

The Discourse of Islamic Civil Society in Indonesia during The Reformation

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Abstract. The idea of civil society is still debated. Some Indonesian Muslim intellectuals state that civil society is connected with the situation at the history of Prophet Muhammad in Madinah. As Nurcholis Madjid and Dawam interpret civil society as synonymous with the Indonesian term *masyarakat madani*, which refers to the Islamic society in Madinah which was constructed by the prophet Mohammed. Conversely, Wahid disagrees with Madjid and Dawam's idea of Islamic civil society. Wahid's concept of civil society is linked to his belief that the Pancasila is a more suitable ideology for the development of civil society as it is more accommodating of the ethnic and cultural diversity of Indonesia.

Keywords: *Indonesia, Islamic perspective, Civil Society*

Introduction

The discourse of civil society has been a major concern for many years. It is generally accepted that the concept of civil society was coming from Western. The Western idea of civil society is always looked at the state always contradict with civil society. In Islamic perspective, the idea of civil society is also still debated. Some Indonesian Muslim intellectuals state that civil society is connected with the situation at the history of Prophet Muhammad in Madinah. The concept of Islamic civil society is translated into Indonesia, viz. *Masyarakat madani*. However, the other intellectuals argue that the idea of civil society in Indonesia is related with the concept of *Pancasila* (the five Basic Principles of Indonesia).

Western Civil Society

A brief history of civil society

It is generally accepted that the idea of civil society has its roots in Western civilisation, and is a concept that goes back to the Greek era. Cohen and Arato state that the first version of this concept was from Aristotle when he used the terms *politike koinonia* (political society) that referred to the human nature in terms of man as a political animal or *zōon politikon*. This term was used to depict a political society where every member of society had an equal say in the law. Law was considered an ethos that was a norm and its value not only related to procedure but was also an essential virtue for every interaction in the community.¹ According to Aristotle, despite the existence of a dualism between household and state (*oikos* and *polis*) there was no significant difference between state and society as known in modern political theories.²

Aristotle's ideas influenced Roman thought. Even though there were no significant changes, Cicero developed civil society through his idea of *societas civilis*. Thomas Aquinas further developed this idea in the Middle Ages referring the idea of 'city-state.' This concept was gradually developed and united with the concept of sovereignty to depict kingdom, city, and every kind of cooperation as a unity of institution. One of the famous ideas from Aquinas was *societas civilis res publica*.³

Aquinas' theories were rapidly developed in the modern era, especially in the eighteenth century. The emergence of the civil society concept in the West in the eighteenth century was a consequence of the general crisis that resulted from social changes brought on by the emergence of market economies (land commercialisation, labour, and capital), scientific discovery, and social revolution. At the same time, the traditional social paradigm based on religion began to be disputed. Wood states that:

¹ Jean L. Cohen and Andrew Arato, *Civil Society and Political Theory*, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1992, p. 74

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

The very particular modern conception of civil society – a conception that appeared systematically for the first time in the eighteenth century – is something quite distinct from earlier notions of ‘society’. Civil society presents a separate sphere of human relation and activity, differentiated from the state but neither public nor private or perhaps both at once, embodying not only a whole range of social interactions and the public sphere of the state, but more specifically a network of distinctively economic relations, the sphere of the market place, the arena of production, distribution and exchange.⁴

Even though the concept of civil society was appeared systematically in the eighteenth century, Thomas Hobbes had a concept of civil society in the seventeenth century. AS Hikam explains that Hobbes is not differentiate state and civil society. This concept is appeared because society needs a new entity to minimize social conflict.⁵ This analysis is rasionable because Hobbes is unify state and civil society. Hobbes explains that state is a creation of individu or society who want to create peace from the character of human nature through the concept of social contract. The consequence of the social contract is appeared civil society, and then the society give leadership to someone or institution absolutely, so the state is very strong.

In addition to economic relations, Seligman sees several causes for the emergence of civil society that are not necessarily linked to the emergence of a free market, such as Protestant Christian doctrine and social contract theory with its differentiation of state and society. Civil society theories were further developed by Immanuel Kant in the nineteenth Century. For Kant, civil society was not understandable as a single entity, as it had been explained by Locke and Rousseau, but consisted of two different entities. By means of his political

⁴ Ellen Meiksins Wood, *op. cit.*, p. 239

⁵Lihat AS. Hikam, *Islam Demokrasi dan Pemberdayaan Civil Society* (Jakarta: Erlangga, 2000), h. 116

philosophy, Kant had started to place civil society and the state in contradiction.

The emergence of Hegel's view on civil society was a reaction to the radical view that saw civil society as an autonomous entity in contradiction with the state. According to Hegel, the state and civil society are not two mutually exclusive entities. Civil society had to be controlled by the state, otherwise there could be anarchy. Civil society needs regulations and limitations, a unity of the state through legal control, administration and politics. It is clear that Hegel's point of view subordinated civil society to the state.

Hegel's idea was then developed by Marx. Whilst Hegel's perspective was based on an idealistic paradigm, Marx's conceptualisation of civil society was based on the material, especially economy or what Marx called 'the realm of needs and necessity'. Combining this with his theories of class structured societies; Marx treated civil society as identical to the bourgeois class.

In the last period of modern, the concept of civil society is developed by Anthony Giddens who had developed the structural theory of Marx. Giddens states that we are not enter the era of post-modernism, because we are still live in modern era. Structural theory that developed by Giddens is a way to anticipate the conflict between structure (state) and agency (civil society).⁶

Civil Society at Post-Modern Era

Debate over the concept of civil society has captured the attention of some of the twentieth century's brightest minds. The tendency is to argue that there are two paradigms of civil society: liberal and Marxian. In the Post-Modern era, major developments of the concept have come from Antonio Gramsci, Michel Foucault, Hannah Arendt, and Jurgen Habermas.

⁶ Anthony Giddens, *The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration* (University of California Press, 1984).

It is generally accepted that Gramsci's idea of civil society is a continuation of Marx's concepts, though he offers a critique as well by generating his conception of civil society directly from Hegel.⁷ Gramsci's conception of civil society was intended as a weapon against capitalism, not an accommodation of it. Gramsci formulated the concept of civil society as a central organising principle of socialist theory. The object of this formulation was to acknowledge both the complexity of political power in the parliamentary or constitutional states of the West as well as the difficulty of supplanting a system of class domination. Wood emphasises the point that Gramsci's idea of class power has no clearly visible point of concentration in the state but is diffused through society and its cultural practices. The concept of civil society was used to define the terrain of a new kind of struggle, one which would see the fight against capitalism focus not merely on its economic foundations, but be extended into the realms of culture and ideology in daily life.⁸

According to Cohen, Gramsci re-conceptualised civil society into a tripartite schema where civil society is not only against the state, but also against the economy and the private sphere of the family as well. He took the state, civil society, and the economy to be distinct elements in the social fabric, but he also stressed that they were methodological distinctions used for the purpose of representation, analysis and critical praxis.⁹

In terms of social structure, as in Marx's conception, Gramsci distinguished two levels; civil society and political society or state. Both of these social structures are a part of a superstructure with its infrastructure based on material conditions. However, he disagreed with Marx, arguing that superstructure is not to be determined by infrastructure because material conditions only provide a real condition that can be arrested through rational theory. Gramsci's theory of

⁷ Cohen and Arato, *op. cit.*, p. 142.

