

A Preliminary Study of *Jemaah Islamiyah* in Indonesia and The Doctrine of Suicide Bombing

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Abstract. The Existence of *Jemaah Islamiyah* in the world, particularly in Indonesia, cannot be underestimated by the Indonesian government. It is extremely needed a serious attention to tackle this movement. This essay entails a strong network between *JI* in Indonesia and *al-Qaeda* Link in Afganistasn. Although the emergence of *JI* in Indonesia cannot be separated from a former rebellion to the Indonesia New Order which was called *Darul Islam*, the development of *JI* has remarkably changed through building strong networking to international link like *al-Qaeda*. A number of evidence has been provided in this article to strengthen the danger of this organization. The doctrine of jihad through suicide bombing fuels the threat of *JI* as an international terrorist organization. Jihad was believed as the holy war against the United States, Israel, Europe, and anyone else who oppose their vision of world governed by shariah. *JI* itself were supported by multitude schools, charitable associations, banks, business activities and Islamic world government.

Keywords: *Jemaah Islamiyah, al-Qaeda, jihad*

Introduction

Of all series bomb attack happened in Indonesia, Bali bomb, on 12 October 2002, is widely considered as the most serious explosion by terrorist since 9/11. The Bali bomb attack was reported 202 people killed, including 88 Australians, and 350 people were seriously injured. It certainly came as a shock to Indonesian government and all parts of the world. Bali was previously called as a paradise of the earth, it has remarkably changed into a centre of terrorist. In this regard, *Jemaah*

Islamiyah (JI) was believed as the actor for this shocking bomb. *Jemaah Islamiyah*, as contended by Pevlova (2006), is an Arabic term which connotes “a society of muslims” or “a worldwide community of Muslims”.¹ Jones (2005) noted that *Jemaah Islamiyah* (JI) is probably the most popular ever known of all the Islamic terrorist organizations in Southeast Asia. It is responsible of a series of bombings in Indonesia since May 2002 and continued through the explosion in front of the Australian embassy in Jakarta in September 2004. JI members, as Jones (2005) continues, have been involved in many of the major bombings in Philippines between 2000 and early 2005. In all cases, the bombs were designed to kill innocent people or civilian. This result in the United Nations lists them as the terrorist organization.²

According to Korschade (2006), JI was formed from the Darul Islam separatist movement in Indonesia during the 1950s. The goal of Darul Islam was the creation of an Indonesian Islamic state, and the movement was responsible for several uprisings through the 1950s and 1960s in Indonesia. Although Darul Islam was suppressed and forced to operate underground during the late mid-1960s, several armed militant organizations formed from the group in the mid to late 1980s; one of these was JI. JI established radical Islamic boarding schools, and expanded their influence into Malaysia and throughout South East Asia. JI recruits trained in Afghanistan from 1985, after being tunneled through *Makhtab al-Khadamat lil Mujahideen al-Arab* (Afghan Services Bureau) to Camp Saddah, in which recruits were schooled in a three-year training course that consisted of weapons, tactics, and explosives instruction, combined with strict *salafist* indoctrination. The last class for Afghan training of JI members arrived in 1991, following the Soviet withdrawal. The subsequent year, following a disagreement between JI leader Sungkar and another senior Darul Islam leader, Ajengan Masduki, Sungkar established JI as

¹See, Elena Pavlova, “From a Counter-Society to a Counter-State Movement: Jemaah Islamiyah According to PUPJI, *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*. 30, (2007), pp.777-800

²See, Sydney Jones, “The Changing Nature of Jemaah Islamiyah”, *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 59,2 (2005),pp.169-178.

an organization distinct from Darul Islam. JI now had the unambiguous goal of establishing a pan-Islamic state in Southeast Asia. From 2000, JI attempted to assassinate the Philippines Ambassador to Indonesia, detonated 38 bombs in churches across the Indonesian archipelago, and attempted to assassinate Indonesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri.³

