

**Islamism in South Sulawesi:  
Studies on the Activism of PKS and Hizb Tahrir Indonesia**

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**Abstract;** Partai Keadilan Sosial (PKS) and Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) are two Islamic political movements in Indonesia with controversies and political sensations. In terms of organization, the two movements have a strong emotional connection historically and ideologically. Both are of transnational Islamic based movements, although in the end they perform their roles in different domains: PKS works at the level of intra-parliamentary with a formal political party label while HTI works in the region of extra-parliamentary and is labeled as a non-formal organizational movement. HTI, which rejects democratic system, turns out to enjoy Indonesian democracy as "a political blessing." HTI strongly criticizes the system of democracy in Indonesia as they genuinely support the concept of Caliphate but they in fact are free to move, to speak and to campaign because Indonesia follows the system of democracy. Although on the surface PKS is not as solid as HTI in holding up the idea of Islamic state/caliphate, many observers consider that PKS still make use of democracy to lead to the formation of an Islamic state. The presence of this kind of political Islam cannot be separated from the conditions of the crisis befalling Muslims, both the crisis of religious significance and structural crisis (political and socio-economic). For this reason, the Islamic movements often step forward to offer a variety of national solutions in accordance to their respective ideology.

Keywords: Islamism, Islamic State, Islamic Movement, PKS, HTI, South Sulawesi

## Introduction

In the expression of its adherents, Islam is often performed not only as a doctrine but also as an ideology which springs from a religious-political view which refers to the proposition: *inna al-Islam din wa dawla*, which means indeed Islam is a religion as well as state.<sup>1</sup> Although in its development, the proposition of Islam as an ideology is still a controversy, in fact within certain Muslim societies there are movements or thoughts which treat Islam as an ideology. The controversy is understandable considering the concept of ideology itself has always been a controversial discourse both as a framework of thought and movement throughout its history.<sup>2</sup>

Almost all Islamic movements in the Muslim world have placed ideology in a very important position and function. Islamic movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Muslim Jama'at in Pakistan, and Islamic movements in Indonesia such as Syarikat Islam and Masjumi, were born and are inseparable from ideology.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Bahtiar Effendi. 2001. *Teologi Baru Politik Islam; Pertautan Agama, Negara dan Demokrasi*, Yogyakarta: Galang Press. p. 29.

<sup>2</sup>Ideology as a concept in the Western scheme, as introduced by Destutt de Tracy for the first time during the era of France revolution, is regarded as an alternative thought of metaphysical presumptions and religion. At that time the concept of ideology was considered as a new science, namely "science of ideas," which was useful as "new basis for community education". Natural conception concerning ideology describes ideology as system of thought, system of belief, symbolic practices, relating to social and political actions. On the contrary, critical conceptual views ideology as a principal subject relating to a process of domination legitimacy. For further explanation, see Jorge Larain, *Konsep Ideologi*, ed. Tom Bottomore, translated (Jogjakarta:LKPSM,1996) h. 20-21, see also John B Thompson, *Analisis Ideologi: Kritik Wacana Ideologi-ideologi Dunia*, translation (Yogyakarta:IRCiSod, 2003). p. 17

<sup>3</sup>The construction of Islam as and ideology (Islamic ideology) is based on the view of Islam as a universal religion. Islamic ideology is an ideology which is derived from life principles based on Islam, that is: "a comprehensive ideology as it comprises principles as foundation of belief and a starting point for any activities. It is absolute (not relative), with a

There are many academic reasons explaining the importance of studies on Islamist parties or Islamist movements. Among them is upon integrating Islamism and democracy. Does Islamism make a potential capability of strengthening social reform and democracy in the Muslim world or otherwise a threat to the survival of the democratic wave in the world?

The discourse of "Islamism is a threat" is largely an "intellectual product" of Western academics. But there are also studies of the scholars or politicians from countries of Muslim-majority, especially those upholding a secular-liberal framework, which deliver academic and non-academic works of suspicious perspective on Islamism. They usually highlight certain aspects of Islamism which they refer to as sectarian and intolerant movements. They also emphasize the tendency of violent Islamist movements in that they think these movements should be banned. Terrorist attacks on the United States, since the tragedy of the World Trade Center (WTC) in 2001, further strengthens the discourse of Islamism as a threat.

Many intellectuals write about Islamism with a negative tone. Those who write specifically about Indonesia and put forward negative arguments or behave in a less sympathetic manner are such as Zachary Abuzz, Bilker Singh, and Savanna Hume. To these figures, Islamism obviously sends signals of a serious threat to the nation's tradition of diversity and plurality. Hume, for example, is famous for his statement that describes

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manual for ways to achieve aims concretely and completely, and it can direct behavior and actions of its followers (Muslim) with clear goals, comprising an ultimate goal as the source of all hopes as well as short time goals as realization of human life in this world." See Abdul Qadir Djaelani. 1996. *Perjuangan Ideology Islam di Indonesia*. Jakarta: Pedomam Ilmu Jaya. p.23

the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) is more dangerous than the terrorist network of Jamaah Islamiyah.<sup>4</sup>

Furthermore, scholars who perceive Islamism as essentially being anti-democratic argue that Islamism has in itself theocratic viewpoints. Therefore, the Islamists are likely to see democracy as a way to achieve the formation of an Islamic country, and democracy is not an end in itself.<sup>5</sup>

So far, the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) has impressed many scholars for it is regarded as an Indonesian Islamist party which widely encountering the dilemma of whether to carry on promoting its initial agenda and rigid ideological ideals, or to be more adaptive and realistic in looking at the existing political realities. Such complexity happens to Hizbut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), as in its major scheme it explicitly rejects democracy but in reality HTI lives in a democratic system in Indonesia. Adaptation efforts and founding a pragmatic-realistic standpoint in looking at the existing political reality still makes a major focus in discussing HTI's commitment in its political vision.

### **Islamism: Concept and History Development**

In manifesting the meaning of Islam as a comprehensive religion comprising all aspects of life including politic, and in projecting Islam directly or primarily within the political or state matters, some Islamic movements such as that of Hasan al-Banna develop the concept of "*Islamiyyah*" (Islamic). In the contemporary discourse it is known as "Islamism". Those who affiliate to *Islamiyah* are called "*Islamiyyun*", while the followers of Islamism are called "Islamists". In contemporary meaning *Islamiyah*, as introduced

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<sup>4</sup>Greg Fealy, "Introduction," in Burhanuddin Muhtadi, *Dilema PKS: Suara dan Syari'ah*.KPG, Jakarta. 2012. p. xv

<sup>5</sup>*Ibid*, xvi

by Western scholars who study Islam as well as the phenomenon of Islamic movements and Islamic fundamentalism, matches up the concept of "Islamism". Islamism is a phenomenon of contemporary Islamic movements which perceives Islam as a political ideology and brings about the trend of neo-fundamentalism with deep concern about *shariah* (Islamic law).<sup>6</sup>

Broadly put, Islamism is defined as a belief that Islam has a set of norms or comprehensive and advanced teaching, which could serve as guidelines for regulations of social order. Therefore Islamists, wherever they are, will always try to change the existing socio-political rules with norms or teachings based on specific interpretation of the Islamic teaching. This can be achieved through peaceful demonstrations or violence, depending on the value system persevered by the Islamist actors. There are two main characteristics of Islamism: Islamic state and Islamic activism in a diverse spectrum. The two are interconnected and cannot be separated, as establishing an Islamic state is not possible without a well organized Islamic activism.<sup>7</sup> This movement (Islamism) views that Islam cannot be separated from and that it has an integral relationship with governmental politics, since Islam comprises all aspects of life.<sup>8</sup> This Islamist group tends to be identified as the ideologically

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<sup>6</sup>Haedar Nashir, *Gerakan Islam Syari'at; Reproduksi Salafiyah Ideologis di Indonesia*, Jakarta 2007. Although in various occasions liberal groups criticize Islamism. To them, Islamism is a movement contradicting modern politics. Islamism is in a sense similar with Fasisme which has been an opponent to democracy and freedom. For more explanation, see Arun Kundnani, *Islamism and the Roots of Liberal Rage*, Race Class 2008, Vol. 50(2): 44–45

<sup>7</sup>Burhanuddin Muhtadi, *Dilema PKS; Antara Suara dan Syariah* (Jakarta: Gramedia, 2012) pp. 48-49.

<sup>8</sup>Olivier Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam*, in Haedar Nashir, *Gerakan Islam Syariah: Reproduksi Salafiyah di Indonesia*, *Disertasi*, Universitas Gadjah Mada, 2006, p. 275

motivated Muslims serving as representations of the "Islamic movement" (*al-harakah al-Islamiyyah*).<sup>9</sup>

Islamism can also be interpreted as a movement or organization that seeks to change Muslim community with programs and ideology fetched from the sacred text of Islam.<sup>10</sup> Unlike the term "Fundamentalist", "militant", "radical" or "terrorist", which tend to carry pejorative connotations and may contain Western reductionism, the term "Islamist" (*Islamiyyun*) is a name chosen by those who take parts in the Islamists movement. The term "Islamist" is different from the term "Muslim" in the sense that the former refers to people with a conscious activist agenda, while the second is a nominal identity for an individual or a group of people in a series of ideological views. Islamism refers to the political Islamists as well as the process of re-Islamization.<sup>11</sup>

In this context, Salwa Ismail asserts:

"Political Islamist refers to organizational activity and movement which burst into public space by means of signs and symbols from Islamic tradition. It belongs to a political ideology which articulates the idea of the need to establish an Islamic government conceived as implementing *shari'a* (Islamic law). Islamization or re-Islamization reflects encouragement to Islamize social space. It implies a process in which various domains of social life are implanted with signs and symbols associated with Islamic cultural traditions."<sup>12</sup>

Ayubi brings up that Islamism is a term commonly used to refer to three categories of Islamic movements: Salafi,

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<sup>9</sup>Dale F. Eickelman dan James Piscatori, *Ekspresi Politik Muslim* (Bandung:Mizan,1998) p. 58

<sup>10</sup>Najib Ghadbian, *op.cit*, p. 6.

<sup>11</sup>Masdar Hilmy, *Teologi Perlawanan; Islamisme dan Diskursus di Indonesia Pasca Orde Baru* (Yogyakarta: Kanisius,2009), p.24

<sup>12</sup>*Ibid*,

fundamentalist and neo-fundamentalist. Islamism does not merely emphasize on Muslims identity, but it is more a conscious choice of Islam as a doctrine and ideology. Political Islam is often used to refer to the category of fundamentalist and neo-fundamentalists who tend to emphasize the political character of Islam and are directly involved in anti-state activities.<sup>13</sup>

The indication of Islamic ideologization has become more frequently associated with “Islamism” (*Islamiyyah*), which, in the discourse of contemporary Islam, has been increasingly used a more appropriate choice of term instead for fundamentalism, which gains a lot of criticism for containing many downsides and ambiguity. In the era of Islamic revivalism at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century and at the beginning of the 20 century, Islamic ideologization seemed to equal Jamaluddin Al-Afghani’s Pan-Islamism, which in further development has echoed to the entire Islamic world including Indonesia.<sup>14</sup>

Pan-Islamic movement with a caliphate leadership model in the Islamic world has been increasingly become a major issue, especially at the beginning of the 20th century along with the growth of national consciousness for independence in almost all colonized Muslim countries. The movement continues to spread after the Ottoman government under Sultan Salim I seized Egypt in 1917 and brought about the issue of a worldwide Islamic caliphate and pronounced himself as protectors of Mecca and Medina. It was after the

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<sup>13</sup>Nazih N. Ayubi, *Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World* (Londres, New York:Routledge, 1993). In Masdar Hilmy, *Teologi Perlawanan; Islamisme dan Diskursus di Indonesia Pasca Orde Baru* (Yogyakarta: Kanisius,2009), p.25.

<sup>14</sup>Pan-Islamism is a movement to unify the entire Muslim world into one political and religious union under the leadership of a *Khalifah*, including in assembling solidarity or Islamic *ukhwah* for the revival of Islam. See Peter R. Demant, *Islam vs Islamism* (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2006) p. 80.

victory of Sultan Salim that Pan-Islamic issues and movements widespread into the whole Islamic world, including Indonesia.