⁸ Wood, *op. cit.*, p. 241

⁹ Jean Cohen, "Interpreting the Notion of Civil Society." In *Toward a Global Civil Society*, ed. Michael Walzer, London and New York: Berghahn Books, 1995, p. 37.

political society has one key aspect that relates to the theme of this book. The state is not an impartial apparatus, but is an instrument of the ruling class. Following from this, the state is therefore not representative of general interests, but represents particular class interests. Moreover, for Gramsci, civil society is often seen as a means or domain for the state to maintain its hegemony. It is referred to as the 'trenches' of the modern state, the first line of defence for the ruling class. It has an absorptive capacity in that radical opposition the state may be defused by its tactical inclusion into the domain of civil society. For many, the New Order's acceptance of the existence of Islamic organizations were viewed as such process.

A second important development in the concept of civil society is that provided by Foucault. One of the major concerns in his analysis of civil society is his presentation of the critique of modern civil society, especially his critique of Marx. Foucault's "analysis...takes up the core categories of civil society – law, rights, autonomy, subjectivity, publicity, plurality, the social – in order to show that, far from articulating the limits to domination, they are instead its supports."¹⁰

Foucault does not use the term 'civil society', yet he maintains the differentiation between state and society, which according to Marx was the hallmark of modernity. Unlike Marx however, Foucault does not believe that society and historical development can be understood by narrowing in on its economic substructure and he does not ascribe to the view that class relations are the essential basis of power relations or struggle in modern society. Instead, forms of power can be found in institutions, such as hospitals, schools, prisons, asylums, armies, and the family.¹¹

It is important to note that in relation to modern society, Foucault discusses a new modern development of the discourse and organisation of law and rights.¹² In Foucault's analysis, the

¹⁰ Cohen and Arato, *op. cit.*, p. 257

¹¹ *Ibid*, p. 258

¹² Habermas states that the reorganisation of rights has had nothing to do with normative developments internal to law since the eighteenth

procedural principles of democratic legitimacy, in civil, political, and social rights are expression of power. With specific regard to the controversy of civil society versus state, Foucault thoughts on the Polish Solidarity movement provide useful point *vis a vis* the Indonesian *reformasi* (reform) movement. Foucault argued that the image of Solidarity as a movement of civil society against the state seriously over-simplified complex relationship in Poland. He also suggested that when one assimilates the powerful social movement that had just traversed that country to a revolt of civil society against the state, one misunderstands the complexity and multiplicity of the confrontation, a point equally applicable to analysis of the last days of Suharto.¹³ Foucault was thus prepared to reject the concept of civil society on analytical grounds, because the idea of civil society as a milieu makes it difficult to distinguish from the state.¹⁴ Foucault's empirical and formal rejection of the continued usefulness of civil society certainly has potential for analysis of Suharto's fall which involved a multitude of different groups with often competing objectives. Likewise it has potential for the wider analysis of the process of civil society formation of which the establishment of Wahdah Islamiyah, KPPSI, and LAPAR were part of. However, the complexity of Foucauldian analysis is not taken up in this paper in the interests of clarity. Civil society may well be a milieu, but there are concrete features which distinguish it from the state in the Indonesian, particularly in South Sulawesi case.

One of the most challenging critiques of modern civil society has been forwarded by Hannah Arendt. Whilst her theories are wide in scope¹⁵, of particular interest to this book is her analysis of totalitarian rule and its implications for civil society. Arendt has shown that under the conditions of totalitarian rule, friendship and any other type of social

century, or with the explosion of civil rights in this century. Jurgen Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987, p. 286.

¹³ Keith Tester, *Civil Society*, London: Routledge, 1992, pp. 145-146.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ Jean L. Cohel and Andrew Arato, *op. cit.*, p. 178

relationship arouse suspicion. In order to legitimise its rule, a totalitarian regime must completely isolate its citizenry. Family ties and relations between friends which provide a sense of being, security and political confidence, are removed. This isolation prevents participation in the public sphere. Arendt emphasises that the opportunity to organise in groups and to have discussion taking place publically within these groups are requisites for political participation. Arendt argues that democratic freedoms are based on the equality of all citizens before the law, but this equality only makes sense and it can only work when the citizens belong to distinct groups that belong to, and have a potentially effective role, within a social or political hierarchy.¹⁶

A further important development in the concept of civil society comes from Jurgen Habermas. Habermas's conception attempts to recapture a richer set of mediations between civil society and state. He also wants to re-emphasise the normative claims of the public sphere. Habermas's analyses takes up the Hegelian project of bringing together the normative achievements of both the ancients and the modern.¹⁷

Habermas inserts the emergence and decline of a new type of public sphere into the history of modern society. While Arendt associated only the decline of the new type of public sphere with the rise of the modern state and economy, Habermas believes the rise, and subsequent decline of this sphere is related to this event. In Habermas's opinion, the public sphere is related to economic activities that have grown vastly beyond the limits of the household, as well as other autonomous spheres, such as freedoms of speech, press, assembly, and communication.¹⁸

¹⁶ Susanne Spulbeck, "Anti-Semitism and Fear of the Public Sphere in a Post-Totalitarian Society East Germany." In *Civil Society: Challenging Western Models*, ed. Chris Hann and Elizabeth Dunn, London and New York: Routledge, 1989.

¹⁷ Cohen and Arato, *op. cit.*, p. 211.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 211

For Habermas, the definition of public and private opinion in modern society through its mass media involves differentiation between informal, personal opinion within the private sphere and formal institutionalised opinion in the public sphere. Public opinion, from Habermas' point of view, is only formed to the degree that critical expression mediates between the two spheres. In other words, participating in political life as a responsible citizen is only possible if individuals have the opportunity to express their opinion in the public sphere.¹⁹

In his critique of Marx's opinion, Habermas recognises that the relationship of a categorical framework for the concept of civil society is ambiguous. In the narrow sense (that of Marx), civil society refers to the sphere of the private, bourgeois economy. When used in this sense, the public sphere is to be understood as mediation between society and state. However, the term civil society means that all the spheres in society are juxtaposed to the state. In this case, civil society will include the public sphere as well as the domestic one, and thus individuals will have three fundamental roles, such as human being, bourgeois, and citizen.²⁰

All the above theories have been important in presenting civil society as a contested and multifaceted domain. Certainly Gramsci's basic book regarding the civil society as the realm through which the state extends its hegemony have proved useful for critics of the existence of Islamic organization in South Sulawesi, viz. Wahdah Islamiyah, Komite Persiapan Penegakan Syariat Islam (KPPSI), and Lembaga Advokasi Pendidikan Anak Rakyat (LAPAR). For pro-reformation groups, the conditions of totalitarianism are expounded by Anthony Giddens, who provides a theoretical explanation of the real life conditions experienced by many under Suharto's New Order. The link between an expanding public sphere and the expansion of private economic interests beyond the household (Gramsci and Giddens) also deserve attention in regard to the emergence of the Asadiyah and Darul Dakwah Islamiyah

¹⁹ Susanne Spulbeck, *op. cit.*, p.76.