Baker (2005) point out that JI, as an Islam militant organization, use terrorism as the medium to create pan-Asian Islamic state centered in Indonesia. JI has been closely associated with *al-Qaidah* network, both and before 9/11 attack. Since 2001, many JI leaders and members have been arrested, imprisoned, such as spiritual leader, Abu Bakar Baasyir. Others have been killed resisting arrest as Abuza (2003) stated that more than 160 JI members were arrested. According to Baker (2005), the remaining JI members have demonstrated a continuing ability to execute major terrorist attacks. Nevertheless, as contended by Abuza (2003), JI powers to attack become lesser and lesser than they were years ago.

Based on the explanation above, it is clearly demonstrated JI posed a message that they are a large terrorist organization in Southeast Asia. That's why Barton (2005, cited in Tan, 2006) suggests that although the quantity of radical Islam in Indonesia is limited compared to Muslim population in this country, we need to give it serious attention due to creeping radicalization. From these points of view, this paper will address *Jemaah Islamiyah* in terms of its pattern of organization, financial network, link to *al-Qaeda*, and more importantly the concept of suicide bombing.⁴

The Pattern of Organization

JI as an international organization is a top down command. According to Baker (2005), JI consists of the *Emir*, or supreme leader and the Regional *Syura*, a consultative council of senior JI members. *Emir*, as stated by Pavlova (2006), is

³Stuart Koschade, S., "A Social Network Analysis of Jemaah Islamiyah: The application to Counter Terrorism and Intelligence", *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 29 (2006), pp.559-575.

⁴See, Andrew T.H. Tan, "Jemaah Islamiyah: Radical Islam in Indonesia (Book Review)", *Pacific Affairs*. 79, 1 (2006), pp 149-151.

normally assisted by *Qiyadah* (Executive) in conducting his administrative duties.⁵ In this sense, Abu Bakar Baasyir served as the JIs' *Emir* at least until he was arrested and taken into custody by Indonesian authorities. Some regard him as the spiritual leader rather than top decision maker. Baasyir was suggested that he was in charge with series of bombing attack across the country through educating and exhorting the radical Muslims who resorts to violence. Baasyir was accompanied by Abdullah Sungkar, who saw themselves as the descendants of earlier Muslim separatist movement, such as Darul Islam, and spent decades working to promote Islamic fundamentalism in Southeast Asia.⁶

Baker (2005) goes on to state that the Regional *Syura* involves the JIs' senior personnel and serves as a top policy making group. It is equivalent to the *Shura Majlis*, or consultative council that *al-Qaeda* has used to its top liberations. This has several functional components, such as operations, security, recruitment, and communication. Both operations and security are crucial to JIs' ability to undertake terrorist attack.⁷

According to Jones (2005), JI established four major territorial divisions known as the *mantiqi*, with responsibilities for JI operations across Southeast Asia, as follow:

1. *Mantiqi 1* covering peninsular Malaysia, Singapore and Southern Thailand. Baker (2005) stated that this group works in conjunction with *Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia* (KMM). This group mainly concentrates on recruitment and indoctrination of JI members, particularly through the Islamic boarding school in Johor Malaysia. According to Desker (2003), this *mantiqi* is regarded as providing the economic wherewithal for operations.
2. *Mantiqi 2* covering Java, Sumatera, and most of other major islands of Indonesia except for Sulawesi. It plays an important role in supporting JI activities in Indonesia's

⁵See Elena, *loc. cit*

⁶John C. Baker, "Jemaah Islamiyah" in Brian Jackson et al (ed.), *Aptitude for Destruction: Organizational Learning in terrorist groups and its implications for combating terrorism*. National Institute of Justice: Rand infrastructure and Environment, 2003.

⁷ See *ibid.*,

sectarian conflict through Islamic paramilitary groups or further called *jihad*.