In the context of Indonesia, since the beginning of its arrival Islam has been full of dynamics with its own color. The dynamics can be obviously observed when Islam deals with politics or the power of state, especially in the modern era after contact with the structure of the nation-state since Indonesian Independence in 1945 which leads Islam to its full problematic ideological struggle. This made a new phase after a prolonged cultural Islamization since the early days of the arrival of Islam to the archipelago as well as a pre - modern political contiguity in the power dynamics of Islamic countries since the 13th century. In such a context, the presence of Islam in real life of its adherents and the world at large became a complex and colorful historical and sociological fact. Moreover, as a religious movement which does not separate religious affairs from those of politics, Islamization always raises the process of meeting and dialogue between demands of doctrine nature with the reality of the social environment.<sup>15</sup>

Political defeat suffered by the Muslims took place in three periods of history. First, the political defeat during pre-independence which reached its peak on the elimination of the seven words of the Jakarta Charter. Second, the political defeat during the Guided Democracy, the peak was Masjumi dissolution in 1960. And third, the political defeat of the New Order era, the peak was acceptance of Pancasila as the sole foundation of political organizations and mass organizations in 1985. The defeat of political Islam was then followed by

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<sup>15</sup> Taufik Abdullah, *Islam dan Masyarakat: Pantulan Sejarah Indonesia* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1987). Dalam Masdar Hilmy, *Teologi Perlawanan; Islamisme dan Diskursus di Indonesia Pasca Orde Baru* (Yogyakarta: Kanisius, 2009), ;p.26



consciousness of the majority of Islamic forces to devise new strategies to articulate their interests more precisely.

Furthermore, the Islamists believe that Islamization will take place only through social and political actions. Therefore, Islamist movements have to plunge into the political field. The Islamists claim that politics starts from the principle that Islam is a global system of thought. Islamists are not led by *ulama* (except in Iran), but by secular intellectuals who claim to be religious thinkers. Islamists adopt the classical vision of Islam as a universal and comprehensive system. In this respect, Islam does not have to be modernized. Rather, the modern life must be Islamized to correspond. Islamist movement sees itself as a socio-political movement built on the foundation of Islam taken more as a political ideology. For this reason it does not confront other religions, but modern ideologies such as Marxism, capitalism, and liberalism.

Therefore, we need to realize that Islamism in its sphere of influence reaches across the spectrum of various activist groups who view their actions as an extension of the concepts promoted by the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Hasan al - Banna (1906-1949) and by Abu al-A'la al-Mawdudi (1903-1978). Islamism has already entered several countries in the form of social movements. Although in the end, especially after 11 September 2001, the Western view of the Islamic Middle East and Indonesia as well as the interaction between them turned to be unsympathetic. More than any region in the Muslim world, the Middle East is now seen as container of *jihadism* while Indonesian Islam is still considered very tolerant and pluralistic. However, the emergence of *jihadist* paramilitaries and terrorist groups in recent years has increased attention to radicalization and diminishing of Islam's moderate characters, especially in Indonesia.

A general reason commonly proposed by Western observers when observing the tendency of extreme minority in Indonesia is that the influence of the Islamic Middle East continues to grow. The increasing flow of globalization due to the penetration of mass communication has contributed to this process, in addition to excessive support of Middle East on radical social programs. So, the more Indonesian Islam seen as reflecting Islamic Middle East quality, the greater the threat spectrum posed. This is the issue which then continues to grow in order to trigger a persistent suspicion among countries of Muslim majority.

Islamist movements have flourished for more than half a century. Their concepts have certainly grown, and the historical situation has changed, while divisions and differences have spawned diversity. Nevertheless, all of these groups share sociological basis for their conceptual framework.

The main reason for the contemporary widespread of Islamism is not a matter of religion alone, for there are many factors that trigger the emergence of Islamism. Some observers divide the contributing factors behind the rise of Islamism into two: internal and external. Azyumardi Azra, for example, said that the root of the rise of Islamism in the past are internal factors such as the declining of Muslim political entity and the increasing conflict among Muslims, while the cause for the contemporary Islamism is an accumulation of the internal and external factors.<sup>16</sup> Muslims even believe that the setback during the pre-modern and colonial era was due to moral degeneration as a result of deviation from religious beliefs and practices. In other words, Muslims are lagging behind as they have

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<sup>16</sup>Azyumardi Azra, *Contemporary Islamic Militant Movements in Indonesia*, Asian Cultural Studies 15, Tokyo: International Christian University, 2006, p. 1-10. in Hilmy, Masdar, *Teologi Perlawanan; Islamisme dan Diskursus di Indonesia Pasca Orde Baru*: Yogyakarta: Kanisius, 2009.

abandoned Islam pure and authentic Islam. Crises in the Muslim community drive the spirit of other groups of Islamic societies to make efforts of purification with the purpose of returning Muslims to authentic and genuine Islam by way of reconciliation and *tajdid* (revival), such as by referring to the portrait of the first Muslim generation (*salaf al- salih*). For this reason, the movement is known as the Salafi movement (salafism or *salafiyah*). Many ways are applied to demonstrate this movement, ranging from the peace movement to the radical and violent manner. Other Muslims deemed to have deviated from the pure Islam become targets of this movement. Wahabi movement that gained its momentum in the late 18th century in Saudi Arabia and the Padri movement in West Sumatra are examples of this movement. According to Azra, the two movements are classified as Classical and radical Salafism wherein significant internal factors become the main aspect driving the emergence of this movement.<sup>17</sup>

External factors began to contribute to the rise of radical Islamism during the period of colonialism, wherein almost all Muslim lands are under the control of foreign powers, especially those of the Western countries. Many assume that Western colonialism was responsible for the difficult conditions faced by Muslims around the world, in terms of exploitation of economic and natural resources in colonial territories. As part of their resistance against Western colonialism, Muslims performed *jihad* to expel Western powers from their lands. As a result, faith-based extremism thrives in Muslim countries. The purpose of *jihad* for Muslims at the time of colonialism was to free their lands from Western hegemony.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>17</sup>*Ibid*, p. 3.

<sup>18</sup>In Masdar Hilmy, *Teologi Perlawanan; Islamisme dan Diskursus di Indonesia Pasca Orde Baru* : Yogyakarta: Kanisius,2009. p.68

Bitter history of colonialism embedded in each memory of the Islamists up to the present will always create reasons to blame the West for the Islamic current downturn and helplessness in facing globalization. For them, power relations have been implanted by the West in the form of economic hegemony in the Islamic world. Islamist groups provoke feeling of distress among Muslims by creating neo-colonialism and the "conspiracy theory" which will destroy the Muslims. In other words, the Islamists showed symptoms of inferiority corresponding to their inability to overcome the existing crisis. In this context, crisis theory can be applied to explain the physical aspects of contemporary Islamism. As indicated by Deukmejian, "repeated patterns in history is a causal relationship between social crisis and the rise of revivalist movements as well as religious revolutionaries aimed at transforming the existing system into a new one based on the ideology they perceive."<sup>19</sup>

Today the term Islamism is returning to be widely used in Western society with the connotations of politics, violence, and even terrorism. With such connotations, it is not surprising when it later on also raised debate among researchers and students of Islam, both Muslim and non-Muslim, concerning the validity and justification of its use. Some American academics also reject the notion of Islamism as a kind of equivalence to other terms such as 'Islamofascism' or 'fundamentalism'. An example is Daniel Varisco, a professor of Hofstra University who views that the term cannot be accepted for it implies certain bias towards Islam. According to Varisco, if there is Islamism there should also be Christianity,

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<sup>19</sup>R. Hrair Dekmejian, *Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World* (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1985) h. 25. in Hilmy, Masdar, *Teologi Perlawanan; Islamisme dan Diskursus di Indonesia Pasca Orde Baru* : Yogyakarta: Kanisius, 2009. p.69

as the later is also not free from engagement with various forms of violence in its history. Furthermore, Daniel Varisco criticizes the term Political Islam mainly because it is considered closely identifies Islam with violence. Islam is perceived as a system of beliefs that perpetuate (political) violence among Muslims.<sup>20</sup>

Upon such objections some other academics offer other qualifications, although not always adequate. James Piscatori, an expert of political Islam, carefully defines Islamism as an ideology held by Muslims who have committed to political actions to implement what they see as Islamic agenda. Don Emmerson adds that Islamism is the commitment and the contents of the Islamic agenda. Thus, according to the pessimistic intellectual stronghold against Islamism, the Islamic people see democracy as a way to achieve the formation of an Islamic state. Democracy is not an end in itself. Islamists accepting democracy is considered a mere practice of "one man, one vote, one time", which insinuated their ulterior motives to suppress democracy and replace it with a system of theocracy if it wins the election.<sup>21</sup>

Islamism is actually not a new term in Indonesia, although over the last half century it is rarely heard. Apart from that, historically put, the emergence of the term 'Islamism' in the country can be traced from the time of Sukarno's debate, prompting by his writing entitled "Nationalism, Islamism and Marxism". Posts containing such eclectic substance undoubtedly prompted a debate between Sukarno, Mohammad Natsir, and also Haji Agus Salim. No doubt, Soekarno's posts were related to the subject of politics, and he applied the term

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<sup>20</sup>Daniel Varisco, *Inventing Islamism: The Violence of Rhetoric*, in Richard C. Martin and Abbas Barzegar (eds.), *Islamism: Contested Perspectives on Political Islam* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010) p. 33-47.

<sup>21</sup>Greg Faely, Kata Pengantar, dalam Burhanuddin Muhtadi, *Dilema PKS; Suara dan Syariat*. (Jakarta, PKG, 2012) p. xvi.

Islamism with the connotation of Islam as an ideology and political praxis to create an Islamic state.

According to Hefner, Indonesian Islam has long enjoyed the reputation as a distinctive and tolerant Islam in accordance with democracy, human rights, civil society, pluralism, gender equality, and other characters from modern civilization.<sup>22</sup> Meanwhile, according to Ricklefs, one of the main aspects contributing to this positive reputation is that Islam entered Indonesia through peaceful means, although it cannot be denied that military expansion accompanies the process of institutionalization of Islam in Indonesia.<sup>23</sup> Dan Howell holds that Sufism is undoubtedly plays an important role in the entry of this new faith.<sup>24</sup> In Indonesia, Islam grows as an entity enriching a cultural network and beliefs at the local level, changing the local population without resorting to the Muslim Middle East. Nevertheless, the above assumption faces challenge from Islamist activists, particularly after the resignation of Suharto. The fall of Suharto's New Order regime led to a Muslim political activity which at a certain point experienced a vacuum. The spirit of democracy, followed by the withdrawal of the anti-subversive Act and the application of Single Principle Rules which determine the Pancasila (the five principles) as the only ideology for every social organization, and also the release of political prisoners by BJ Habibie, provide a foundation which did not exist before for the Islamists to carry out activism again. The arrival of variants of radical Islamic groups in the forefront took part in this

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<sup>22</sup>Masdar Hilmy, *Teologi Perlawanan; Islamisme dan Diskursus di Indonesia Pasca Orde Baru*. Yogyakarta: Kanisius,2009. p.69

<sup>23</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>24</sup>Masdar Hilmy, *Teologi Perlawanan; Islamisme dan Diskursus di Indonesia Pasca Orde Baru* : Yogyakarta: Kanisius,2009. p.69. quoted from Julian Day Howell, "Sufism and the Indonesian Islamic Revival", *The Journal of Asian Studies* Vol. 60, No. 3 (Agustus, 2001), 701-29.

euphoria. While some groups focus on peaceful campaign for the implementation of Islamic law, other groups use violent means such as sporadic attacks on entertainment spots and *jihad* by means of suicide. This crisis is used as a base for radical Islamic groups to proclaim “genuine” Islam as the single solution for the multi-dimensional crisis.

Nevertheless, the picture of Islamism in Indonesia cannot be separated from the general picture of the Muslim community. It is necessary to note that being a Muslim does not mean the person is tied to an organization's network, but it is more to attachment in thought. It should be recognized that Islamism is not a separate category of socio-cultural system of Indonesian Islam in general. On the contrary, Islamism is a melting category which is sporadically by time, and its definition could shrink and enlarge depending on the circumstances surrounding the Muslim community in general. There is a large ideological unity in which radical phenomenon integrate and unite in a variety of Muslims segmentations.

It is therefore not surprising when Indonesian Islam becomes a huge spectrum consisting of non-conventional, tolerant, moderate, liberal, and even intolerant form of Islam, as well as radical Islamic extremists. This large Spectrum does not reflect a dividing line between a Muslim group with the other. Instead, other group members from any Muslim community could share their views in certain cases and preserve different opinions in other cases. Likewise, while the brutally violent tactics used by some Islamic hardliners are rejected as morally wrong, motives evoking the radical forms is perpetually growing wider and sometimes gains sympathy, especially among Muslims who are considered "moderate."<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>25</sup>Erich Kolig, “Radical Islam, Islamic Fervour, and Political Sentiments in Central Java, Indonesia”, *European Journal of East Asian Studies* 4, No. 1(2005) p. 57. Dalam Masdar Hilmy, *Teologi Perlawanan...*p. 69

With these characteristics, dividing line between peaceful Islamism and radical Islamism cannot be clearly defined. In this context, Greg Fealy argues that Islamism cannot be placed in separate categories such as that of "Moderate" or "liberal".<sup>26</sup> In reality, Islamism is a boundless unity which makes the boundaries between Islamism and "moderate Islam" is blurred. In other words, Islamist thinking could easily co-exist with that of "moderate" Muslims in certain issues and cast its echo within the mainstream of Islamic organizations such as Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). Apart from their reputation as "moderate" organizations, some parts of these organizations are sympathetic to Islamist agenda. Therefore, sometimes these organizations share opinions with the Islamists.<sup>27</sup>

In light of method, Islamism in post-New Order era took two forms of manifestation; the first form is manifested in a structural struggle to gain power through general elections. To this point, several political parties of Islamic foundation and spirit have been established in Indonesia with the main agenda of enforcing Islamic law. Islamists tried to drag symbols, concepts and doctrines of religion in order to win the contestation of public space discourse.<sup>28</sup>

The second form of how Islamism manifests itself is through social and cultural activities outside the formal political arena. Islamist organizations such as MMI (Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia), HTI (Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia), FPI (Forum Pembela Islam), the Laskar Jihad, and the like are

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<sup>26</sup>Greg Fealy, *Islamic radicalism in Indonesia: The Faltering revival*, Southeast Asian Affairs 2004 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2004) p. 104-121.