²⁰ Cohen and Arato, *op. cit.*, p. 219 – 220.

organizations (they have successfully been create Muslims middle class' in South Sulawesi). The issue of Islam is one factor which makes the application of these western models complicated. Indeed, the broadly Marxist interpretations which tend to deny the distinction between state and civil society are often at odds with interpretations within Indonesia itself. Often the concept is understood in more 'simple' terms akin to Gellner's definition which refers to a society that consists of autonomous non-governmental institutions that are strong enough to keep the state at a balance. Balance means this group has the ability to hold back the state in its domination of social life. However, this concept is not intended to obscure the state's activity in its role as a referee in any conflict that could destroy of the arrangement of society.²¹ In general, according to Gellner, civil society is a strong institution capable of preventing political tyranny by the state. Its central characteristic is the existence of individual freedom where civil society as an institution can be entered and exited by the individual.²² The following chapter traces the development Indonesian civil society in a manner consistent with Gellner's basic model. It outlines the nature of the state under the New Order and the emergence of civil society as a challenger to state authority in the 1990s. Of particular interest is the way in which excesses of state intervention into all spheres of life provided the discontent which fuelled the *reformasi* (reform) movement. However, in addition to the above described theories, significant alternative views on the precise nature of civil society in Indonesia exist which give precedence to the role of Islam, something which Gellner disputes.

Islamic Civil Society: Debating the Issue of Civil Society

Democracy in Islam is a universal idea. There is no special Islamic version of democracy, but Islamic values and principles support a universal notion of democracy. Adnan Buyung, the prominent pro-democracy and human rights

²¹ Ernest Gellner, *The Conditions of Liberty, Civil Society and Its Rivals*, London: Penguin, 1994

²² *Ibid.*

activist, states that “Islam has the potential to support democracy and human rights: strengthens human rights with its own arguments. That means that it enriches the argumentation, so that in addition to arguments that are already known by the international community, Islam brings its own arguments.”²³ Islamic concepts, such as *shura* (consultation), *musyawarah* (deliberation) and *musawat* (equality) are not only compatible to democracy, but if, correctly interpreted, in themselves constitute a form of democracy. These principles could be practiced in all public spheres, but most Muslim scholars confine them to the political sphere.²⁴

Regarding Muslim intellectual philosophy in Indonesia, individuals as Nurcholis Madjid and Abdurrahman Wahid are categorised as belonging to Islamic neo-modernism.²⁵ Madjid’s thought was influenced by Fazlurrahman when Madjid studied at the University of Chicago, while Wahid is associated with the Nahdlatul Ulama (Islamic traditionalist organisation in Indonesia).²⁶ Madjid's view of civil society is similar to that of Dawam Rahardjo. They interpret civil society as synonymous with the Indonesian term *masyarakat madani*, which refers to the Islamic society in Madinah which was constructed by the prophet Mohammed in 570 A.D. Conversely, Wahid disagrees with Madjid and Dawam's idea of Islamic civil society. Wahid’s concept of civil society is linked to his belief that the Pancasila is a more suitable ideology for the development of civil society as it is more accommodating of the ethnic and cultural diversity of Indonesia. Another Muslim intellectual is Imaduddin Abdurrahim. He is a fundamentalist figure that has a role in

²³Geoff Forrester and R.J.May (ed), *The Fall of Suharto*, (Bathurst: Crawford House Publishing, 1998), p. 68.

²⁴ *Buku Panduan bagi Anggota ICMI (1995-2000)*, Jakarta, 1996, p. 70.

²⁵ Fachry Ali is a member of LP3ES research in Jakarta

²⁶ Fachry Ali and Bachtiar Effendy's book analyses the development of social history of Islamic thought in Indonesia. It also presents the Muslim intellectual thoughts, such as, Nurcholis Madjid, Abdurrahman Wahid, M. Dawam Rahardjo, Adi Sasono, A.M. Saifuddin, Ahmad Syafi’I Ma’arif, Kuntowijoyo, M. Amien Rais, Jalaluddin Rachmat, and Djohan Effendi. See Fachry Ali and Bachtiar Effendy, *Merambah Jalan Baru Islam: Rekonstruksi Pemikiran Islam Indonesia Masa Orde Baru*, Bandung: Mizan, 1990.

developing students' Islamic fundamentalist through universities in Indonesia.

Nurcholis Madjid

The first point to note in relation to the contribution of Madjid on Islamic thought in Indonesia is his background. Like Wahid, the educational path which he pursued had a critical bearing on the formation of his ideas on civil society.

Nurcholis Madjid was born in Jombang, East Java on March 17, 1939. He studied at elementary school in the morning and Islamic elementary school in the afternoon. He studied at the traditional *pesantren* (traditional Islamic boarding school) Darul 'Ulum in Rejoso and the modern *pesantren* Darussalam in Gontor, Ponorogo. Following this he moved on to study Arabic literature at the State Institute for Islamic Studies Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta in 1968. He continued his post-graduate studies with a PhD in Islamic thought at the University of Chicago in 1984. Aside from formal study, Madjid was also very active in the student movement. For example he was a leader of the Islamic Muslim Association (HMI) from 1966 to 1969 and from 1969 to 1971. He was active as the president of PEMINAT (Moslem Association of Southeast Asia) between 1967 and 1969, and as vice president of IIFSO (International Islamic Federation of Students Organizations, between 1969 and 1971).²⁷ In 1993, he was and had been active as a member of the National Committee of Human Rights, and in following year as a member of the National Research Council since, and in 1995 as an executive member and adviser of ICMI.²⁸

A question that is often asked of Madjid's model of civil society is 'should it be categorised as Islamic neo-modernism or neo-traditionalism? Some people argue that Madjid's thinking is influenced by neo-modernism. This argument emerged in the 1970s when Madjid elucidated his ideas through his "shock therapy" to challenge Indonesian Muslims to participate in development and modernisation. Meanwhile, other Muslims

²⁷ <http://www.paramadina.com/File-index/nurfile/sekilas.htm>, p. 1

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 2

tend to argue that Madjid's model of thought is compatible with neo-traditionalism. This idea appeared when Madjid delivered his ideas after he returned from Chicago. Regardless of this debate, all sources agree that Madjid's thought is a new paradigm of Islamic thought in Indonesia, because he seeks to form a bond between Islamic modernism and Islamic traditionalism.²⁹

Barton defines Islamic neo-modernism as a new movement in Islamic thought that combines progressive liberal ideas with the essential elements of Islamic teaching. Islamic neo-modernism is different from Islamic modernism or classical modernism in relation to the new approach in *ijtihad*³⁰ (*individual interpretation* to Islamic law).