3. *Mantiqi 3* covering the Philippines, Sabah in eastern Malaysia, Sulawesi, and eastern Kalimantan. This group has been important for training JI personnel and supporting its logical network, including the use of MILF training facilities in Mindanao.
4. *Mantiqi 4* covering Australia that focuses primarily on recruiting and fundraising in the large Indonesia diaspora community.⁸

These territorial groups, as contended by Baker (2005), consist of several branches known as *wakalabs*, which comprise operations cell, or *fiab*, that normally consist of four or five JI members. Desker (2003) compares the *mantiqi* and *wakalah* to brigades and battalions, and so on all the way down to the *fiab* squads. Although JIs' organizational structure suggests a hierarchical organization, it was frequently happened that there is strong differences of perspective have existed within the organization, especially in terms of Jihad.⁹

In relation to the sustainability of leadership in four *mantiqi*, Jones (2005) stated that *Mantiqi 1* had already collapsed due the arrest of the leader. That is, however, not to say that it will disrupt the future of JI. Until 2003, many of JIs' top chief leaders for *mantiqi 1* were believed to involve in designing Bali bomb. Nevertheless, they tended to be more internationalist in outlook than other parts of the organization and were more attracted by al-Qaeda

Financial Network

According to Abuza (2003), there are at least eight financial sources of JI in operating their attack. However, only two of them will be explored in detail in this paper, bags of cash and Islamic charities.

Bag of Cash

⁸See, Sydney, *loc cit.*,

⁹See, Barry Desker, "The Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) Phenomenon in Singapore. *Contemporary Southeast Asia*. 25, 3 (2003), pp.489.

Delivery of cash by personal couriers is the most popular way of funding JI operations. According to Malaysian and Singaporean intelligence reports (cited in Abuza, 2003), the JI received some Rp1.35 billion from al-Qaeda since 1996. According to Regional intelligence officials, that year, the JI received Rp250 million, Rp400 million in 1997 and Rp700 million in 2000 (roughly US\$40,000 and US\$70,000 respectively). Umar al-Faruq testified to transferring US\$200,000 to the JIs' Indonesian cell after 2000.¹⁰

Syeikh Abu Abdullah al-Emarati, was popular called Usama bin Laden, was reported to fund JI operations about US\$74,000 through giving Umar al-Faruq to purchase three tons of explosives for JI operations. The Bali bomb was funded by US\$35,000 transferred by Wan Min Mat, believed to be an important JI treasurer in Malaysia, to Mukhlas and Imam Samudra, the key actors of the Bali bombing. However, as Baker (2005) view, the fund was frequently insufficient, particularly to support a larger bombing attack. In this sense, JI members had to rely on criminal activities, such as the robbery of a jewelry store, to generate the cash it needed as it happened in the Bali bomb attack.¹¹

Islamic Charities

Abuza (2003) stated that much of al-Qaedas' as well as JIs' funding are believed to come from charities. Indonesian intelligence officials estimate that 15 to 20 percent of Islamic charity funds are diverted to politically motivated groups and terrorist. In Islamic culture, Muslims are expected to donate 2.5 percent of their net revenue to charity, known as *zakat*. It is a compulsory to every single Muslim through taking some their wealth out to distribute poor people or worthy people. This practice is unregulated, unedited, and thus leads to terrible abuse by groups such as al-Qaeda. There are some 300 private

¹⁰See, Zachari Abuza, "Funding Terrorism in Southeast Asia: The Financial Network of al-Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah. *Contemporary Southeast Asia*. 25,2 (2003), pp. 169.

¹¹See *ibid.*,

charities in Saudi Arabia alone, including 20 established by Saudi intelligence to fund the Afgan Mujahidin. It is estimated that US\$1.6 million per day is donated by wealthy Saudi. Thus, Saudi Arabia is believed as the most important source of fund of al-Qaeda as well as JI.¹²

Despite *zakat* donations, which are obligatory, there are also *infaq* and *sadaqah* donations which are voluntary and made depending on individual circumstances. This is completely unregulated, allowing for financial mismanagement and the diversion of funds to terrorist cells.