<sup>27</sup>*Ibid*, p. 105

<sup>28</sup>Noorhaidi Hasan, *Islam Politik di Dunia Kontemporer; Konsep, genealogi dan teori*, SUKA Press, 2012.p.150.



representation of this type of Islamism.<sup>29</sup> The fall of the New Order regime triggered such organizational character, wherein they exploit the weaknesses of the state to gain power. The two manifestations of Islamism mentioned above are both struggling to create a law-based society.

Apart from their difference in articulation, the two manifestations of Islamism above have similar characteristics. The most important point is that they use Islam as a reference to the activities they perform, and they call themselves "Islamic." Secondly, they also share the goal to spread Islam at all levels through the implementation of Islamic law. Although they agreed on the idea of Islamization of state and society, they differ from each other regarding the process of Islamization method implemented in practical level. Although the antagonism between the two sometimes appear on the surface, the difference in the method usually understood as minor differences in order to struggle for the same goal: the application of Islamic law at all levels. The first manifestation of Islamism uses intra-parliamentary politics (being a part of the system of political parties) as a means of Islamization of state and society, while the second manifestation of Islamism uses extra-parliamentary politics (outside the formal political party system) as a means to struggle for the same purpose.

### **Islamism in South Sulawesi: the Perspective of Social Movement Theory**

In the context of South Sulawesi, Islam became an important part in the state government, as Islam is the major religion in public life. Up to the present, people of South Sulawesi are often associated with Islam. If Aceh is known as

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<sup>29</sup>Michael Davis, "Laskar Jihad and the Political Position of Conservative Islam in Indonesia," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 24, No. 1 (April 2002) p. 12-32.

the porch of Mecca, the people of South Sulawesi identifies their region as the porch of Medina.<sup>30</sup> As a region with a majority of Muslim population, in addition to the Islamization roots existing since the kingdom era, it is very natural that the patterns of Islamism has always been there, and even affect the local politics.

Islamism in South Sulawesi itself takes at least two patterns: the pattern existing in the state institutions (structural power of the state) and the pattern existing outside the state institutions. Islamism pattern that exist in the state institutions (structural state) comprises: first, the pattern of successful Datuk in Islamizing the kings within South Sulawesi; secondly, the pattern of Islamic parties which have existed since the Old Order until now as Syarikat Islam, Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP), Partai Keadilaan Sosial (PKS), and Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB). While the pattern of Islamism that exist outside the formal state institutions are such as, first, the pattern of Kahar Muzakkar who had rebellion/resistance to the government aimed at establishing the Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia ( DI / TII ); second, the pattern of Komite Persiapan Penegakan Syariat Islam (KPPSI) which partly deemed successful by using the structural politics approach; third, the pattern of Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia ( HTI ), which is consistent with its struggle for caliphate system, as well as other Islamic movements carrying the struggle for Islamic purification according to their respective view of Islamism.

In the above patterns of Islamism, there are non-single variants of Islamism, as Islamism is very multi-faced that it requires a serious study to show these variants. These variants

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<sup>30</sup>The term “Serambi Madinah” has been an issue and become a new term for people of South Sulawesi. This to some extent indicates that the region has a historical value as a powerful Muslim community area like Aceh.

are observable in the activism of some distinctive Islamic movement in South Sulawesi. In addition, they can also be seen in the structural approach (power) to see the government's political policies, in both districts and provinces, relating to ideals of political ideology of Islam supporting the formalization of Islamic law in governmental institutions in South Sulawesi.

The formalization of *sharia* and struggle for forming Islamic state are not new issues in south Sulawesi society. Kahar Muzakkar is a figure considered as performing "*jihad*" reinforced Islamic law as a form of rejection for the elimination of the seven words in Jakarta Charter and for the communist influence in South Sulawesi in the early 1951. His struggle was famous as Darul Islam /Tentara Islam Indonesia (DI/TII) movement. Next is the struggle or movement of KPPSI for enforcement of Islamic law. For KPPSI, formal enforcement of Islamic law should be established through political propaganda and *jihad* accompanied with education and constitutional as well as democratic *jihad* within the framework of the unitary Republic of Indonesia. This movement aims to achieve formal legitimacy of the institutionalization of Islam in the form of the Special Autonomy Islamic Law Enforcement in the province of South Sulawesi as a political home, whereas scholars, experts, community leaders and leaders of political Islam institutions fill the house with rules, *manhaj*, and laws based on the Qur'an and Sunnah, so that the struggle can run simultaneously with a synergy<sup>31</sup>

The next most influential movement is Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI). For HTI, *Khilafah* is a solution to the problem

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<sup>31</sup>Concluding points resulted from the 2<sup>nd</sup> Congress of South Sulawesi Muslim regarding the historical ground of the Islamic *sharia* enforcement actually consist of 8 points which are included in point "A. Historical and Cultural Base" (points 1-4), but the other four (points 5-8) are of cultural base.

of the nation. Muslims all over the country have long lived under the patronage of the Caliphate which enforced the laws of *sharia* in all aspects of life and bore propagation to all mankind through *jihad fi sabilillah* that they achieved a variety of liberation and victory. It was with the system of *khilafah* that all Muslim affairs were managed to be put together, and this is what will unite people, sheltering and protecting them.<sup>32</sup>

The presence of the Islamic movement in South Sulawesi sociologically occurred in a complex context and manifestations, both inherent in the internal dynamics and in the external structure of Indonesian society. There are certain sociological conditions which provide encouragement as well as a fertile ground for the growth of Islamic movements attempting to conduct formalistic Islamization in the country with legal-formal, doctrinal, and militant characters. The presence of ideological Islamic movements as shown by HTI, KPPSI, and groups of formalization of Islamic law in South Sulawesi certainly raises a question from the public relating to the underlying basis of their movement.

Political expression and political ideology of Islam in various variants such as those described above will affect the means used by the Islamic political activists, including in South Sulawesi. In this case, the most prominent point is whether the political ideals of Islam should be pursued through formal political instruments by means of political parties, parliament or bureaucracy as a venue for political games. Conversely, is there no other ways to be taken, for example by involving NGOs or socio-religious organizations, to allow the process of the political significance's diversification to occur? If they have to use political parties as instruments to articulate the interests of

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<sup>32</sup>Muhammad Rahmat Imdadun, *Transmisi Gerakan Revivalisme Islam Timur Tengah ke Indonesia 1980-2002: Studi atas Gerakan Tarbiyah dan Hizbu Tabrir Indonesia*, Tesis Master, UI, Jakarta, 2003. p. 76

Islam, should it be restricted to political parties which formally have Islamic social and "theological" origins, or otherwise should they use non-Islamic characteristic parties?

The fundamental questions above are rising to the surface when the phenomenon of Islamism in South Sulawesi in post-reformation era is increasingly showing existence. At least there are some Islamist groups increasingly showing activism, both inside and outside the formal state institutions. The issues concerning the enforcement of Islamic *sharia* fought by Islamist groups will be very influential to the top of local politics or to its characteristic democratization in South Sulawesi.

In the dynamics of local politics, the most successful Islamist party is PKS, which has been fighting through electoral democracy and procedural mechanisms. PKS is the largest Islamic party in Indonesia. On the general election in 2009, it became the only Islamist party which successfully raised electoral support amid the declining electoral performance of Islamic parties as well as the Nationalist Party as a result of the surge for Democrate Party. Such is also the case of Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), an Islamist movement with a huge typical cadre base in South Sulawesi and with a widespread officials reaching as far as small villages. PKS and HTI are two Islamist organizations in the area of intra-parliamentary (in the parliament) and Extra-Parliamentary (parliament outcomes) which are very influential to the local socio-political conditions.

In the context of the reformation era, both HTI and PKS were benefited enormously from the recent political developments in Indonesia because the ideological barriers as experienced in the New Order are no longer found. Although PKS was born after the New Order, it was formed from Islamic organizations previously repressed by the New Order.

### **PKS as a Social Movement**

Furthermore, to obtain a more comprehensive understanding of the PKS, at least we have to look back at the early days of this unique Islamic party. As with other Islamist movements in Indonesia, which were formed in the late 1970s and took inspiration from the Middle East, PKS started with small discussions among some secular university students and later on transformed into a political movement. PKS emerges as an Islamic social movement which still preserves its essential character by increasing the capacity of its organization and resources for mobilization of large-scale demonstrations.

This section will discuss the historical aspect of the emergence of PKS. It will explain three stages of formation of the social movement PKS up to the level of formal politics institutionalization. The first stage is the phase of campus propagation, the second is the formation of the student movement, and the third is the political movement. Since the basic history of the establishment of PKS was a missionary movement, the systematic explanation of the party's strategy in bearing the Islamism agendas makes an important subject to discuss at this point. Analysis of the mutation of PKS from a social movement organization into a political party will be further elaborated in the next chapter. Three stages of development of the PKS are:

#### **First, on Campus Missionary.**

The origin of PKS can be traced through an on campus missionary movement. This movement comprised a series of activities that appealed to religion performed by and for students. The emergence of this campus missionary itself can be interpreted as a reaction to Soeharto's antagonism and repressive actions against the group of "Political Islam" which was visible in the first minute after Suharto achieved his power peak. Soeharto was reluctant to rehabilitate the largest Islamic

political party, Masjumi. Masjumi was banned by Sukarno regime in 1960 and has an agenda to establish a state based on Islamic ideology.

Realizing that the Suharto regime was hostile to the idea and struggle of "Political Islam," some former leaders and elites of Masjumi pioneered by Muhammad Natsir established Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII) in 1967. At the beginning this missionary agency focused on serious efforts to widespread propaganda in the midst of the penetration activities of Christian missionaries.<sup>33</sup> In the next development, DDI also wanted to respond to what they perceive as a threat from Muslim groups of liberal and cultural orientation.<sup>34</sup> The main objective of "Cultural Islam" is rejecting the agenda of "Political Islam." The "cultural Islam" group tries to redefine religion as well as politics and encourages religious tolerance. On the contrary, DDI serves as the most vocal supporters for the movement of "political Islam" and it aggressively preaches that Islam is not just a religious or theological construction but also a political ideology. In August 2000, eight Islamic Parties (PPP, PBB, PK, Masyumi, PKU, PNU, PUI, and PSII 1905) held an informal discussion and *silatullah* of Islamic parties at Al- Azhar Mosque and inquired that the Jakarta Charter to be included in the 1945Amendment, but unfortunately this effort was not successful<sup>35</sup>

DDII's religio-political agenda had to face not only the faction of "cultural Islam" but also platform of the Suharto regime, which never tolerated "Political Islam". The dilemma

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<sup>33</sup>Burhanuddin Muhtadi, "The Conspiracy of Jews: The Quest for Anti-Semitism in Media Dakwah", *Graduate Journal of Asia pasific Studies*, 5:2 (2007).

<sup>34</sup>Martin van Bruinessen, "Geneologies of Islamic Radicalism in Post-Soeharto Indonesia", *Southeast Asia Research*, 10,2 (2002), 127.

<sup>35</sup> Zuly Qodir, HTI dan PKS menuai kritik; Perilaku Gerakan Islam Politik di Indonesia, JKSG, Yogyakarta, 2013. p. 133.

then pushed DDII figures to change strategy, preferring the path of *da'wah* revitalization to pave the way for the birth of more liquid Islamic social movements on campuses as campuses are considered relatively less controlled by the state. Campus mosques were chosen as the headquarters of the social movements fostered by DDII in secular universities.<sup>36</sup> DDII figures consciously make students of the secular campuses as the target groups to counter the influence of the ideas developed by the proponents of "cultural Islam."