Islamic neo-modernist adherents include some of Indonesia's most prominent Muslim intellectuals. Nurcholis Madjid, Djohan Effendi, Ahmad Wahid, and Abdurrahman Wahid have all been classed as proponents of this broad school of thought which seeks a new interpretation of classic Islamic knowledge using Western analytical methods.³¹ Barton's list of important neo-modernist figures is nonetheless contestable. Djohan Effendi and Ahmad Wahid, for example, have never presented their writings in traditional classic thought. However, their ideas are mostly based on modernism and the

²⁹ There are two big Islamic ideologies in Indonesia that appear to be contradictory, Muhammadiyah is symbolised as Islamic modernism and Nahdlatul Ulama as Islamic traditionalism. Islamic neo-modernism is a new paradigm, which tries to bridge both of them. Fachry Ali and Bachtiar Effendy state that neo-modernism is 'a new product that proceeded both of the ideologies: modernism and traditionalism. The essential distinction between neo-modernism and both of these ideologies is the ability to accommodate the modern idea and the traditional as well. Fachry and Effendy, *op. cit.*, p. 175.

³⁰ In Islam, there are three law resources; the Quran, Hadith, and Ijtihad. If someone has a problem in Islamic law, they seek answers in Quran and Hadis, and if not found here, they must decide based on logic or interpretation of the two main resources. The Islamic prophet states that someone will receive a merit if the interpretation is wrong or two merits if the effort is true. Neo-modernists actualise the concept of ijtihad in order the Islamic teaching would be suitable with the development of new era.

³¹ Azyumardi Azra, Cak Nur: Neo-modernisme atau Neo-traditionalisme?" <http://www.paramadina-online> November 30, 2000, p. 1.

modernisation phenomenon. Therefore, Effendi and Wahib are probably more correctly categorised as classic modernist scholars.

Nurcholis Madjid's and Abdurrahman Wahids' ideas are far more substantial than those of Djohan and Wahib. Madjid's and Wahids' ideas are based on the roots of traditional Islam classical thought, while their interpretations are carried out using western approaches and methodologies.

According to Ali and Effendi, the emergence of neo-modernism is related to the history of Islamic civilisation. Islamic modernism was emerging as a powerful social force in the earlier part of the 20th century but it failed to maintain its modern ideas when the Muhammadiyah movement grew too large. The modernist ideology is based on action and is enacted through modern institutions in very practical activities. For example, Islamic modernism concentrates on the observance of textually defined religious duties. Islamic teaching has to purify itself from elements that can cause heresy, myth and superstition. The return to the scriptures has seen modernist Islam branded as fundamentalist Islam. On the other hand, Islamic traditionalism is rich with the treasures of Islamic classical thought.³² The followers of this model of thinking have been oriented to Islamic thinking in the past and its unique cultural manifestations in the present, and are very selective about adopting the idea of the modernists. Neither of the two forms of belief have specific programs for modern development. Nurcholis Madjid, as a figure of Islamic neo-modernism, had been socialised in both models.³³

Madjid's agenda developed when he came back from Chicago. According to Azyumardi Azra, the rector of State

³² Islamic traditionalism used *tarekat* (Islamic mysticism method) to spread Islam in Indonesia. This method is developed by traditionalist ulama in teaching through *pesantren*, mosques, and houses over many centuries. In *tarekat*, the society is taught how to chant the confession of faith in praise of God, to be ascetic, patient, resigned, and show love of God. There are many *tarekats* in Indonesia, for instance, Naksyabandiyah, Khalwatiyah Sasiliyah, and Qadiriyyah. Usually, the name of the *tarikah* refers to its founder, for example Qadiriyyah was established by Abdul Qadir Jailani.

³³ Ali and Effendy, *op. cit.*, p. 51

Institute for Islamic Studies Jakarta, Madjid had been introduced to audiences as an Islamic thinker through his articles at a national level. In this period, his ideas were not only based on classical Islamic tradition, but also his intellectual concern with the modernist struggle. When he returned from Chicago, his way of thinking had been changed. Madjid's agenda was no longer based on making Indonesian Muslims awaken from their long sleep through his 'shock therapy' theory of 1970s.³⁴

In analysing Madjid's change of focus, Asyumardi Azra argues that Madjid's ideas cannot be categorised as neo-modernist, but are probably neo-traditionalist for several reasons. Firstly, Madjid's ideas, as shown in his writings on Islamic civilisation, have strong roots in Islamic tradition. Therefore, those who are familiar with these discourses will assume that there are no new concepts in Madjid's writings. Secondly, at an ordinary level, Madjid has an essential appreciation of *syariah* (Islamic law), although he could not be said to be "*syariah*-oriented." Even though *syariah* is not Madjid's specialisation, he has a good knowledge in this field. In his writings, Madjid emphasises the importance of *syariah* in daily life. Thirdly, at the esoteric level, it is clear that Madjid has paid extraordinary attention to *tasawuf* (Islamic mysticism). In discussing *tasawuf*, he criticises Ibnu Taimiyyah, who refused *tasawuf*, and asks people not to generalise *tasawuf* as negative. In Madjid's opinion, *tasawuf* is very important to spiritual aspects of life necessary for the present and the future.³⁵ This would overcome the tendency of society towards materialism, hedonism and poor attention to spiritual aspects of life.

Whether or not Madjid's ideas are categorised as Islamic neo-modernism or neo-traditionalism, he provides a valuable contribution to the development of Islamic thought in Indonesia. Some of Madjid's writings regarding to the concept of civil society are also important to examine because of his influence.

³⁴ Asyumardi Azra, *op. cit.*, p. 2

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 4

Madjid's idea of civil society draw on distinctly Islamic concepts. His ideas are based upon analysis of the Islamic society established by the prophet Mohammed in Madinah City, Arabia, in 570 A. D. The name Madinah has two meanings, firstly as a 'city' and secondly as a 'civilisation'. Before Mohammed moved to Madinah the city was known as Yastrib. According to Madjid, Mohammed changed the name because he wanted to develop Islamic civilisation in the city. The principals of civil society were added to 'the Madinah Charter'³⁶, the document that covered nationality concepts, particularly aspects of religion and economy, responsibilities of society and politics, and defence.³⁷ Therefore, Madjid gives contemporary interpretations on the characteristics of the type of civil society which had been constructed by the prophet Mohammed. Features which he emphasises include egalitarianism, respect towards other people, active participation in society, upholding the law and justice, tolerance and pluralism, and deliberation. Madjid states that to create a civil society, people's lives require a spiritual dimension, and a good attitude towards other people.