Links to al-Qaeda

According to Baker (2005), the first contact between JI and al-Qaeda started when Abdullah Sungkar traveled to Afghanistan and met with Osama bin Laden some time in 1993-1994. Afterwards, both JI and al-Qaeda make agreement to engaged in a number of activities that benefited both of them. The main benefit of JI is access to al-Qaeda training facilities, financial support, and the ability to plan and carry out joint operations.¹³ Likewise, al-Qaeda take advantage from this relationship through gaining support form JI to support terrorist attacks on targets in the region and elsewhere.

The following table clearly demonstrates the chronology of interaction between JI and al-Qaeda.

Table 1. Key interactions between JI and al-Qaeda

Date	Key Interaction
1993–1994	JI is formed by Abdullah Sungkar after a meeting with Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan.
1999–2000	Singapore Fiah Ayub cell leader goes to Afghanistan for training in mid-1999 and later briefs the al Qaeda leadership on JI preparations for a bombing attack on a rail station in Singapore that is routinely used by U.S. military personnel.
January 2000	Hambali, serving both JI and al Qaeda, helps arrange a meeting in Kuala Lumpur that involves some top al

¹²See *ibid.*,

¹³See John, *loc. cit.*,

2000–2002	<p>Qaeda operatives involved in the 9/11 plot as hijackers and the USS <i>Cole</i> attack</p> <p>Omar al-Faruq, al Qaeda’s senior representative in Southeast Asia, works with the JI to undertake surveillance of the U.S. embassies in Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur in preparation for a car bomb attack.</p>
2001	<p>JI member Yazid Sufaat spends several months trying to cultivate anthrax as part of the al Qaeda biological weapons program at a laboratory in Afghanistan.</p>
September 2001– October 2001	<p>JI’s Fiah Musa cell in Singapore is approached by JI leaders and al Qaeda operatives to assist in a plan to bomb specific targets in Singapore (e.g., embassies, U.S. business offices); the plan calls for JI personnel to undertake surveillance and bomb preparations and support activities for al Qaeda suicide truck bombers.</p>

Source:s White Paper, 2003, pp 4-5, 9-12 (cited in Baker, 2003)

Suicide bombing : the noble *jihad*

According to Pavlova (2007), *Jemaah Islamiyah* based themselves on *salafi-jihadist* religious principles and a rigorous methodology of self discipline, inter-body consultation, and internal control mechanism. There are at least three emphasis of JI movement as follow:

1. The emphasis on *Daulah Islamiyah* (Islamic state) as a framework toward the restoration of the global Islamic caliphate. However, Jones (2005) stated that JI organization merely focus on establishing an Islamic state in Indonesia, not a caliphate, not a regional Islamic state in Southeast Asia.
2. The preparation of establishing *Daulah Islamiyah* through a persistent of the individual, the familiy, and the *jamaah* as Islamic entities
3. Concentrate on military training and *Jihad musallah* (armed struggle) as the final outcome and the ultimate test of success for JI long term target.

Those three important movements, *jihad* is becoming the most serious concern of the JI. *Jihad*, to them, will bring peoples’ qualities to the fore and highlight their potential. It was believed that *jihad* is the most virtues in the group ethos. This

principle is strengthened by JI members to prepare them to fight till death in the name of the groups' religious vision and strategic vision.

