectively use models of cell movements. Therefore, it would be difficult for the government to fully control the HT's movements. The dissolution steps are not impossible to further strengthen the HTI's militancy as the party which is

truly out of the state system and has a high morale to change the system and ideology of Indonesia. The government and people of Indonesia should not ignore that the HTI as a transnational movement having an extensive worldwide network. Therefore, it seems very difficult to completely halt the HT's movements and influences to Muslims in Indonesia. The most appropriate strategy is to balance the HTI's discourses by strengthening our national outlook (NKRI and Pancasila) as the truly idea for Indonesia contexts.

Conclusion

In terms of academics and the Western literatures, the transnational ideology is equally to the fundamentalism term, popularized by John L. Esposito, which is conceived as attempts to return to the basic believes and concepts related to political activity, extremism, fanaticism, terrorism, and anti-Americanism. The spreading patterns of trans-national ideas and Islamic movements in Indonesia through three channels, i.e. social movements, education institutions and propagandas, and through publications and the Internet.

HT is a model of Islamic political consciousness based on the blue print models of past Islam governance model of *Caliphate minhajun nubuwwah*. The Muslims awareness of Islamic politic (*siyasah*) is a response to conditions of Muslims and Islam countries experiencing adversity, control, and Western domination and hegemony especially after colonialism era. The orthodox model of interpretation becomes *manhaj* of HT in systematizing and internalizing its

epistemological concepts in the form of propaganda of political ideology. The HT's political awareness is no less than reflections of group of people's deep frustrations, especially young people when facing futures challenges.

The presence of HT in Indonesia cannot be separated from an organization which actually have the mission of *siyasah* (politic) to achieve its main goal *Khilafah Islamiyah*. In order to realize the goal, the HT's extra-parliamentary choice makes its movements conducted through a cultural door to door *da'wah,* in the form of a discussion known as *halaqah*. The HT makes its *da'wah* or missionary movement as a model and the *siyasah* as its final destination in achieving the goal of *Khilafah Islamiyah*. Also, the HT intensively utters the *Khilafah Islamiyah* jargon as the final word to any problems that occur in the midst of the Muslims.

The HTI movements in Indonesia, of course, will receive resistances and be regarded as " a latent danger" threatening the existence of the Republic of Indonesia and Pancasila. The idea of the *Khilafah Islamiyah* as a political system*,* which are essentially different with the NKRI and Pancasila concepts, will be rejected. It is because the HTI concept will directly negate the NKRI and Pancasila.

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