Prophet Muhammad's decision to change the name of the city to Madinah is interpreted by Madjid as 'a proclamation' or 'a declaration' that in the new place Mohammed was intent on creating an orderly society. Therefore, the concept of *madinah* is a new paradigm of Islamic social civilisation, which is built on an obligation and general awareness to follow regulations and laws.³⁸

In terms of the upholding of law and justice, Prophet Muhammad always respected every person, without regard to their social status. Prophet Muhammad asserted that the destruction of countries in the past, occurred if those of high status were involved in crime without punishment, while those of low status who did the same had to be punished. Society

³⁶ 'The Madinah Charter' (also known as 'The Constitution of Madinah'), see appendix.

³⁷ Nurcholis Madjid, "Islam dan Politik: Studi atas Prinsip-Prinsip Hukum dan Keadilan," *Pemikiran Islam Paramadina*, Jakarta: Paramadina Fondation, 2000, p. 3

³⁸ *Ibid.*

thus has strong sense of equality or egalitarianism under God. Civil society needs good conduct, which ties together a collective of good souls, and creates social control in daily life. According to Madjid, to bring this social control into reality, every person should be opened to society, because they commonly commit errors (see the Koran 3:28). Therefore, every person has a right to express their ideas, while they have a responsibility to listen to other's opinions.³⁹

Civil society, in Madjid's opinion, is a democratic society, which has a social contract based on deliberation. Deliberation means a positive interpretation from every person to understand each other with an awareness of the diversity of society. In other words, deliberation is an interactive relationship to remind us that goodness and truths solve every problem in society. In the process of deliberation, social interaction emerges, which is based on tolerance and pluralism.

It is clear that Madjid's idea of civil society seems to be based on normative argumentation. Madjid emphasises the necessity of values of humanity, which are based on religion in relation to the existence and development of civil society. As social entities, civil societies are individual human collectives expressing an idea and attitude based on religious morality. Madjid scrutinised democracy, saying that is not the only basis upon which to build civil society. He argues that religious morality is far more important. If civil society is understandable only by democratic criteria, the establishment of autonomous social institutions will probably be a disaster when all people do not show tolerance, such as in a relationship between a religion or a tribe. Therefore, civil society needs to reflect the essential elements of civility. All people and groups have to be represented in order to respect the difference in others, without destroying the integration of states.

A third important point is Madjid's idea of Islamic modernism as a reaction to the modernisation policy of the government of Indonesia in the New Order era. The development strategy set up under Suharto differed greatly

³⁹ Nurcholis Madjid, "Agama dan Sosial" *Budaya dan Peradaban Ulumul Quran*, Jakarta: LSAF, 1986, p. 53

from that of the Old Order.⁴⁰ The New Order strategy emphasised a pragmatic approach to solving the problems of Indonesia. Through the institution of Golkar, New Order programs of material development and modernisation were rapidly implemented.⁴¹

This raises one major problem in regard to the issue of modernisation: how do Islamic people scrutinise 'modernisation' from the point of view of Islamic teaching? Do modernisation programs and nationally based development strategies have negative impacts for Muslims? Certainly the political and economic marginalisation of many Muslims in Indonesia triggered a strong reaction to the effects of modernisation and its inherent secularism.⁴²

According to Ali and Effendi, the reality is that the effects of political and economic marginalisation stimulate conflicts of religion and politics, particularly where Muslims are unable to compete with more economically powerful minority groups. The role of the Muslim intellectuals is to promote the inclusion of Islamic philosophy in the modernisation strategies that have resulted in such marginalisation. Muslim intellectuals must explain to Indonesian Muslims that they have equal rights to participate in every process of national development and help in equipping them to do so.⁴³

Intellectual responses began with relating modernisation to Islam, and to its implication for Muslims. Madjid states that modernisation is nearly identical with rationalisation. Modernisation has been a process to erase irrational thinking patterns replacing them with a new rational system of thought. The process is based on the applications of science and technology. Science is the objective human comprehension of natural laws, so its implementation is characterised as rational and modern.⁴⁴

⁴⁰ Herbert Feith, "Soeharto's Search for Political Format" in *Indonesia*, October 1968, p. 88.

⁴¹ Kamal Hassan, *Muslim Intellectual Response to New Order Modernization in Indonesia*, Malaysia: Kuala Lumpur language Council, 1990, p. 1.

⁴² Ali and Effendy, *op. cit.*, p. 109

⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 115.

Madjid's explanation tends to accept modernisation, because it works and requires thinking according to natural law. The characteristics of modernisation are scientifically oriented, and have an attitude resembling universal fidelity to development. In addition, the Koran as a Muslim way of life is suitable for modernisation (16:3, 27:28, 7:54, and 25:2). Despite Madjid's appreciation of modernisation, he is still careful in his response to the development of modernisation in Indonesia where it has produced obvious social problems.

Madjid is careful to note that modernisation is not Westernisation. If modernisation is the same as Westernisation, which includes elements of secularism, then Islamic teaching refuses the concept. It is generally accepted that secularism tends to separate the church and the state. As pointed out earlier, Islam does not necessarily separate the political and religious spheres of life. Islam prides itself on the fact that God intervenes into all the activities of people.

In regard to his idea of Islam and ideology, Madjid argues that there is a separation of Islam and ideology, which is limited by space and time. Even though ideology is involved in a wide and sophisticated range of aspects, and has had a positive meaning for Islam since the post-WWII resurgence, a comprehension of Islam as ideology would humiliate the religion by making it equivalent with other ideologies.⁴⁵ In this statement, Madjid asks Muslim Indonesians to review the process of Islamic political ideology from the beginning of Indonesian independence to the New Order era. He argues that critical study of religious resources is needed, to not only respect but criticise the cultural inheritance of earlier generations, and to understand the development of the period.⁴⁶

Madjid argues that Islamic Ideology in the past was held very firmly and ignored the need to adjust to the conditions of Indonesian Muslim society in general. Hence, when Madjid

⁴⁵ Nurcholis Madjid, "The Aspiration of Our Politics." In *The Aspiration of Islam Indonesia*, Ed. Basco Carvallo Dazrizal, Jakarta: Leppemas, 1983, p. 4.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

discusses the relationship between the New Order and Islam, he emphasises that the development of social politics cannot be conducted in terms of absolutes, but it has to be demonstrated in relative terms.⁴⁷

Abdurrahman Wahid

Abdurrahman Wahid is the charismatic chairman of Indonesia's largest Islamic social organisation the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). NU is known as a 'traditionalist' Islamic organisation that has its base in Central and East Java's densely populated rural regions. He has returned to that role after his tumultuous term as president of Indonesia (1999-2001). However, he has also been described as the leader of the modern and liberal oriented democratisation movement in Indonesia.⁴⁸ Wahid's thought has also been located in the neo-modernist school of Islam.⁴⁹