In the early 1980s the campus propaganda began to introduce the term *usrab* (Arabic for "family") and began to make arrangements and training for its members with more systematic organizations and programs.<sup>37</sup> *Usrab* are small groups closely related to each other through a hierarchical structure. Most members do not know the members in other *usrab* group. With this kind of organizational structure, on campus propagation was rapidly growing and campus mosques since then became centers of students' activities. The educational model is well designed and neatly structured, referring to the organization and thought framing in the scheme of Muslim Brotherhood organization in Egypt.<sup>38</sup>

The implementation of *usrab* (cell system) in the program of religious training in campus activities adopts the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood cadre system. Relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and the on campus propaganda was also facilitated through student leaders who acted as agents of socialization by offering works of monumental figures of the Muslim Brotherhood as the main

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<sup>36</sup>Yudi latif, "The Rupture of Young Muslim Intelligensia in the Modernization Indonesia", *Studia Islamika*, Vol 12, No. 3, 2005,391.

<sup>37</sup>For a more complete discussion of the training programs, see DPP PKS, Manajemen tarbiyah Anggota Pemula, PKS & Syamil Cipta Media, Bandung, 2003. Dalam Burhanuddin Muhtadi, *Dilema PKS*...p.101

<sup>38</sup> Zuly Qodir, HTI dan PKS:.....p.133



reference in the study. Thus the process of vision and ideas affinity was established by adopting models of activism and intellectual movement of the Brotherhood as –borrowing Bubalo and Fealy’s terms- "jewels of propaganda thought."<sup>39</sup>

The process of framework transplantation and methods of the Brotherhood into the on Campus propaganda groups was made possible by an extensive network owned by DDII. Since the establishment of DDII, its leaders have directed the movement to a Middle East orientation. DDII has already established intense and strong relationship with the Muslim World League (Rabithah Al-Alam Al-Islami), a global Islamic organization funded by the State of Saudi Arabia, wherein Muhammad Natsir was appointed as one of the Vice Chairmen.<sup>40</sup>

### **Second, the Institutionalization of the Student Movement.**

From the point of socio-anthropology, the on campus propaganda became more established along with the momentum and spirit of Islamic revival emerging within the educated society, especially among students at secular universities in the 1970s.<sup>41</sup> Thus new phenomena of interest in learning religion on the sidelines of their studies started growing among students. It was then not surprising when campus mosques became centers for the on campus missionary attended by many students intending to participate in a small circle for the study of religion.

This campus propagation then eventually transformed into an official students’ activity unit as Unit Kegiatan Mahasiswa (UKM), that is Lembaga Dakwah kampus (LDK).

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<sup>39</sup>Bubalo & Fealy, *Joining the Caravan?* 2005, p. 67

<sup>40</sup>Bruinessen, *Genealogies...*, 2002. p. 123.

<sup>41</sup>Burhanuddin Muhtadi, *Dilema PKS: Suara dan Syariah*, KPG, Jakarta, 2012. p. 38.

LDK is the best strategy for the activist propaganda in order to expand network, recruitment and organization. At first, the theological thought and activism models of LDK were drawn from the ideas of Hasan al-Banna's Ikhwan and al-Mawdudi's Jamiat Islami. The essence of the Ikhwan and Jamiat Islami's thinking rests on the argument that Islam is *al-din*: a total way of life, comprehensive, and summarizes all aspects of life without any demarcation between *aqidah wa syariah* (Islamic theology and law), *din wa dawliah* (religion and state), and *din wa dunya* (religion and worldly matters).<sup>42</sup>

In further developments, some LDK activists announced the formation of Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia (KAMMI). The role of KAMMI was then seriously considered, especially on the point of Suharto regime's tumble. KAMMI emerged as the most vocal student movement in voicing public discontent by demonstrations across the country in Indonesia. KAMMI actively run protest to push the agenda of reformation.

The fall of Soeharto, after months of demonstrations raised by a number of organizations including KAMMI student movement, forced the campus missionary movement to redesign strategies to achieve their ideological goals in a more democratic political system.

### **Third, the Political Movement.**

Soon after Soeharto stepped down on May 21, 1998, KAMMI figures started to consider establishing Islamic political party. This initiative is also supported by several activists who believed that the existing campus missionary networks and resources should be transformed into a political party. An internal survey on the core cadres of this movement

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<sup>42</sup>Muhtadi, Dilema PKS:..., p. 41.

indicated that the majority of activists agreed to form a party.<sup>43</sup> The party was then named "Partai Keadilan" (PK), known today as Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS). The need for declaring an Islamic party by PK was prompted disappointment with the existing Islamic parties which were diametrically regarded as failing to fight for the fate of the Muslim majority. Even more essentially, the existing Islamic parties were considered less determined in upholding Islamic teachings as the spirit of their political movements. What emerged were only pragmatic steps which slowly but surely delineate Islamic values from the existing Islamic parties.<sup>44</sup>

### **PKS: Ideological Issues**

In the Vision and Mission of the PKS before it was "revised" with the latest version, it was mentioned that the general vision of PKS was being a missionary party to uphold justice and welfare in a unity frame of *ummah* and the nation. The specific vision of PKS was to have a good influence through political power, participation, and opinions in creating Indonesian civil society. This vision directs PKS to be (1) a Missionary Party promoting Islam as a solution in the life of the nation, (2) the transformative power of the Islamic values and teachings in the process of rebuilding people and the nation in various aspects, (3) the strength of pioneer and mobilize cooperation with different forces advocating similar ideals in upholding Islamic values and systems of *rahmatan lil alamin*, and (4) Accelerator for the realization of civil society in Indonesia.

The mission of PKS consists of seven items, namely (1) to disseminate Islamic mission and to recruit cadres as elements of change; (2) to develop Islamic social institutions in various

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<sup>43</sup>Machmudi, "Islamising Indonesia", 2006. In Muhtadi, *Dilema PKS...*p. 103

<sup>44</sup> Djon Edward: *Efek Bola Salju Partai keadilan Sejahtera, harakatuna*, Bandung, 2006. p.75

fields as centers of change and solutions; (3) to establish Islamic public opinion and supportive climate for the implementation of Islamic decent and comprehensive teachings; (4) to build society's political awareness and to provide defense, services, and empowerment of citizenship rights; (5) to teach *amar ma'ruf nahi munkar* consistently and continuously in the frame Islamic law and ethics to those currently in power; (6) to be actively engaged in communication, friendship, cooperation and *ishlah* with various elements or among Muslims for the establishment of Islamic brotherhood and *wahdat al-ummah*, and with various components of the nation to strengthen unity in the realization of the reformation agenda; and (7) to participate in providing positive contributions in upholding justice and rejecting tyranny especially upon Muslim countries undergoing oppression<sup>45</sup>

In addition to the issues of Islamism contained in the above vision and mission, PKS also routinely campaigned for the rhetoric "clean and good governance" as well as anti-corruption. PKS also tried to preserve its traditional roots by maintaining commitment to the agenda and ideals of Islamism politics. This situation was reflected in its strong support for the legalization of the Anti-Pornography and the National Education System rules. Another reflection was the support of PKS cadres in parliament or through demonstrations demanding the insertion of *sharia* nuance into regional regulations in various provinces, including South Sulawesi. These regional regulations take many shapes such as, rules on Islamic outfit in government offices, obligation to recite the Koran, prohibition of alcohol drinking and gambling, prohibition of women to be outdoor at night, prohibiting prostitution, and so forth.

### **HTI in South Sulawesi: *Historical Review***

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<sup>45</sup>Official site of PKS, <http://www.pk-sejahtera.org>.

Hizb ut-Tahrir was founded in 1953 M/1372 H by Shaykh Taqi al-Din ibn Ibrahim ibn Mustafa bin Yusuf bin Ismail an-Nabhani, an Islamic scholar who achieved a degree of absolute *mujtahid*, a judge (*qadi*) in the Court of Appeals in al-Quds, as well as an accomplished politician. He comes from a "science family," as his parents were experts of Islamic law (*faqih*). In addition, his great-grandfather, Shaykh Yusuf bin Hasan bin Muhammad an-Nabhani as-Syafi'i, Abu Mahasin, was a scholar, poet, and judge in the Khilafah reign.

After Shaykh an-Nabhani's death in 1977 M/1396 H, his position was signed over to Shaykh Yusuf Abdul Qadeem Zallum, one of those assisting his missionary since the founding of Hizb. With guidance from God, Shaykh Abdul Qadeem Zallum successfully developed Hizb, and thousands of people became members and bearers of his thinking, while millions of others became supporters. Under this second Amir of Hizb, Hizb was able to fight in many Muslim countries (more than 40 countries) and became the largest party in the world to fight for the establishment of Caliphate system.

In the context of Indonesia, the Islamic organization Hizb ut-Tahrir was relatively young (1953) when it aligned with Islamic organizations in the country such as Muhammadiyah and Al-Ershad (1912), Persatuan Islam (1923), and NU (1926)<sup>46</sup> Moreover, HT entered Indonesia in the decade of the 1980s and it did not seek followers from traditional society bases, but from educated-urban areas around the campus. In its early history, HTI was a part of the three components of Da'wah institutions (LDK) competing to win influence at campus mosques: Jamaat Tarbiyah, Salafi, and HTI itself.<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>46</sup> Howard M. Federspiel, *Islam and Ideology in the Emerging of Indonesia State*, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 2001. pp. 31-32.

<sup>47</sup> As reported by the General Secretary of KISDI in a mailing lists: [Indonesia\\_damai@yahoo.com](mailto:Indonesia_damai@yahoo.com) (2Juli 2001).

The emergence of HTI in South Sulawesi cannot be separated from the role of the network of LDK in the 1990s. Makassar, the capital of South Sulawesi province, is a city of learning destinations for young people of East Indonesia, as it provides a number of leading universities such as: University of Hasanuddin (UNHAS), Makassar State University (UNM), Alauddin State Islamic University (UIN) Makassar, Indonesian Muslim University (UMI), and some others. As is known, the campuses provide basis for the Islamic movement to flourish through the LDK. In Makassar, UMI and UNM have had LDK in the 1990s as a part of Indonesian LDK network, a movement initiated by Muslim student activists in West Java. However, in the early phase of its development, LDK was a sort of loose organization which accommodated students from different Islamic organizations. LDK activists of UMI played instrumental role in bringing the HTI ideas and developed their plantations in Makassar. It was the result of intensive interaction between the activists of UMI's LDK and activists of LDK in Java.<sup>48</sup>

Furthermore, the launch of HTI Makassar was conducted with a seminar on Khilafah at UNHAS campus in 2000. This event took the pattern of the emergence of HTI in Jakarta which was held with an International Conference on Khilafah on May 2000 at Senayan Stadium. HTI in Makassar seminar was attended by about 1,000 people, comprising students and various segments of society. Speakers presented include: Prof. Dr. H. Abdurrahman Basalamah (Rector UMI), Prof. Dr. Mattulada (historian of UNHAS), and Dr. Uthman (HTI activist from Surabaya). Since then HTI has been actively

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<sup>48</sup> Syamsu Rizal, Jaringan Hizbu Tahrir Indonesia di Kota Makassar Sulawesi Selatan. in Syafii Maarif (ed.), *Perkembangan Paham Keagamaan transnasional di Indonesia*. Jakarta, Puslitbang Kehidupan keagamaan, Nov. 2011. p. 20

run in the community by organizing a series of activities to promote its ideas to draw public support.

As a region of HTI branch, South Sulawesi has management levels as follows: HTI management at the provincial level is called the Regional Leadership 1 (DPD1), at district level is DPD II, and at sub-district level is Leadership Council (DPC). DPD I's structural board consists of *Lajnah Tsaqafiyah* (Cultural Department), *Lajnah Siyasiyyah* (Political Department), *Lajnah Maslahiyah* (Financial Department), *Lajnah Fa'liyyah* (Administration Department), and *lajnah Ilamiyyah* (Information Department).<sup>49</sup>

During its development, the HT expansion in a number of areas should not be released from the doctrine and missionary activities in this organization. HT sees itself as a representative of the *ummah* and tries to construct Muslim mentality to restore the glory of Islam in the past. In this regard, recruitment strategies are intimately associated with HT's ideology and views on propaganda. Most of HTI's recruitments are conducted on campus. Significant means for recruitments are training programs and seminars in various forms on campuses. Even so, most of the recruitment processes occur through interpersonal relationships between HTI activists and prospective members.

### **HTI as Social and Political Movements**

It should be explained that although Hizb ut-Tahrir (HTI) are identifying itself as a political party, it cannot be regarded as a political party in the true sense. Sherman and Kolker<sup>50</sup> mention four aspects that characterize the existence of a party: 1) to have alliances and a durable structure consisting

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<sup>49</sup> See Sukma, *Hizbu tahrir Daerah Sulawesi Selatan*, thesis at the faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Hasanuddin University, 2008. In Syansu Rizal, *jaringan Hizbu tahrir...*p.20

<sup>50</sup> See Arnold K. Sherman & Aliza Kolker, *The Social Bases of Politics*, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1987. pp.212-213,216

of a stable relationship among the national leadership, sub-leadership, and active participants at the local as well as broader public levels; 2) to develop procedures to carry out functions such as winning a major political governance; 3) to try to win the support of community groups and a broad segment of voters, to have stable followers, and highly dependent on brokerage function and compromise which bind different interests and individuals into a working coalition; 4) to articulate a set of perspectives which evolve into an ideology

The above four characteristic can be found in most Islamic political parties existing today, but not all of them are found in HTI. The main factor distinguishing HTI from other political parties is its involvement in highway option. In addition, HTI's ideological conflict with the existing system also poses uniqueness in the party itself.