In general, the notion of *jihad*, as contended by Khosrokhavar (2002), first emerged in Arabia as a result of Islam's ideologicalisation of tribal warfare. Incessant warfare between various tribes was frequent in Arabia, where the heterogeneity between different religious communities (Jewish, Christian and pagan) and divergent interests resulted in constant fighting. Islam gave this type of warfare a unitary meaning by giving it a religious content. Initially, the meaning of *jihad* fluctuated to a greater or lesser extent. It gradually took on the codified meaning of 'for the cause of God' as the universalism gradually established by Islam transcended tribal rivalries and intertribal economic struggles.¹⁴

Jihad, to JI, is the duty of a Muslim to avenge. This can be seen when Fealy (2003) interviewed Amrozi (one of the Bali bombers) saying that "I carry out *jihad* because it's the duty of Muslim, so (that) the America terrorist and their allies understand that the blood of the Muslim community is not shed for nothing". Likewise, Imam Samudra stated that "let it be acknowledged that every single drop of Muslim blood, be it from any nationality and from any place will be remembered and accounted for". From these points of view, it is obvious that *jihad* (armed fighting) is the noble movement among the JI.¹⁵

Fealy (2003) continues to say that many bombers saw themselves as fighting a heroic war against evil. They portray themselves as high minded warriors acting according to the demands of their faith. Indeed, many JI members have stated that they are engaged in a holy struggle and are happy to die as the martyrs for the cause. Imam Samudra, for example, stated:

I have not done anything barbaric that is prohibited by God. The precise path I have taken is Gods' path. Have

¹⁴See, Farhad Khosrokhavar, *Suicide Bombers: Allah's New Martyrs*. (London: Pluto Press, 2002).

¹⁵See, Greg Fealy, "Hating Americans: Jemaah Islamiyah and The Bali Bombing. *ILAS Newsletter*. 31 (2003), pp3-4.

faith that the soldiers of Muhammad will win. However, that victory will certainly have victims. Be certain that I am on the road of *istiqamah* (sincerity), the road of *jihad*. Even if I die, I will die a martyr. I await the enemys' bullet or spear piercing my breast so that I die a martyr.¹⁶

From these points of view, it is shown that the driving force of committing suicide bombing is *jihad*. It plays an important role to guide JI members to attack Western people. Thus, the following table clearly demonstrates a serious of bomb attack by JI members. Some of them were performed by suicide bombing.

Table 2. JI Bomb attacks, 2000-2004

Date	Target and Location	Type of attack and result
August 1, 2000	Residence of the Philippine ambassador to Indonesia (Jakarta)	Single car bomb: 3 killed, 17 wounded
December 24, 2000	Churches and priests in Indonesia (11 cities across Java and Sumatra)	Christmas Eve bombings—38 bombs (20 detonated): 15 killed, 94 wounded
December 30, 2000	Metro Manila, including the light rail Train	Five near-simultaneous bombings; 14 killed, 70 wounded
Late 2001	Foreign embassies (U.S., Israel, UK, Australia), U.S. naval ships, and other Western interests in Singapore	Six large truck bombs: foiled by Singapore police arrests in December 2001
October 12, 2002	2 Bali nightclubs (Kuta, Bali) and the U.S. consulate (Sanur, Bali)	One large car bomb and two smaller bombs: 202 killed, over 500 wounded
August 5, 2003	J.W. Marriott Hotel (Jakarta)	Single car bomb: 12 killed, numerous Wounded
September 9,	Australian embassy	Single truck van bomb:

¹⁶See, *ibid.*,

2004	(Jakarta)	9 killed, nearly 100 wounded
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Source : Report of the Inquiry into the Australian Intelligence Agencies, 2004, p. 41; White Paper, 2003; various TEMPO Magazine articles. (cited in Baker, 2003)

Conclusion

Based on the explanations above, it can be regarded that JI is a serious terrorist organization that need to be concerned among the government, particularly, Indonesian authority where JI centered. The strength financial network with al-Qaeda showed how JI is an international terrorist organization that may threat the harmonious and peaceful of the world. Additionally, the concept of *jihad* which results in committing suicide bombing fuels the danger of this organization. Although, the three Bali bombers, Amrozi, Mukhlas, and Imam Samudra, have been executed by Indonesian prosecutor, the rest of JI members are considered to exist across the country. Thus, an attempt to tackle the expansion of this organization is necessarily required.

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