Wahid is not only the leader of NU (the largest non-governmental Islamic organisation in the world with a membership of 20-30 million), but he is also a outspoken religious and political thinker and a proponent of secular democracy in Indonesia. Moreover, Wahid even before becoming president, was a figure of considerable international stature, having been honoured with a Ramon Magsaysay Award in 1993 (Asia's equivalent of a Nobel Prize). In late 1994, he had served as a member of the Presidential Board of the prestigious World Council on Religion and Peace.⁵⁰

Abdurrahman Wahid was born in 1940 into a Nahdlatul Ulama family. Wahid is a grandson of the founders of NU, Kiai Hasjim Asy'ari and Kiai Basri Syamsuri. His father, Kiai Wahid Hasjim, was a nationalist figure and Minister of Religious Affairs under Sukarno.⁵¹

Between 1953 and 1957, Wahid stayed with Kiai Haji Junaid, a modernist Muhammadiyah *Ulama* (Islamic leader,

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

⁴⁸ Douglas E. Ramage, *Politics in Indonesia Democracy, Islam and the Ideology of Tolerance*, London and New York: Routledge, 1995, p. 49

⁴⁹ Ali and Effendy, *op. cit.*, p. 185

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 45.

⁵¹ Douglas E Ramage, *op. cit.*, p. 51

scholar and guide), when he studied at Junior High School (SMEP). He then studied at Pesantren Tagalrejo, Magelang from 1957 to 1959. Between 1959 to 1963, he taught at Mu'allimat, a Muhammadiyah Islamic High School for women, Bahrul Madrasah at Pesantren Tambak Beras Jombang, and he also studied at Pesantren Krapyak during a period in Yogyakarta.⁵²

In 1964, Wahid studied at Ma'had 'Ali Dimsat al-Islamiyah (Al-Azhar) in Egypt. However, he was unsatisfied with the didactic technique of memorisation in the university. Hence, Wahid spent his time reading in modern libraries, such as the American University library in the city. Moreover, he was involved in discussion with a group with young Egyptian intellectuals, and some non-Egyptian intellectuals who had come to study in Cairo. Wahid then moved to Baghdad where he spent four years studying Arabic literature and culture, and European social theory. In Baghdad, Wahid was much happier, because the education system in the university was closer to the European system than at the University of Al-Azhar. In 1971 Wahid went to Europe to continue his study, but his studies in Cairo and Baghdad were not recognised in Europe. He also had plans to go to study at the McGill University of Canada in its Islamic studies program, but he decided to return to Indonesia to be involved in the *pesantren*.⁵³

In the mid 70s, he joined with some Islamic intellectuals, such as Nurcholis Madjid, Johan Effendi, and Dawam Raharjo, in a series of academic forums. Wahid had easily adjusted to the discourse of western thought, Islamic teaching, and Muslim society. During this period he also was busy with Islamic study groups and involved in the broader intellectual life in Jakarta.⁵⁴

Wahid's thought as a chairman of NU is not only in contradiction with intellectuals from parts of NU, but also with several NU leaders among the *ulama* (Islamic scholars), who openly oppose many of Wahid's opinions. For example, Wahid's uncle, Yusuf Hasjim disagrees with several of Wahid's

⁵² Greg Barton, *loc. cit*

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 193.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 194.

initiatives and statements. However, Wahid has been selected three times to lead the NU organisation despite New Order attempts to rig the voting and remove him.⁵⁵ He has more support than any other figures as the organisation's leader and spokesman.

NU had directly contested for state power as a political party under Sukarno. It was merged into the official Islamic opposition (PPP) in 1973 as discussed earlier. But in 1983 Wahid led the NU out of the formal political sphere in a move referred to as the return to NU's *kebittab*, or original socially orientated principles. Wahid states, "NU saw that continued participation in the New Order political structure would eventually render the organisation politically impotent."⁵⁶ In Wahid's opinion, NU's freedom of political movement had been heightened outside the formal structure of the New Order politics.

One way for the NU to negotiate its autonomy has been in the group's willing acceptance of the Pancasila. NU's appropriation of *Pancasila* is to serve its own political needs but Wahid is more committed to the civic ideology in principle as he sees the *Pancasila* as a nationalist ideology necessary to maintain the unity of Indonesia. *Pancasila* as the basis of the state is important because some Muslims have viewed *Pancasila* as a sectarian ideology, which is suited to Islam. Indeed, Wahid's father, a former NU leader, also agreed to support a nationalist, non-Islamic state.⁵⁷

This idea is related to the concept of civil society. As has been mentioned earlier, Nurcholis Madjid argues that 'civil society' is best translated into Indonesian via the idea of *Masyarakat Madani*. If Madjid wanted to develop civil society in Indonesia, this implies support for the concept of an Islamic state in Indonesia. Conversely, Wahid's concept of civil society links to his idea of *Pancasila* as ideology. Ramage argues that

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 46

⁵⁶ Dougle E. Ramage, *Pancasila Discourse in Suharto Late New Order.* In *Democracy in Indonesia 1950s and 1990s*, ed. David Bourchier and Legge, Clayton: Monash University Centre of Southeast Asia, No. 31, 1994, p. 158

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

Wahid supports *Pancasila* as an inclusive ideology, because it can manage the diversity of ethnic groups and cultures in Indonesia. For Wahid, *Pancasila's* essence is tolerance and mutual respect between Indonesia's diversity of religions, regional, and ethnic groups.⁵⁸

Wahid was from the outset one of ICMI's fiercest critics. Barton states:

“Abdurrahman Wahid was alarmed at what he perceived to be a trend towards ‘re-confessionalisation’ of politics and a decline in religious tolerance. In this context, he has focused on the new Islamic organisation ICMI, founded in December 1990, as representative of a major threat to his vision of a religiously pluralist Pancasila society. He has thus sought to contrast NU with ICMI.”⁵⁹

In Wahid's opinion, Pancasila is not about a sectarian or Islamic State, but offers all Indonesians free choice in their pursuit their religion.⁶⁰ Wahid's criticism of ICMI is based on religious and political reasons.⁶¹ Hence, Wahid perceived that the ICMI is dangerous not merely because of the existence of a new Islamic organisation, but also due to the fact that some members of the ICMI were very cosy with the ruling elite.⁶² Wahid argued that the political strategy of Islamic activists in ICMI would increase ABRI's concerns and fears of Islamic fundamentalism.⁶³

One of Wahid's main concerns over the existence ICMI and its relation to *Pancasila* was issued in the *Rapat Akbar* (great meeting) for the anniversary of NU on March, 1 1992 at Senayan Sports Stadium in Jakarta. According to Ramage the *Rapat Akbar* was issued as a powerful endorsement of *Pancasila*,

⁵⁸ Ramage, *Pancasila Discourse in Suharto's Late New Order*, *op. cit.*, p. 159.