Broadly put, the presence of HTI as a party can be described as follows: First, unlike other existing ordinary political parties, the leadership and party structure in HTI is closed for public because it can only be accessed by members. This restriction is firmly reflected in the fact that the entire board of HTI -at the central, regional, and local levels- do not have clear management structure. Second, HTI does not perform the function of providing prospective leaders or society representatives as it refuses to participate in general elections. HTI also does not form a coalition with any political forces, but rather to approach and engage in missionary communication in order that the political forces can accept and accommodate its ideas in their political programs. However, to mobilize support, HTI also conducts campaigns (such as "save Indonesia with *sharia*") and develops national programs (such as the religious circle *taqarrub ilallah*). HTI also formulates and issues principle statements about issues, attitudes, and policies, especially those related to the interests of Islam and Muslims



Third, although it was initially dominated by young people and students, in current situation HTI's support base is increasingly diverse in terms of age, profession, social, and economical backgrounds. Efforts to broaden the support base from different business environments are now being conducted by HTI. However, these undertakings will be hampered by a number of aspects: 1) the Muslimhood pre-condition; 2) the identification of several types of business environments which are not in accordance with *sharia*; 3) the long cadre leveling which is relatively hard prior to membership; 4) non-populist controversial aspects comprised in HTI's ideology.

Fourth, HTI members are literally ideological cadres. In interacting with other groups, they always preserve their normative views insist that their ideas and solutions offered by HTI to be accepted as decision points for the variety of existing problems. HTI's firm ideology shows in its slogan: "There is no glory without Islam, no Islam without *shari'a*, and no *shari'a* enforcement without establishment of the Caliphate."

From the examination of the existence of HTI as a political party above, it appears that HTI will be more appropriately seen as a social movement rather than a political party.<sup>51</sup> The type of social movement applied by HTI can be identified by three categories of distinction which Harper describes as follows: general movement, specific movement,

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<sup>51</sup> As put forward by Heberle (1951), the most significant distinction between a political party and a social movement is that a political party only exists in a political system or only in a state, whereas a social movement does not have to be restricted within a particular state or society. A party is institutionalized inside of political system, whereas a social movement serves as a means of non-elite participation which is institutionalized outside the system (extra-institutionalized). In Kurniawan Abdullah, *Fenomena Gerakan Politik Islam Ekstra parlementer: Hizbu tabrir Indonesia*, DIALOG: Jurnal Penelitian dan Kajian Keagamaan. 3<sup>rd</sup> ed, 2005. p. 48

radical movement, reform movement, as well as left-wing and right-wing movements.<sup>52</sup>

HTI belongs to the specific movement as it articulates Muslim sentiment to implement Islamic law entirely and simultaneously through the establishment of a Khilafah State. In terms of purpose, HTI belongs to a revolutionary/radical movement as it intends to replace the secular system with the system of Islam. In terms of its historical relevance, HTI belongs to a right wing movement as it seeks to restore the Islamic order which once collapsed and to restore the former glory of Islam as the center of world civilization.

As a social movement, HTI emphasizes its actions with a quite orderly mobilization models. Charles Tilly<sup>53</sup> mentions that the collective action of an opponent group can be analyzed on the basis of five main components. First, interests: something related to gains and losses earned or suffered by a group in interaction with other groups. In this case, the interests articulated and advocated by HTI in the public arena through media publications and other activities are associated with three cases: 1) Acceptance of HTI's thinking. At the lowest level, acceptance of the notion plantation is indicated by lack of resistance to HTI main ideas and by interest for further involvement. Admission on the high level is indicated by appreciation and actualization of the ideology of HTI in personal, group, and State level. 2) Active support of HTI activities. This support may take forms of participation and cooperation in the activities, funding, membership, as well as active participation in the efforts of *shariah* enforcement and Caliphate establishment. 3) Policies that benefit Muslims.

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<sup>52</sup> Charle L harper, *Exploring Social Change*, New Jersey: Prentice Perkaral, 1989. p.125-129.

<sup>53</sup> Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution*, New York: Random House, 1978.

Policies considered beneficial for Muslims are ranging from removal of repression against Muslims, advocacy for oppressed Muslims, *shari'a* enforcement, and change of the state system into the system of Khilafah. The first three policies are priorities in HTI's short-term interests. Second, organizations: the aspects in the structure of a group which directly affect its capacity to act in order to achieve its interests. In terms of organization, HTI can be considered to be growing more solid. There are some indications of this case: 1) affectivity and efficiency of the organization, which is visible in its neat work division, centrality of activities or policies, and differentiation of organization sections and activity themes; 2) members loyalty, which seemed greatly affect the intensity and qualities of collective actions and 3) inclusivity of organization in facilitating activities of the members by providing spaces in accordance with the tendency of each member. Members wishing to become thinkers of the ideological movements are directed to deal with handbooks and dissemination of thought, while members of the general educational background and are less familiar with Islamic doctrines are directed to pursue on practical missionary activities.

Third, mobilization: the process in which a group changed from a collection of passive individuals into active participants in public life. In terms of resource mobilization and control over coercive (weaponry, armed forces, or advanced technology), utilitarian (of goods, information services, money), HTI is still relatively weak.<sup>54</sup> HTI only has a normative resource (in the form of active participating cadre membership) and utilitarian (membership fees, one forma secretariat office, and publications with a circulation of only tens of thousands to hundreds of thousands of rupiahs). Mastery of these resources

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<sup>54</sup> HTI tidak punya tentara, satgas dan lain-lain seperti perkaranya dengan ormas-ormas besar Islam yang lain.

is relatively very small when compared to other major parties in Indonesia. In terms of how mobilization applied, HTI run more preparatory mobilization which only concentrate on the mobilization of resources to anticipate opportunities and threats in the future. The main forms of preparatory mobilization conducted by HTI are publishing activity, discussions and seminars, *tabligh akbar*, *silaturrahim* and dialogue with other Muslim groups, as well as meeting with government and political figures.<sup>55</sup> But in terms of means of identification, HTI can be classified as an organization with a mobilizing potential. HTI also has well defined rights of members to speak or act on behalf of the group, has a strong control on the areas of organization's activities, members' activities, and personal relationships of the members, and continues to develop ownership and control over key resources required.

Fourth, opportunities and threats: this is associated with other groups, including the government, who can easily accept new claims so that if the opponents make use of it well they will support the realization of their interests. While the threats are associated with other groups who filed claims that hinder the realization of the interests of opposing groups. In terms of opportunities and threats, HTI is currently enjoying a relatively wide space of freedom. Democratization is getting better and civil liberties have provided wide opportunities for HTI to rapidly grow and no longer be an underground movement. HTI also much benefited by the more melting claims of many secular groups which previously often

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<sup>55</sup>The activities of publishing, discussion, seminar, *tabligh akbar*, *silaturrahim*, dialogue with other Muslim groups, and meeting with government as well as political figures are routinely held in South Sulawesi. Interview with Dirwan Abdul Djalil, Public Relation HTI Sulselbar, 30 September 2013. *Tabligh akbar* at Andi Mattalatta square recently was attended by thousands of audience various areas in Sulselbar, ranging from children to elderly.

discredited radical Islamic groups. In addition, the multi-party system that spawned several Islamic political parties also participated in fertilizing the growth of HTI. But on the other hand, secular groups in the political arena, public apathy towards the idea of a Muslim Caliphate, and terrorism occurrences which discredited radical Muslim groups appear to be potential threats to the movement. With its main goal of regime and system replacement, HTI is actually very vulnerable toward repressive situation.

Fifth, collective action: this is conduct of people who act together to achieve common interests. According to Tilly, political system opponents can be classified four groups: zealots, misers, run-of-the mill contender), and opportunists. The level of repression from the rulers upon the first group will be lower compared to the second group and so forth. HTI is classified as a group of zealots. HT has a very high value on some collective policies (enforcement of *sharia*, Caliphate, and the interests of Muslims) and is willing to sacrifice its resources to achieve it. HTI also did not regret its involvement in the general election, even in the ideology of the movement; HT established that repression and violence must be faced with patience and firmness of the commitment to struggle through a line of thought. On the other hand, in terms of allocation of resources to achieve the goal, HTI is classified as opponent from the group of misers or, sometimes, of opportunists when compared to other radical Islamic groups such as FPI, MMI, Laskar Jihad, and others. It is classified to be that of the misers as HT does not want to sacrifice its moderate image acquired at this point of time to reveal its radical ideological struggle.

HTI in achieving the vision of struggle sometimes considered radical by means of revolution (politics). According

to Mustafa Rejai,<sup>56</sup> political revolution based on its target can be identified according to three types: civil revolution, national revolution, and the failing revolution. Meanwhile, according to its driving force, revolution can be distinguished into three types: revolution from below, a revolution from above, and a palace revolution. In the context of HTI, it was obvious that HTI is an organization that carries the ideas of revolutionary change, or in HTI's terms: *Taghyir*. In terms of the revolution targets to be achieved, HTI requires a civil revolution as well as national revolutions. Civil revolution intended by HTI is opposition towards tyrannical rulers in Muslim countries, disclosure of their crimes, changing the behavior of those who violate nation's rights and neglect their affairs or infringe the of Islam, and in the end, elimination their power and a replacement with a power based on Islamic law. As for the national revolution desired by HTI is of unveiling the conspiracy of colonialist countries dominating the Islamic countries; resistance to all forms of foreign occupation either in thought, politics, economics, or military, liberation of *ummah* from all forms of the influence of foreign powers, and ultimately, enforcement of Islamic rule in the international order.

Based on the driving forces of its revolutionary change, HTI aspires to form a revolution from below. HTI believes that the motor alteration is the community, and success in bringing about revolutionary change is significantly dependent on the community. in this regard, HTI continues to build communities to support and take its ideas. HT continues to develop a mass movement slowly with hopes of one day it is going to explode into a major upheaval leading to political and far-reaching social changes.

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<sup>56</sup> Mustafa Rejai, *The Comparative Study of Revolutionary Strategy*, New York: Anchor Press, 1977. p.117

## Identification of Movement and Pattern of Articulation of Interest

### Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS)

As a social movement organization, PKS is very actively involved in the production of meaning and in the process of framing of what is happening on the condition of Indonesian Muslims in particular, and on the dominance of the West on the world governance at large. An important component in PKS' frame shaping is accusation of Western liberalism as the source of problems which lead to moral decadence, economic injustice, and political degradation. PKS activists specifically declare secularism as the root of Western values which destroy the principles Muslim live. Liberalism and secularism therefore make the biggest challenge for Muslims worldwide in the practice of universal Islamic values.

In addition to constructing process of Islamic framing as a solution for individual transformation and State Islamization through formal political participation, PKS also offers a solution package through two patterns of Islamization.<sup>57</sup> First, cultural Islamization of individuals and groups through missionary medium and cultural institutions to strengthen the cultural and intellectual basis of the *ummah*. The essential argument is that the process of cultural imperialism through secularism has destroyed Muslim perspective, so it is necessary to have cultural Islamization in order to return to the path of reference determined by sources of Islam (*al-riju' ila al-Qur'an wa al-Hadith*). Islam should be taken in universal, total, and comprehensive manners encompassing way of life without any separation between *al-din wa al-Dawla* (religion and state). In other words, PKS perceives Islam as a complete corpus of rules and guidelines which provides guidance for both spiritual and

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<sup>57</sup> MPP PKS, *Platform*, 2007. p. 48

worldly necessities. The conception is coupled with the belief that Islam is universal. This universality of Islam is then planted as the spiritual and moral basis for the development of Indonesia. The cultural Islamization is performed by gradual and phased manner, and it takes a long process to accomplish.<sup>58</sup>

The second type of PKS' prognostic framing is a structural Islamization approach.<sup>59</sup> Some prominent PKS figures admit that the primary purpose is the establishment of "a State with an Islamic Law based."<sup>60</sup> For this target, systematic structural strategies are needed to realize the formalization of law or Islamic values through the instrument of the State. As stated in the PKS paradigm, this structural pattern takes the form of formal political participation aimed to restructure policies and state institutions in order to implement Islamic law (*sharia*) in the community.<sup>61</sup> The main argument is that Islam must play a key role in the state, and *sharia* is an inherent part of Indonesian society which should be presented formally in the law.<sup>62</sup>

For PKS, however, the implementation of Islamic values and Islamic law in the State is the final stage of an ongoing process of Islamization, ranging from that of individuals, families, neighbors, and communities.<sup>63</sup> In order to sharpen the structural Islamization strategy, PKS is open to work with the existing political system. This is the main

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<sup>58</sup> Burhanuddin Muhtadi dalam wawancaranya dengan Aan Rohana, Jakarta 4 Oktober 2013

<sup>59</sup> MPP PKS, *Platform*, 2007. p. 50

<sup>60</sup> Di antaranya adalah wawancara dengan mantan Presiden PKS, Tifatul Sembiring, "The PKS dan Shari'a Law", *The Jakarta Post*, 8 Februari 2006. Dalam Burhanuddin Muhtadi, *Dilema PKS*....p.169.

<sup>61</sup> MPP PKS Platform, 2007. p.50

<sup>62</sup> Di antaranya adalah wawancara dengan mantan Presiden PKS, Tifatul Sembiring, "The PKS dan Shari'a Law", *The Jakarta Post*, 8 Februari 2006.

<sup>63</sup> MPP PKS, *Platform*, 2007. p.35



distinction of this party from the more radical Islamist movements in Indonesia such as Hizb ut-Tahrir which rejects democracy since its inception. Rumadi calls PKS "parliamentary Islamist" for its willingness to work in the system of procedural democracy mechanism. However, PKS did not want to blindly carry out the Islamization by ignoring structural plurality of the nation. The options for PKS is not an Islamic state implementation of *sharia* nor a secular state which rejects *sharia*, but the state of Indonesia with realization of religious teachings and presentation of noble and universal humanity values.<sup>64</sup>

In intensifying ideological programs, PKS offers motivational framing through a massive and organized program called *dakwah ila Allah*, which means "call to God."<sup>65</sup> Since PKS seeks individual and structural changes, the party tries to revive the aforementioned missionary concept for different purposes. First, the call is also directed to conduct re-islamization of the *abangan* Muslims. Second, PKS introduces a new content in the missionary materials which emphasizes interpretation of Islam not only as a moral and personal codes, but also as a universal life manual package for guidance in living in this world and the Hereafter, and which also offers social, political, economic and cultural prescriptions as well as provides guidelines in the transformation process of confidence of individuals, community organizations, and the State.<sup>66</sup>

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<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*, p.50

<sup>65</sup> For PKS, politics is a skill to express tolerant attitudes to achieve consensus. Therefore it is necessary to apply the approach of purification of political meaning with a universal touch unifying nation with the elites in a balanced point to produce a redefinition concerning state and politics in a diametrical context and content. See Tamsil Linrung, *Politik untuk Kemanusiaan; Mainstream Baru Gerakan Politik Indonesia*, Tali Foundation, 2013, in "Introduction," p. ix

<sup>66</sup> Majelis Pertimbangan Partai (MPP) PKS, *Filsafat dasar Perjuangan PKS*, n.p., n.p., 2007.

For that reason, PKS distinguishes the missionary phases which include activities and objects into four stages called the orbit of propagation (*mahawir*).<sup>67</sup> Each achievement of one orbit serves as a prelude to the next stage of propagation. Thus, this *mihwar da'wah* is not understood as separate stages of missionary, but rather it is a continuous procedure. For PKS, a change from one *mihwar* to another *mihwar* at the next level is a sort of extension from the stage of devotion and leadership process. The first orbit is *mihwar tanzihimi*, which focuses on the consolidation and development of cadres.<sup>68</sup> In the essence, the change must start from the PKS's ability to build internal strength, both the infrastructure and the superstructure of the missionary. The second is *mihwar sya'bi* (society orbit) wherein missionary activities began pouring its energy for the benefit of general public through the motions of *amar ma'ruf nahi munkar* through the instrument of social organization.<sup>69</sup> At this point, the growth of Islamic social institutions which have formal or informal relationship with PKS known as *wajibah*, such as school, hospital, charitable institutions, and others becomes a social institutional factor which facilitates the relationship between the party and the community. According to PKS, *mihwar sya'bi* provides many incentives for cadres and the party's social institutional structures. Such as, first, the establishment of the NGO propaganda provides an opportunity to interact with diverse interests of the community. Second, leaders and cadres of the party will be better known by public. Third, there is opportunity to attract figures from the outside to join the party. Fourth, *da'wah* institutions emerged as an effective pressure group. Fifth, professional management of missionary

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<sup>67</sup> Aminuddin, *Bingkai Dakwah*, 2008, 1-5; MPP PKS, *platform*, 2007. Dalam Burhanuddin Muhtadi, *Dilema PKS*....p. 163.

<sup>68</sup> MPP PKS, *Platform*, 2007, 30.

<sup>69</sup> MPP PKS, *Platform*, 2007, 31.

organizations should optimize the role of institutions and missionary cadres.<sup>70</sup> This missionary phase allows PKS to penetrate the society to increase electoral support base. The missionary media is no longer centered in mosques as performed by the *tarbiyah* group during the authoritarian regime, but it has expanded into a broader realm along with changes in the political structure which becomes more democratic.

The third stage is *mihwar muasasi* (institutionalization orbit), wherein PKS cadres starts to appear and enters into social and political institutions including parliament, bureaucratic, and professional associations.<sup>71</sup> The primary mission of the party cadres while in this phase is to perform vertical mobility and penetration into public institutions by way of affecting, interpreting, and formulating concepts and values of Islam into public policies produced by the political institutions. This stage is divided into two sectors: propaganda in the parliament and in the bureaucracy. Parliamentary propagation is the official podium of the state which provides a forum for the cadres to carry out constitutional struggle for the implementation of Islamic values through legislation (*taqnin*), supervision (*hisbah*), and public statements (*tabligh*). The bureaucracy propaganda is the executive media to conduct efforts to translate, influence, formulate, and implement policies with reference to Islamic values.<sup>72</sup> The expansion of *mihwar muasasi* was more obvious when in the 2004 election PKS managed to increase its vote up to 600 %, from 1.3 % in 1999 to 7.4 %. Dozens of cadres entered the House of

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<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 32

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 32-33.

Representatives at the national level, not to mention those successfully elected at province and district levels.<sup>73</sup>

The fourth stage is *mihwar daulah* (State Orbit), which aims to achieve power democratically and to establish Islamic law comprehensively.<sup>74</sup> This *mihwar daulah* bears a resemblance to direct and total management of the state institutions by PKS. If in the institution orbit (*mihwar muasasi*) the interaction of PKS cadres in bureaucracy and parliament sectors is still carried out on individual and partial basis, in the State Orbit interaction is performed in a totality.<sup>75</sup> But the constitution, manifesto, and platform of the party do not clearly describe the final stage of the missionary. This case is made so to reduce public suspicion towards the party's agenda and ideological ideals to change the basis of the Indonesian state.

Seeing the development of PKS so far, the tendency of post-Islamism is evident from the political behavior of the party, which is focused more on the agenda of substantiation of Islamic values. Moreover, politically and socially PKS has not been successfully managed to establish a dominant force, as indicated by its failure to reach the target of 20 % votes in the 2009 election. Having passed three orbits (*mihwar tanzhimi*, *sya'bi*, and *muasasi*) makes it possible for the party to not over-exposing hidden agenda related to public presumption about to establishment of an Islamic state. However, the existence of *mihwar daulah* makes it difficult for PKS avoid the impression that the party is still keeping political ideals to establish an Islamic State. PKS does look more patient and keen in carrying

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<sup>73</sup> Burhanuddin Muhtadi, *Dilema PKS...*p. 171

<sup>74</sup> Burhanuddin Muhtadi, quoted from Rumadi, "Gerakan Islamis Kontemporer di Indonesia", a paper presented in Diskusi Lesehan Kalyanamitra with the theme "Menguatnya Fundamentalisme Agama: Ancaman bagi Pemenuhan hak Azasi Perempuan dan Demokrasi di Indonesia", 20 Juli 2010.

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*, p.35

out the missionary stages. The four stages above are implemented gradually through a bottom-up line. This is called "tadarruj" (gradualism), which is a series of preparatory steps towards a prognosis package or prescription of solution called the Islamization of Indonesia which springs from the formalization of *sharia* into the constitution. The founder of the Ikhwanul Muslimin, Hassan al-Banna, states:<sup>76</sup> we begin (missionary movement) from individual, family, neighborhood or local community, and then the wider community. When the people themselves have embraced Islam as principle, then it is only a matter of time before the Islamic *sharia* is able to be expand (its implementation) to the realm of the State.<sup>77</sup>

These four steps above can be divided into two major strategies, namely cultural strategy or horizontal mobilization (*ta'biyah al-afaqiyah*) and structural strategies or vertical mobilization (*ta'biyah al-amudiyah*). Horizontal mobilization summarizes *mibwar tazhimi* and *ya'bi*. This is the stage that necessitates PKS cadres to do the internalization of propaganda and penetration through dissemination of propaganda cadres to various levels of society in order to receive *manhaj* of Islam and Islamic policy products. On the other hand the vertical mobilization consists of *mibwar muasasi* and *daulah*. These two orbits necessitate deployment of cadres in executive, legislative, and judicative institutions through the mechanism of political parties and professional cadres.

After its National Conference in Bali confirming the status of the party as an open party, PKS as an Islamic party started to include some non-Muslim representatives in the eastern parts of Indonesia. PKS also held its second National Conference at Ritz-Carlton attended by inviting some

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<sup>76</sup> Burhanuddin Muhtadi, *Dilema PKS*...p. 177

<sup>77</sup> Burhanuddin Muhtadi mengutip dari Wickham, *Mobilising Islam*, 2002. In *Ibid*.

ambassadors, including the ambassador of the United States, to engage in a dialogue about Islam. As stated in article 5 of the association's creed, the mission of PKS is realization of a just and prosperous civil society and which God approves in the frame of a Union State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI). Civil society is a society which is highly civilized and advanced on the basis of values, norms, laws, and moral sustained by faith, respect plurality, be open and democratic, and worked together to safeguard the sovereignty of the State.<sup>78</sup>

PKS aims to establish a civil society based on Islam (a religious-based civil society), which allows for people of faith to present *rahmatan lil alamin*. PKS proposes the idea of realization of Islamic values through ideology transformation from personal-objective region into public-objective realm. The vision, mission, as well as purpose and function of PKS are as follows:

The party's vision is to be the vanguard party in realizing the national ideals of Indonesia as referred to in the opening to the constitution of the Republic State of Indonesia 1945. The mission is to make the party serves as a means of realization of just, prosperous, and dignified civil society with the blessing of God, in the unity of the Republic of Indonesia.

The purpose of this party is the fulfillment of the political rights, obligations, and responsibilities of each member as a citizen in the life of the nation. The function of the party are: 1) as a vehicle for work in organizing political education; 2) to fight for and defend the political interests of the community, the nation and the state; and 3) maintain the integrity of the Unitary Republic of Indonesia.<sup>79</sup>

In general, the purposes of political parties according to Law no. 2 of 2008 are as follows:

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<sup>78</sup> AD-ART PKS (Perubahan, 2013), p. 6

<sup>79</sup> AD-ART PKS (Perubahan, 2013), p. 6

1. To embody the national ideals of Indonesia as referred to in the Opening to the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia Year 1945.
2. To preserve and maintain the integrity of the Unitary Republic of Indonesia.
3. To develop democracy based on Pancasila by upholding the sovereignty of the nation in the Republic of Indonesia.
4. To establish welfare for the entire people of Indonesia
5. To increase political participation of the members and the public in the course of the political activities and government.
6. Fight for the ideals of political parties in the society, nation and the state.
7. To build ethics and political culture in the life of society, nation, and the state.<sup>80</sup>

In the case of the 2013 election for the mayor of Makassar city recently, the main programs proposed by the pair of candidates from PKS are as follows:

1. Quick Response
2. One-stop service
3. Transparency of Information
4. Mayor listens
5. Makassar Cyber Net
6. Optimizing Government officials

Of the seven main programs above clearly illustrates that the PKS couple in Makassar municipal elections fairly provide an overview of concepts related to good governance. Although substantially in reality, such an Islamic party concept is not significantly different from those proposed by the 'nationalist-secular' parties. This phenomenon has a direct effect in terms of PKS votes in the general election.

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<sup>80</sup> UU Partai Politik No. 2/2008

Therefore, in the case of South Sulawesi, there are some interesting points to be explored relating to public response to the political parties, especially the Islamic parties. Observing the situation can rise a question concerning why Muslim voters tend to vote for the nationalist party rather than Islamic parties. There are at least three answers to this concern: First, the nationalist parties are successful to shift the paradigm of positioning from the parties of originally branded less friendly to the agendas of Muslim religious-political to become more accepting of people's aspirations. This point is reflected in such case as support of Golkar and Democratic parties on National Education and the Anti-Pornography propositions, which becomes "an electoral political investment" of the nationalist parties in winning voters sympathy.