⁵⁹ Barton, *op. cit.*, p. 239

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

⁶¹ Adam Schwarz, *A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia in 1990s*, NSW: Allen and Unwin, 1994, p. 185

⁶² Ramage, *op. cit.*, p. 64

⁶³ *Ibid.*

the constitution and democracy.⁶⁴ The Rapat Akbar agenda stressed the NU's support for Pancasila for several reasons. The national ideology was obviously seen as one way of combating what Wahid saw as a rise in sectarianism and fundamentalism in Indonesia. Wahid used the *Rapat Akbar* to demonstrate that the *umat* (Islamic society) in Indonesia was still united behind him and supportive of an inclusive Islam. Wahid's perception was that ICMI had legitimated Islamic separation and degraded Muslim tolerance for non-Muslim Indonesia.⁶⁵

Based on the description above, it seems that Wahid's arguments over the existence of ICMI are based on certain assumptions, and without adequate examination of its progressive role. Wahid never viewed ICMI in positive terms. Wahid's accusation that Suharto used the ICMI for his own political interest certainly has substance. However the student origins of ICMI are evidence of a spontaneous, grass-roots foundation of the organisation.

Imaduddin Abdurrahim argues that Wahid opposed ICMI because of personal gripes relating to his involvement in the organisation. According to Abdurrahim, when ICMI was first established in Yogyakarta, Wahid wanted to joint and agreed to be act as one of the leaders. But he could not attend the meeting because his wife was sick. When Habibie determined the ICMI membership, Wahid was left out of the initial ICMI clique. Feeling slighted, he went on to criticise the existence of the organisation. Hence, Habibie asked Wahid to join with the ICMI, but he refused. Habibie then asked Wahid for the second time, so Wahid proposed that his members join with the ICMI. These NU members including Muhammad Thohir, KH Yusuf Hasyim, and KH Ali Yafie.⁶⁶

⁶⁴ Ramage, Pancasila Discourse..., *op. cit.*, p. 158

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 59.

⁶⁶ Muhammad Imaduddin Abdurrahim, "Habibie Mengatakan Silakan Tembak Saya.. atau" *Majalah Suara Hidayatullah*, November 2000, p. 2.

Dawam Raharjo

Dawam Raharjo is an economist who received a secular education but now lives a life adhering to modern Islamic thought in Solo (Surakarta) in Central Java. Born in this city in 1942, he studied at Yogyakarta's University of Gadjah Mada in the Faculty of Economics in 1960.⁶⁷ While a student, he was active in the Islamic Student Association (HMI). He and other young Muslim intellectuals, such as Johan Effendi and Ahmad Wahid, were active in closed discussion groups which were cultivated by Mukti Ali who became Minister for Religion at the beginning of the New Order era.⁶⁸ Rahardjo became director of LP3ES and the head of *Prisma* magazine from 1980–1986. From December 1996, he has worked as Rector of the University of Islam '45, Director of the Religion Study and Philosophy Institution (LSAF), Director of Postgraduates study at the University of Muhammadiyah Malang, editor of *Ulumul Quran Journal*, and is one of ICMI's central committee.⁶⁹

In discussing the condition of Islamic society in Indonesia, Dawam poses three introspective questions; who are the Muslims? What is their mission in Indonesia's struggles? And what is their position in Indonesia? In his opinion, conceptualisations should come from religious concepts, found in Islamic traditional knowledge, such as *aqidah* (basic principal of Islam), *syariah* (Islamic law), *akhlak* (Islamic ethics), and *tasawuf* (Islamic mysticism). Social, economic, and development concepts are not accommodated in the Islamic paradigm. In order to change Muslim perceptions of Islam, Dawam suggests theological reform.⁷⁰ Even though this theme is characterised as metaphysical, Dawam emphasises the empirical aspects of Islamic development.

⁶⁷ Kompas Online, <http://www.kompas.com/9703/32/naper/lebi.htm> p. 1

⁶⁸ Aly and Effendy, *op. cit.*, p. 199

⁶⁹ Kompas Online, *loc. cit.*

⁷⁰ Theology reform from Dawam's point of view is religious thinking that reflects human responses toward divine revelation. In other words, theology reform is practical reflection from unity of God in all aspects of social life. See Ali and Effendy, *op. cit.*, pp. 210-211.

In Dawam's view, the obsession with society, economics, and politics in Islam is not an arrangement of the state, but of civil society. He refuses the tendency of Islamic economic thinking, which aims to produce an Islamic State in order to realise Islamic economic institutions and practices. For example, he refuses the Islamic State theory of Abu Ala Al-Maududi's, a Muslim intellectual from the Middle East. According to Dawam, the ideal state that is dreamt of by Maududi is motivated by his desire to balance the concept with the modern Western state. In fact, Maududi imitates the paradigm of the modern western state, and he legitimates this with the Koran. Dawam believes that the Koran contains the ideal model of society, not the state. In order to implement this idea, it is necessary to acquire power as its instrument. The power comes from *musyawarah* (meetings), which is supported by *umat* (Islamic civil society) that needs emancipation in order to develop them.⁷¹

The idea of social emancipation is related to Dawam's idea of theological reform of Indonesian Muslim society. According to Dawam, the main problems that are faced by Islamic society in Indonesia are poverty, the imbalance in the economic structure, and the uncompassionate political system. Therefore, Islamic society needs to scrutinise these problems as a nation and provide real responses either through actions or conceptions.⁷²

The idea of *masyarakat madani* (civil society) in Dawam's writings is identical with the Islamic idea of developing the *umat* (Islamic civil society) and resembles the ideas of Madjid on the same topic. In examining the role of religion in politics, particularly in the form of civil society, Dawam pays attention to the role that religion played in East Europe. The emergence of social and political movements against the totalitarian regime in that country was a signal of the presence of civil society.⁷³

⁷¹M. Dawam Raharjo, *Mencari Konsep terhadap Emansipasi Negara*, Jakarta: Mizan, 1985, p. 7

⁷² Ali and Effendy, *op. cit.*, p. 215.

⁷³ Dawam Raharjo, "Agama dan Masyarakat Madani." In *Dialogis Budaya: Agama dan Masyarakat Madani*, Jakarta: LSAF, 1996, p. 2.

Dawam defines civil society as a realm of social involvement through voluntary association, such as through the mass media, professional organisations, labour and peasant unions, and religious organisations. As argued in chapter two, such organisations certainly existed under the New Order but participation was hardly voluntary. In Indonesia during this period, Dawam argues that the condition of society tended to be closer to the Hegelian definition of civil society. Through the concept of the integrated state that formed the legal basis of the new Indonesian state, the role of civil society was marginalised. This situation was continued, strengthened, and maintained in every form of political policy until the climax of the New Order era.⁷⁴

Dawam states that civil society refers to the integrity of *umat* (Q.S. Al-Imran: 103, and Al-Baqarah 104 and 110). The description of integrity of *umat* can be found in NU, Muhammadiyah, and ICMI organisations in Indonesia. In this context, civil society refers to the creation of civilisation, such as *al-din*, *al-tamaddun*, or *al-madinah*, which means city or city society. The Islamic civil society concept contains three aspects, which have religion as its source, civilisation as its process, and “city society” or organisation as its result. This concept of civil society needs to be implemented in Indonesia, because during the New Order era the state was dominant, while civil society was in a secondary position. Sharing this subordinate position was religion as a component of Islamic civil society.⁷⁵

Dawam’s idea of civil society is also influenced by Gramsci, even though it is integrated with the concept of the Koran. He identifies a negative or positive aspect in the domination of the state under civil society. Therefore, the development of the state and civil society need to be guided by religion. Echoing Majdid, it is the latter which is required to provide an ethical and moral dimension to modern civil society in Indonesia. In the end of Suharto’s government, he looked at

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 4

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

Islam as a power to back up his political government, and he establish ICMI as an agency of civil society.

According to Dawam, the emergence of ICMI was based on several concerns. The most important concern was related to the disunity of Muslim intellectuals in Indonesia. They were divided by loyalties to differing doctrines and schools of thought, such as NU/Muhammadiyah or the traditionalist pesantren versus the urban *madrasah*. The pro-modernists such as Nurcholis Madjid, Johan Effendi, Abdurrahman Wahid, and Jalaluddin Rakhmad are always in contradiction with the anti-modernists, such as Endang Saifuddin Anshari, Ridwan Saidi and Abdul Kadir Jaelani. In establishing ICMI, M. Imaduddin Abdurrahim and several students hoped to reconcile these intellectuals.⁷⁶ Despite the claims that its agenda has been captured by one group or another, ICMI is foremost a forum for Muslim intellectuals of any persuasion.

The second important concern was related to modernisation and the development process. According to Dawam, several Western scholars argued that Islamic society in Indonesian was opposed to political development and was an obstacle to modernisation and development processes. Meanwhile, Islamic society was also charged with professing an ideology that stood in contradiction with Pancasila.

Imaduddin Abdurrahim

Imaduddin Abdurrahim (Bang Imad) was a lecturer at Institute Teknologi Bandung (ITB) and a visiting lecturer at University Sains Malaysia (USM). Imad had an important role in developing central dakwah Salman mosque ITB campus and followed by several universities in Indonesia. His thought can be categorized as Islamic fundamentalist. Many people appreciate to Imad, including Anwar Ibrahim.

Anwar Ibrahim, a former vice Prime Minister of Malaysia, states:

"Karenanya saya begitu mengenal beliau, kedisiplinan dan komitmen tinggi yang dimiliki Bang Imad perlu diteladani. Ia seorang guru dengan prinsip hidup yang

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 34

baik dan sangat optimis dengan kemajuan Islam di masa mendatang. Nilai kebenaran yang diajarkan Bang Imad adalah nilai yang bersumber pada agama. Suatu budaya hidup dan bisa bertahan lama karena kekuatan nilai. Oleh karena itu perlu ditanamkan baik dan mendalam nilai anti korupsi sedari dini. Dengan kuatnya nilai anti korupsi pada generasi muda maka budaya anti korupsi akan terbangun dengan pasti. Mengenang tokoh lama bukan hanya kenang bagian terhebat tapi tetap menyalakan api semangat dan meneruskan perjuangan akan nilai kebenaran."⁷⁷

Discussing about Islamic fundamentalist, at least there are three categorizations of Islamic fundamentalist movements in relation to the response of democracy concept. *Firstly*, disagree with the values and principles of democracy, as well as the procedure and institution, which is used to produce a leader. This category does not want to involve in the political process, and criticize the system as a Western product. Some examples of Islamic fundamentalist organizations in Indonesia are NII, Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI) and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI). *Secondly*, disagree with democratic values and principles, but agree with democratic procedure and institution that is used to produce a leader. The main purpose of this category is to Islamize the system in order suitable with Islamic values. For example, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) disagree with sources, values and principle of democracy, including the procedure and institution that is used to produce a leader. However, they agree with the result of the process of democracy. *Thirdly*, the category that is concerning with the concept to obey Islamic leaders. The people believe that they have to respect to their leaders and have to obey the leader's policy as well as do not contradict with syariah Islam.⁷⁸

⁷⁷ITB News, "Sarasehan Nasional Refleksikan Pemikiran Tokoh Pergerakan Indonesia", Institute teknologi Bandung, 31 Januari 2012.

⁷⁸ Slamet Mulyon Redjosari, Kepemimpinan dalam Pandangan Kaum Salafi, *Disertasi Program Pascasarjana LAIN Sunan Ampel Surabaya*, 2011, p. 20-21

Tarbiyah model is popularized by Imad through intensive discussion which is conducted by Lembaga Dakwah Kampus (LDK) where Salman mosque in Institute Teknologi Bandung (ITB) as the central of the activities. The transmission of Tarbiyah movement is more appearing when it is supported by the alumni of Lembaga Ilmu Islam dan Sastra Arab (LIPIA) Jakarta, its name at that time was Lembaga Pengajaran Bahasa Arab (LPBA). The alumnus are get information about the existence of Ikhwanul Muslimin (MI) through their interaction with IM activists, when they get scholarship to pursue their study in Egypt.⁷⁹

According to Yudi Latif, the process of islamization in secular universities in Indonesia is assigned by the existence of mosques that used as base camp of religious-political movement of students at secular universities is a new phenomenon. Mostly the mosques are appearing in of New Order Era. One of the important aspects of the phenomena of Islamization campuses are the establishment of mosques at the universities in Indonesia, such as Institute Teknologi Bandung (ITB) and Universitas Indonesia (UI). Salman mosque is a central of par excellence Islam. In the beginning of 1980s, what the Salman mosque reach is being a characteristic of nearly every university in Indonesia. Dakwah movement of Salman mosque ITB is adopted by mostly secular universities in Indonesia that has been developed by Imad is a kind of social interaction between students and support them to enhance the students moral and ibadah. Imad is an intellectual Muslim that has a role in establishing Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia (ICMI).⁸⁰

Based on the existence of mosque in most secular universities in Indonesia, the students established Islamic organization, viz. Lembaga Dakwah Kampus (LKD) as a place to increase their religious virtuous and educational activities.

⁷⁹Muhammad Turhan Yani, *Dinamika Pendidikan Islam di Perguruan Tinggi Umum: Studi niversitas Negeri Surabaya dan Universitas Negeri Malang*, *Ringkasan Disertasi, Diajukan untuk Memenuhi Sebagian Syarat Memperoleh Gelar Doktor dalam Program Studi Ilmu Keislaman pada Program Pascasarjana LAIN Sunan Ampel*, 2009, p. 5

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 6

This organization has a role in the process of Islamization at secular universities, particularly among the students.⁸¹ In South Sulawesi, there are two secular state universities, namely Hasanuddin University and State Makassar University have Lembaga Dakwah Kampus.

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⁸¹*Ibid.*

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