Second, in addition to playing on symbolic religious issues, Islamic parties, including PKS, needs to prepare electoral strategies to win the sympathy of the increasingly rationalistic Muslim voters. The majority of Muslim voters are now more interested in non-religious issues, especially those of economics, rather than religious issues. In contrast, Islamic parties are considered less concerned about economic issues and are too busy arguing over symbolic issues.

In the end, if the Islamic parties, including PKS, want to win and be trusted by the society, they need to explore and offer more measurable welfare programs, and no longer rely solely on rhetoric reinforcing religious sentiment. This makes an important subject since Islamic parties, including PKS, have been mistakenly pictured as failing to carry out programs for the benefit of the society.

Hizbu Tahrir Indonesia (HTI)

Tony Fitzpatrick illustrates that the political life now refers to two opposing but mutually reinforcing processes, the process directing to the center (centripetal process) and the



process directing to the edge (centrifugal process). In the context of the opposition, Fitzpatrick sees the first process as leading opposition to the government's power in relation to the demands and interests of the people. The second process is a novel of political opposition which is more characterized by the tendency of individuals to mobilize around a single issue rather than by merging themselves or participating in political parties. According to Fitzpatrick, parliamentary opposition interprets politics as a struggle to control the board members. Meanwhile, extra-political movements interpret politics as an aesthetic, a counter culture. The first still apply the terms state crisis and state bankruptcy, whereas the second is much more reinforcing different views from the left and right spectrums.<sup>81</sup>

HTI is regarded as an extra-parliamentary movement as its political activities lead to the community (centrifugal process), revolving around a single issue and interpreting politics as a counter culture, as in Tony Fitzpatrick's description of the extra-parliamentary opposition above. This is evident from the outpouring of HTI concentration on community development rather than engagement in general election, the mobilization around a single issue such as the obligation of Muslims to establish a Khilafah State, and the interpretation of politics as of noble and obligatory activities, opposing the notion contemporary Muslims who view politics as dirty and therefore should be avoided.

Regarding HT's political activities, one should first listen to the statement of Philo C. Wasburn,<sup>82</sup> who sorts political activities into two types: routine and non-routine.

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<sup>81</sup> See Tony Fitzpatrick, "Seeming Contradiction: Parliamentary and Extra-parliamentary Politics of Opposition," <http://www.psa.ac.uk/cps/1995>. dalam *Fenomena Gerakan Politik Islam Ekstra parlementer: Hizbu tabrir Indonesia*, DIALOG: Jurnal Penelitian dan Kajian Keagamaan. 3<sup>rd</sup> ed, 2005. p. 39

<sup>82</sup> Philo C. Wasburn, *Political Sociology: Approaches, Concepts and Hypotheses*. New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1982. p.125

Political activities in a social system express confidence in the power structure legitimacy and authority within the existing social system. On the other hand, the non-routine political activities express belief that there is something wrong in the existing political structure and socio-economic conditions, and or in the policy, and or within the officials themselves as well as in their behavior. These activities aim to make changes by undervaluing the significance of political activity routines as they do not bring many changes in the political and socio-economic significance. This is sometimes regarded as an expression of social protest, but many times it is also regarded as criminality or rebellion, depending on the shape of the given public reactions.

HTI's political activities can be categorized as non-routine political activities because it is expressing not only disappointment but also opposition to the system as well as desire to replace it. HTI does not only down value the significance of participating in routine political activities but also makes efforts to delegitimation of the systems, policies, and government. Such collective actions are very vulnerable as they can be easily regarded as criminality or rebellion. However, the ability of HTI to deliver a political message without leaving much fundamentalist impression keeps the community and the state from responding with sharp reaction to confront the position of this group.

In terms of political activity and thought to disseminate its ideas and attitudes, HTI implement political actions and struggles as its method of movement. These actions may take forms in demonstration, sending delegations to various embassies, and hearings to certain state agencies. The demonstrations are usually held simultaneously in various cities in Indonesia.

Furthermore, in addition to publishing and political actions, HTI also hold a variety of discussions, studies, and meetings into the main concentrations of its members. The purposes of these activities are to foster community in general as well to attract prospective members. These activities can be divided into two patterns: 1) activities organized by a committee and are the organization's programs, which are centrally coordinated and involved in the mobilization of all members; 2) activities initiated by the members and only involve voluntary participation.

HTI's first main media used to disseminate ideas and movements is the Friday Bulletin *al-Islam*. This bulletin was first published 1994 and has been distributed every Friday in the major cities and municipalities in Indonesia. Besides distributed in print, the whole issue of this bulletin is also accessible on the website [www.al-islam.or.id](http://www.al-islam.or.id). The second major media in HTI's movement is a monthly magazine *Al-Wa'ie*: "Political and Missionary media to Build Awareness of Ummah", published since September 2000.<sup>83</sup> The third media is publishing handbooks. There are 23 books published as members' handbooks which should be studied. Three books which must be completed prior to membership are *Nizam al-Islam* (the rules of life in Islam); *Mafaheem Hizb al-Tahrir* (the basic reasoning of the Hizb Tahrir), *Al-Takattul al-Hizbi* (formation of political parties).<sup>84</sup> These handbooks serve as reference of themes and arguments in a variety of written views, statements, and attitudes of HTI.

HTI also spread its ideas and attitudes through booklets (brochures), leaflets (flyers), and press releases. The

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<sup>83</sup> Kurniawan Abdullah, "Fenomena Gerakan Politik Islam Ekstra parlementer: Hizbu Tahrir Indonesia," in *DLALOG: Jurnal Penelitian dan Kajian Keagamaan*. 3<sup>rd</sup> ed, 2005. p. 39

<sup>84</sup> See [www.al-islam.or.id](http://www.al-islam.or.id) and [www.hizbu-tahrir.or.id](http://www.hizbu-tahrir.or.id)

booklets contain HTI's main idea packed in a book and distributed for free to public and members. The leaflets contain HTI's official attitudes in responding to various issues related to Islam and the Muslims in the national and international arenas. The press releases contain HTI's statements on various cases both of national and international events, especially relating to Islam and the Muslims.

In addition to utilizing print media, HTI also use electronic media in disseminating movements. The website *al-islam.or.id* is HTI's site, which has been operating since 2000. The main function of this site is featuring the writings in the bulletin *al-Islam* and various leaflets issued by the Indonesian HT, HT in other regions, and HT center. In addition, the site also displays current news related to Islam and the Muslims. In March 2004, HTI launched a second website, *Hizb-tahrir.or.id*. The second site appears to be managed more seriously and includes several major rubrics in addition to featuring the writings from the bulletin *Al-Islam* and the magazine *Al-Wa'ie*.

Other sorts of activities supporting the transformation efforts of HTI thought are such as the activities in the intellectual environment in forms of seminars, and general public activities which usually take forms in *Tabligh Akbar*, book review, or other fluid and open activities. In general, HTI activities can be divided as follows: the interactive dialogue on the radio, public discussions, regular assessments, training, forums of *silaturrahim*, proselytizing tour, and *Tabligh Akbar*. In most of these activities, there is a separation between men and women.

Public discussions are HTI's most widely held activities. The names and forms the forums are varied: conferences, seminars, interactive dialogue, discussion series, Muslim chat, book/magazine review, and others. HTI held regular review is intended for further introducing its ideas to

those who are already interested in this organization. The themes covered are usually already focused on the core ideas of HTI, for example "Change Method to Establishing Islamic Society."

*Tablig Akbar* is more often applied as a political machine implemented to mobilize mass supports for HTI. Participants who attend usually numbered in hundreds to thousands, and therefore, the locations used are such as open fields, Sports buildings, or courts of mosques. The theme is usually the main idea of HTI, particularly related to the importance of an Islamic state and Muslim unity. The *Tablig Akbar* also sometimes makes use of public figures as an appealing way to attract larger masses

The presence of this sort of political Islam cannot be separated from the conditions of crisis befalling Muslims, both the crisis of religious significance and of structural crisis (political and socio-economic). The crisis of religious significance among Muslims is prompted by the encounter of Islam with modernity. The crisis has lasted since the 18th century as a result of demolition carried out by the West through science and technology developments. Superior and Modern Western civilization has dragged Islam into an unequal battle wherein Muslims are weak not only in terms of civilization but also in the aspect of politics and military.<sup>85</sup> As a result, Muslims are also experiencing a structural crisis leading to acceptance of the nation-state institutions in most of the Muslim regions.

The acceptance of the nation state occurred when a group of Western-educated elites who appeared to be more

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<sup>85</sup> See Tibi, *Islam*, 1, 21-22, 54; Howard M. Federspiel, *Islam and Ideology in the Emerging of Indonesian State* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 2001), p. 18; Ahmad S. Mousalli, *The Islamic Quest for Democracy, Pluralism, and Human Rights* (Florida: University Press of Florida, 2001), pp. 41-43.

skillful in directing anti-colonial struggles assured that secular ideologies of socialism and nationalism were more promising. This situation forced the ideologies of Islamic revivalism to step aside.<sup>86</sup> In addition, the reception was also a result of negotiations under conditions in which Muslims were forced to postpone their larger national interests.<sup>87</sup> After the defeat of secular regimes in the Arab world on the "Six Day War" in 1967, followed later by the Iranian revolution in 1979, the trend in the Muslim world was re-colored by the appeal of Islamic solution (*ball al-Islam*). This appeal was a response to the failure of the nation-state in handing out welfare which was promised during its setting period. In the appeal, it was affirmed the entire Muslims - 1,3 billion people living within 55 nation states – is a unity and to live under an Islamic political order.<sup>88</sup>

The appeal of the Islamic order became more pervasive when Muslim countries were in crisis. These circumstances result in easy penetrate into Muslims' thinking because, as stated by Bassam Tibi, secularization in the Muslim world was only to the extent of functional differentiation of the existing social system and the redefinition of religious teachings to fit with changes, so there has not been any fundamental theological reform. In a situation wherein secular ideologies are taken as imported solutions of this, the articulation of political will on the basis of religion is increasingly gaining sympathy. World de-westernization ideas contained in the appeal also present a continuous threat of crisis to the legitimacy of secular ideologies. Furthermore, in the fight for its ideals, Hizb ut-

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<sup>86</sup> Tibi, *Islam...*, p. 55

<sup>87</sup> See Fiedersipel, *Islam and Ideology*, p. 52, 73-74; Bahtiar Effendy, "Islam sebagai Kekuatan Ideologi Politik" in *Islam dan Partaisipasi Demokrasi*, kompilasi materi diskusi seri III (Wisata Internasional Hotel Jakarta: Ikatan Remaja Muhammadiyah, 24 Mei 2000), p. 62.

<sup>88</sup> Tibi, *Islam...*, p. 54.

Tahrir has three stages of propaganda and political activities, which later became major movements in the struggle:

Phase of *tatsqif* (coaching and cadre), is a stage of movement formation, in which seeds of movement are found and the first *halqah* is formed upon understanding the concepts and methods of propagation of the Hizb. The first *halqah* then individually make contact with community members to offer the missionary concepts and methods the Hizb.

Anyone who accepts HTT's *fikrah* (Ideology) is directly invited to continuously follow guidance in HTT's *halqah*, until they blend with the ideas of Islam and its laws. The intention is to provide them with Islamic personality, mindset, and outlook, so that in making each decision they refer to the benchmark of Islam, namely *halal* and *haram*.

HT is characterized with an Islamic soul pattern, so its tendency is to always follow Islam wherever it exists, and to determine its steps on the basis of Islam. They are pleased with everything that God and His Apostle approve, they hate anything that causes the wrath of Allah and His messenger, and they will moved into the center to carry out missionary upon people after they fused with Islam.

Phase of *tafa'ul* (interact), is the stage to interact with the public, so that people also assume the obligation to implement Islam and take it as a major issue in their life. This is the way to raise awareness and to shape public opinion on the ideas and laws of Islam, in order that that they take the ideas and laws as their thoughts and their stand in the midst of life, and they will walk side by side with HT in their efforts to practice Islam in all aspects of life, to appoint a Caliph to sustain Islamic life and to carry out the message of Islam all over the world.

At this stage, Hizb ut-Tahrir turns to convey missionary to general public collectively. Activities performed at this stage are such as the following:

1. *Tsaqafah Murakkaḥah* (intensive) coaching through Hizb's *halqahs* for its followers in order to establish the framework and to multiply followers of the movement as well as to realize Islamic individuality, who are able to bear the task of preaching and are ready to navigate the ocean of trial with the upheaval of thought.
2. *Jamaiyyah Tsaqafah*, coaching for people by conveying the ideas and laws of Islam openly to the general public. This activity can be performed through religious circles in mosques and in other public meeting places. It can also be conducted through the mass media, books, or leaflets.
3. *Shiraul Fikri* (upheaval of thought) to oppose the ideology, rules, and ideas of the *kufri*, in addition to opposing faulty *aqeedah*, misguided ideas, and ambiguous understanding. This activity is conducted by way of explaining falsehood and the fallacy of such ideas from the point of Islam in order to purify and save the society from such misguided ideas and from their negative effects.
4. *Kifaahus Siyasi* (political struggle) which covers activities:
  - a. Struggle against all forms of colonialism and reveal their design strategies.
  - b. Resistance against the rulers in the Arab countries and other Islamic countries, unveil their crime plan, and throw criticism as well as advice upon them.
5. Setting benefits for the *ummah*, that is by providing service and management for all the affairs of the *ummah*.<sup>89</sup>

The phase of *Istilamu al-Hukmi* (acceptance of power), that is to implement Islam in concrete, easy, and thorough manners as well as to spread the message of Islam throughout

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<sup>89</sup> Taqiy al-nabhani, *Mengenal Hizbut Tabrir: Partai Politik Islam Ideologis*, translated by Abu Afif and Nurkhalish, (Depok: Pustaka Thariqul Izzah, 1992), pp. 43-47.



the world. The Prophet's missionary method shows that to establish Islam thoroughly, there must be an absolute force to carry it out. That is the power of government. Therefore, one of the Prophet's stages of missionary is receiving power (*istilam al-bukem*). In every season of pilgrimage a lot of people came to Makkah from Madinah. Among these are 75 leaders of the tribes in Medina who had embraced Islam. In Mecca they gave words with the Aqabah II for allegiance to the Prophet. Before allegiance was held, the Prophet Muhammad conveyed to them: "I ask your pledge to defend me as if defending your own wives and children." This event reflected a process of power acceptance by the Prophet from the power of the Medina community represented by their leaders.

At this stage of the Hizb-use way *Thalabun nusrah* (ask for help) from people who have the power or influence. This was done for two purposes:

1. *Himayah* purpose is intended to seek defense of HT and its members so that they can keep carrying out missionary safely.
2. As intermediaries to gain power by establishing Khilafah and deploying an Islamic legal system.<sup>90</sup>

The missionary method adopted by HT in calling to the true path is the method of the Prophet which is derived from *Siroh Nabawi*. However, many parties views that the missionary method implemented by Hizb ut-Tahrir is still very inflexible and therefore needs some adjustments to fit with current realities so that people are more willingly accepting Islam itself.

In general, as already explained above, the political stages / steps of both PKS and HTI in achieving their ideals are summarized in the table below:

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<sup>90</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 79

<b>PARTAI KEADILAN SEJAHTERA (PKS)</b>	<b>HIZBU TAHRIR INDONESIA (HTI)</b>
1. <i>Mibwar Tanzhimi</i> (coaching cadre)	1. <i>Stage of Tatsqif</i> (coaching)
2. <i>Mibwar Sya'bi</i> (society orbit)	2. <i>Stage of Tafa'ul</i> (Interaction)
3. <i>Mibwar Muasasi</i> (Institutional orbit)	3. <i>Stage of Istilamul Hukmi</i> (power take over)
4. <i>Mibwar Daulah</i> (state orbit)	
<b>Islamic State</b>	<b>Islamic State</b>

From the above scheme it is clearly illustrates that the two Islamic movements, in spite of their different political regions, share the same ultimate goal namely Islamic state / caliphate. They also believe that politics is a mechanism to be used to reach the safety of human life in this world and in the hereafter. Politics encourages people to work together to meet their basic needs and defend themselves, both against threats coming from outside and the hostilities occurring within the community itself. PKS and HTI also play in it in terms of regulating the human race in order to achieve a prosperous society in accordance with the methods and ideology of their own.

From the author's view, the struggle for *sharia* enforcement performed by both PKS and HTI cannot be taken as an indicating that they impede democracy. Indeed according to the author the struggle for *sharia* enforcement substantially intensifies the run of democracy. *Sharia* has become people's choice of solution for the crisis encountering. Democratic transition at the beginning of the 2000s was characterized by

various issues. The most prominent is the inability of the state to ensure security, public order, and the rule of law. On the one hand, the state security apparatus undergo delegitimation and disability due to history loads from the New Order as well as the internal institutional reform demands of the police force and the military. On the other, social groups enjoy the euphoria of freedom of expression, association, and thinking. Space of freedom becomes an arena of expression for various groups with respective standard of morality. As a result, conflicts and social tensions often occur and sometimes lead to mass anarchism.

In the midst of these conditions, *sharia* becomes an alternative, especially in Muslim-majority areas such as Cianjur, Bulukumba, Madura, Padang, and in some other districts/cities in South Sulawesi. This alternation is not in substitution of formal-legalistic sense, but rather a discursive construction as the new reference standard of morality and social order. It is phrased discursive construction because the real *sharia* movement is partial and superficial, and it is partial as it tends to be quite restricted within the area of religious rituals, such as congregational prayer, reciting the Qur'an, and Islamic clothing. Problems related to poverty, education, corruption, tolerance, and social integration has not been touched, not to mention issues concerning man's relationship with nature and environment.

Therefore, *sharia* movement is still considered superficial, circling around the surface area. *Sharia* movement tends to be non long-term oriented in solving socio-economic problems of communities. It is still short-term results oriented with short time and measurable targets. In spite of various limitations, *sharia* discourse is at least capable of functioning as a collective morality bond, especially in the Muslim-majority regions. Under conditions of crisis, people need a value system

to hold on together. Crisis often lead to anomie in which the old system is no longer valid or delegitimized, whereas a new system for substitution has not been provided.

Rapid growth of *sharia* regulations occurs during the period of this anomie. It is in this context that the initiation of *sharia* becomes praiseworthy as it prevents greater risk of chaos due to the absence of moral value base to hold on together. This argument is strengthened by fact that the "golden" period of *sharia* s in these areas only lasted for 3-5 years before they lost charm and influence on society.

Sharia movements at the local level have also become a momentum of social as well as democratic consolidations. The discourse of *sharia* has attracted Islamic ideological groups to enter into the epicenter of the local democracy dynamic. These groups were previously excluded from political activism, and they comprise such groups as ex. Masjumi, Darul Islam, and other *sharia* ideology bearers. For four decades (1950-1990's) they experienced repressive military regimes and stigmatization.

During this period they were forced to be apolitical whereas in fact, establishment of substantive democracy requires active participations from all elements of society. In the context, *sharia* discourse becomes so magnetic and provides space for political participation of ideological Islamic groups. This development is of course very meaningful to the improvement of the quality of democracy in Indonesia.<sup>91</sup>

It is interesting to see that the consolidation and political participation of the ideological Islamic groups do not only occur within the golden period of *sharia* movement. For the case of Bulukumba district, for example, the golden period

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<sup>91</sup> Hakimul Ikhwan, "Gerakan Syariah dan Demokrasi," in *Kompas*, 26December 2011.

of *sharia* movement occurred in 2001-2006 under the Regent Patabai Pabokori. In that period, *sharia* movement was able to mobilize human and financial resources in large numbers. *Sharia* discourse colored government bureaucracy, education in general, teaching in schools, and even wedding celebration events in the society. After 2006, when the local power switched, *sharia* trend started fading. Financial support was thinning, and mobilization of *kiai* and *ustadz* was also coming to an end.

However, such situation did not suddenly depoliticize ideological Islamic groups. Consolidation of movement is maintained. Substantive participation in the policy making process remains consistently performed. If prior to the declaration of *sharia* movement they tended to withdraw from political activism, in present situation they are actively trying to influence the policy process. They did not enter the political power structure, but they have an effective medium for expressing political aspirations in the sense of local democracy.

Furthermore, the ideological Islamic groups, who formerly often performed street actions for their *amar ma'ruf nabi munkar* mission, are now beginning to adopt a more elegant method. Their moral movement is no longer violent, but peaceful and measurable. Physical violence is no longer the case, especially in dealing with immoral practices such as gambling and prostitution.

This condition is influenced by at least two features. First, internalization of Islamic values of peace and mercy upon all has settled. Second, democratic mechanism is believed to open up space for the possibility to realize the ideals of the struggle. Thus, *sharia* movement in many areas has contributed to build and strengthen democracy. Relationships do not happen in fights and negating each other. Instead, it should be

understood within the frame of complement upon each other in building a democratic system.

Review of the two case studies (PKS & HTI) above generally indicates four fairly steady shifts in Islamist ideology and activism which tend to be more manifested as a step of transition from a non-democratic context into a democratic context in Indonesia, including in South Sulawesi:

1. From the idea of an Islamic state establishment and *sharia* enforcement to Islamic values / sharia: In certain cases, the normalization of democratic perspective especially that of PKS showed a shift of the struggle of *sharia* (Islamist activism prerequisite) which requires new institutions (as a system or an Islamic state), to focus on *sharia* as a set of values or principles intended to be enacted through the existing political process. They are more likely to achieve these goals through political participation rather than revolution, this is a logical conclusion of a tactical decision; however, it can also have wide-ranging consequences as it could potentially change the ideological relationship and practical of Islamism with its historical purpose, the Islamic state. Specifically viewed from the stand point of the Islamists, Islamic State becomes a less important factor in the Islamization of society. Similarly, although HTI struggles to establish the Khilafah, in practical terms they are more likely to be soft in articulating their interests.

2. From Islamic Government to 'Good Governance': the term good governance has become the jargon of the two movements (PKS and HTI). The two case studies reflect gradual secularization of the policy agenda of the Islamists. This is not to assert that the Islamists abandon their religious agenda or adopt policies which are incompatible with their Islamic principles, as for them, clinging to the interpretation of Islam remains important. In these contexts, Islamists also become involved in, and are forced to respond to, a broad range of

issues in which 'Islam' says very little. Sometimes it is hard to show supporters what is Islamic regarding the way out offered by these movements. For example, this is reflected in their approaches to economic policy wherein there is a shift from the historically Islamism focus on social equality to a more neo-liberal approach. This shift serves as a substantive purpose in relation to Islamist efforts, not only to find a rational policy response to the real problems, but also to serve as a political goal in order to attract new followers.

3 . Greater diversity of members: the shift in the ideas and activism of the Islamist movements facilitates and reflects changes in the membership of the movement and the party. As socio-religious movements, Islamists groups typically restrict their membership to people who fit certain criteria - usually it requires a Muslim, or even a 'particular Muslim', embracing certain type of interpretation of Islam and has a certain role in public life. As a political party in a democratic context, the most important point is to expand the scope of membership, more specifically to attract talented people from all political circles. This trend then taken by many observers to judge that the Islamic movements, particularly PKS, are very pragmatic in certain conditions. Similarly, although HT is not as open as PKS, for the sake of development and to realize the vision and mission of the organization HT also must act "pragmatic" under certain conditions. For example, lack of firmness for prospective members to fit in their organization. Another example is lack of determination for members to participate or not participate in the elections.

4 . Oscillation rather than moderation: Seen from the surface, a review of the two cases above shows that PKS and HTI agreed to support the idea that greater democracy tends to smooth

Islamist movements to the center or even perform transparently.<sup>92</sup>

### **Conclusion**

With a strong Islamic identity, it comes naturally reasonable when Islamic symbols were highly correlated with their political identity. Political expression of Islam and political Islam in South Sulawesi has its own identity. The feature of Islamism operating on intra-and extra-parliamentary areas in South Sulawesi provide its own color in the constellation of local politics, both directly and indirectly. PKS and some other Islamic parties such as the PPP and UN, which prefer entering the structural power, also provide their own color in the activism of fighting for the values of Islam. On the other hand, KPPSI and some other extra-parliamentary forces of Islamic movement in the region also accommodate with its own color in the activism of fighting for Islamic law. This is different from the case of Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia, which is likely to be consistent with its concept of Khilafah that it appears contra to the model of democracy existing currently.

At least the movement pattern of Islamism in South Sulawesi tends to the direction of post-Islamism, which is a more modern movement. It means that most of the existing movements tend to be more accommodating to the ruler or government, except for HTI, which is more consistent their political base and vision compared to other ideological movements in South Sulawesi. Even so, HTI still occupies an area of criticism as it is regarded to be enjoying the existing democracy system. The logic is that HTI would never survive

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<sup>92</sup> Some parts of this conclusion agree with that of Greg Fealy dan Anthony Bubalo. See Anthony Bubalo, Greg Fealy & Whit Mason. 2012. *Zealous Democrats: Islamism and Democracy in Egypt, Indonesia and Turkey*. Translated by Syamsu Rijal, *PKS dan Kembarannya; Bergiat jadi demokrat di Indonesia, Mesir dan Turki*. Jakarta, Komunitas Bambu. p..5



with its current existence if they did not “negotiate” with the state. This tendency of sifting feature from Islamism to post-Islamism is more or less influenced by three sources of influence and main challenges, namely the political system existing in Indonesia, the emergence of critical secular groups, and the factor of geo-politics.

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